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Abstract 
My thesis concerns Plato's theory of human motivation and action in the Republic. My 
aim is to try to investigate how and to what extend the tripartite division of the soul into 
reason, appetite and spirit explains human action and behaviour. 
I shall concentrate mostly on the appetitive part of the soul and discuss how and in which 
cases this part affects the character and the dispositions of human beings. 
In my first part (ch.1-2) I investigate the nature of this part of the soul arguing that it is 
totally deprived of any kind of cognition and incapable of motivating actions on its own 
without the involvement of reason. 
In my second part (ch.3-5) I present an analysis of the story of Leontius in R. IV which 
illustrates an instance of human behaviour that seems to suggest that the desires of the 
appetitive part can motivate action despite reason's resistance. Then I discuss the role that 
Plato attributes to appetite in his description of unjust souls and the way that the 
appetitive part is related to reason in the soul of the non-virtuous person. Finally through 
my discussion of the ideal soul of the philosopher I sketch the minimal role that the 
desiring part has in human motivation and ethical perfection. 
In the last part (ch.6) I provide a brief account of the so-called 'Socratic' thesis of human 
motivation as it appears in the Protagoras. My point is that despite some apparent 
differences the two theories have a substantial similarity. 
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Introduction 
On one theory of human motivation the agent's conception of what is good for 
him is sufficient to motivate action. This motivation involves desire for what is good as 
well as belief about what is good or beneficial for the agent. This theory is often labelled 
as 'intellectualism' and is attributed to Socrates in a number of Platonic dialogues such as 
the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Meno, the Lysis, the Symposium and the Euthydemus. 
The important feature that underlines this theory of human motivation is that action 
cannot be motivated unless the agent judges that a certain course of action is the best 
available option in the circumstances. Thus, all our desires are rational in the sense of 
being desires for what the agent believes best. At the same time wrongdoing is not 
explained by reference to the strength of another desire that goes against what the agent 
believes it best to do. Any failure of the agent to act on his best judgement at the time of 
the action is explained by an intellectual error; he simply did not know what the best 
thing to do was. Against this view many modem philosophers like Kant or Hume would 
protest, suggesting that it is a brute fact of human nature that we sometimes act or we are 
motivated to act against what we believe or even know to be best. It is a human fact 
because there are irrational desires that can operate independently of our reasoning 
capacities and can motivate us to take a certain course of action without any 
consideration about the goodness or the badness of the action or the object of our desire. 
Plato himself seems also to disagree with the view that is presented in these 
dialogues and in the Republic he is trying to develop a more complex and elaborated 
theory of human action and motivation according to which the various ways that human 
beings are motivated to act and behave can be explained by the existence of different 
elements in their souls. Each element has its own function and accounts for different 
dispositions of character. These elements provide also the key for Socrates to give at least 
a preliminary answer to the initial question of the dialogue: 'what is justice?' According 
to the moral psychology that Plato develops in Republic Book IV the soul is divided into 
three parts: reason, spirit and appetite. Each of these parts has a certain function: we learn 
and we exercise all our cognitive capacities with reason, we experience emotions such 
fear and anger with spirit while we feel attracted or repelled towards pleasant sensations 
and bodily pains with appetite. At the same time all these three elements are distinct 
sources of motivation. Only reason out of the three is the source of rational motivation 
while the other two generate irrational desires that are not for what the agent thinks or 
believes to be best. The extent to which the theory of human motivation in the Republic is 
more complicated or advanced than the Socratic theory depends more or less on how the 
nature of the lower parts and their motivational role is understood. In this thesis I shall 
concentrate on the appetitive part of the soul. In Book IV this part is described in terms of 
a beast as generating numerous irrational bodily appetites without any consideration of 
what is best or beneficial for the whole soul (437d2-439bl). These appetites seem to have 
the strength to overcome reason's power and to be able to motivate the person to act 
against what he believes it best to do. 
This thesis has two main purposes. One of these is to investigate the nature of the 
appetitive part of the soul and the kind of desires that this part generates. The division of 
the soul into three parts has raised a lot of questions about how these parts should be 
conceived. The fact that these parts are often presented by Plato as having their own 
desires and being able to motivate action on their own has led some scholars to view the 
parts of the soul as agent-like parts within the person. This view entails that the parts of 
the soul are proper subjects having their own reasoning capacities such as evaluative 
beliefs and their own desires. On this view the appetitive part of the soul desires what it 
considers to be pleasant for the satisfaction of bodily needs and is also capable of finding 
adequate means to acquire the object of its desire. On another interpretation, the desiring 
part is not capable of engaging in the activity of reasoning, but it is equipped with the 
ability to represent things to itself in a certain way. On both interpretations the appetitive 
part has some cognitive capacities, either higher or lower, that allow to it to describe 
objects in a certain way and to generate desires for these objects. In the first part of this 
thesis I try to disarm the view that the appetitive part can have access to any kind of 
cognitive abilities so as to be able to recognize objects and to generate full desires for 
these objects. My view is that in the Republic Plato retains a view about perception and 
belief similar to the one that he holds in the Theaetetus, the Philebus and the Timaeus. 
According to this view judgement requires the application of the 'commons' to which the 
soul has access with its own resources. The commons are concepts such as 'being', 
'sameness' and 'difference*, hence perception itself is neither judgemental nor 
representational. Thus, even if the appetitive part of the soul in the Republic is related to 
perception, as the lower parts in the Timaeus are, it seems that it has no access to any 
cognitive capacity according to which it can recognize objects in a certain way. The view 
that the appetitive part of the soul is totally deprived of any kind of cognition seems to be 
compatible with Plato's claim about the 'simple desires' of hunger and thirst in the 
argument for the tripartition of the soul. He claims that the desire for thirst as such is 
directed towards drink or drinking without being able to describe any kind of drink in a 
certain way either as 'hot' and 'cold' or 'good' and 'bad'. My claim is that the desires of 
the appetitive part of the soul should be conceived not as full desires which involve some 
belief according to which we represent something in a certain way and motivate 
ourselves to act or to acquire the object of our desire, but as unconceptualised irrational 
motions of the soul that are related to pleasant sensations or bodily pains and so on. Plato 
is using these simple desires to separate reason from appetite and allocates them to the 
appetitive part of the soul. Since these motions are unconceptualised and cannot 
recognize certain objects it seems difficult that this part on its own or the appetites of this 
part can normally motivate action. In that sense, the motivating power of the appetitive 
part as it is presented in the argument of Book IV is restricted to the influence that the 
irrational motions of the soul have on the formation of our fully-fledged physical desires. 
The second main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the explanatory value of 
the appetitive part in human behaviour and action and ultimately to the question of 
justice. On the grounds that this part seems incapable of motivating action relying on its 
own resources, it has explanatory value for very few and rather unnatural cases of human 
behaviour and action. The existence of the appetitive part can explain, for instance, why 
some people may act unwillingly and under compulsion against what they believe to be 
the best thing to do. We find such a case in Republic Book FV which is illustrated by the 
story of Leontius. According to the story that Plato is using to separate spirit from 
appetite, Leontius acts against his judgment of what it is best to do because he is under 
the influence of a very sfrong appetite that he cannot resist despite the fact that he does 
everything not to succumb to his appetite. It can be said that in such cases the agent is not 
free to act according to what he believes to be the best thing to do, but is acting under 
compulsion and the action is counter-voluntary. 
The explanatory value of the desiring part seems to be less important when in 
Books VIII and IX Plato describes why the non-virtuous unjust types mistakenly choose 
the wrong ends in their lives and arrange all their particular choices and their desires 
according to these ends. The behaviour and the choices of these types can be explained 
by reference to a weak and distorted reasoning part that is infused with the wrong beliefs 
about what is worth pursuing. Although the appetitive part is said to take the government 
in the soul of the oligarch, the democrat and the tyrant, it is not the appetitive part that 
takes the decisions and leads the soul in these types by its own devices. All these three 
types decide what to do by reference to the false beliefs that they hold. The picture of the 
appetitive part as being in charge is merely rhetorical and emphasizes the unreasonable 
character of the actions and the choices of these types. 
The really virtuous and just soul of the philosopher still has the appetitive part. 
But this part is not presented even in a metaphorical way as influencing the choices and 
the actions of the just person. The philosopher decides what to do in the light of his 
knowledge of what is really good for him and as a result all his actions, his choices and 
his desires, including the bodily desires, are rationally shaped and organized by his 
knowledge. This is not to say that in the ideally just soul the appetitive part has been 
educated or has improved its appetitive and bestial nature so that real harmony is 
achieved. It is the strength of reason which is in its best condition that ensures and 
promotes real justice in the soul. 
On these grounds it seems that Plato in the Republic does actually provide a more 
complex picture of human motivation than the one we get in the dialogues where the 
view of 'intellectualism' appears. The main idea that underlines, in my view, the Platonic 
theory of motivation in the Republic is that, since reason is strong and rules in a 
normative way over the soul, the person will be motivated towards the right courses of 
action. When people go wrong they do so not so much because of appetite or spirit, but 
because of the improper fiinction of the reasoning part. I f we look at the Protagoras, one 
of these dialogues in which the Socratic view can be found, we can also see that strength 
of knowledge ensures that all the practical value-judgements on which we act are always 
true so that a true homogeneity in the way that we think and act can be achieved. 
PART ONE 
1. Perception, Belief and Parts of the Soul in the Republic. 
It has been assumed' that Plato in the Republic holds a view of perception 
according to which perception can form judgements and can say that something is 'so and 
so'. At the same time 'perception' is used by Plato almost interchangeably with 'belief^ 
as if perception itself involves some kind of judgement. In this chapter I shall try to claim 
that Plato does not necessarily hold the view that perception is propositional or that belief 
and perception are the same. The fact that in the Republic he treats belief and perception 
as being the same relies maybe on the fact that perception plays an important role in the 
formation of our perceptual judgements and appearances and that the deceptive character 
of perception is usually responsible for the falsity of these appearances.^  In the 
Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Philebus and the Timaeus, dialogues that postdate the 
Republic, perception is non-judgemental, which means that perception cannot form 
beliefs of the kind 'x is F' when what constitutes 'F' is any term whether or not it is 
available to the senses. My claim in this chapter is further related to my main view in 
this thesis according to which the lower parts of the sou! in the Republic lack any kind of 
cognitive resources. I f it is true that Plato in the Republic maintains the idea that mere 
perception is capable of forming beliefs of the form 'x is F', then it can be argued that the 
lower parts of the soul that have access to perception or are affected by perception have 
' Cf. among others Cooper 1970: 127, Bumyeat 1976: 34, Bobonich 2002: 322 and Fine 1988b: 15-28. 
' C f . Frede, M., 1987: 3-8. 
^ Within the Two World distinction in the Republic beliefs are about the visible world while knowledge is 
about the realm of the inelligibles. I do not claim here that this is a distinction between belief and 
perception that Plato really holds. The fact though that he uses this distinction in order to show the 
instability of belief in relation to knowledge, allows him to present perception as closely related to, or even 
identical with, belief 
this ability too. This is a claim that Bobonich takes up,'* arguing that the lower parts of the 
soul in the Republic do have cognitive resources, i.e. are able to form beliefs at least 
about physical objects exactly because they have access to the data of perception and the 
beliefs that are involved in perception: 
'Perception in the Republic has prepositional content, that is, it involves perceiving that 
objects have certain features. Nor is perception there limited to grasping the proper sensibles, e.g., 
colours and sounds. It can, rather, grasp a fairly open-ended set of features, including, for 
example, that something is a finger'. 
Bobonich, like others (see n. 1), relies his claim about the judgemental capacity of 
perception on Republic 523alO-524a9 — the 'finger passage'— where Plato's use of the 
idea of judging terms in relation to percepfion seems to suggest that he holds the view 
that perception is capable of forming beliefs. 
In the Republic the relarion between perception and the lower parts of the soul is 
not made clear. Bobonich recognizes this fact, but he assumes that the lower parts have 
access to perception probably in the sense that the lower parts have the capacity to 
perceive and thus have the judgemental capacity that Plato seems to attribute to 
perception in the Republic. 
'Although the Republic does not make fully clear the relation between perception and the lower 
parts of the soul, the lower parts do have access to perception and the beliefs that are part of 
Bobonich 2002: 322. 
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perception, while they lack higher sorts of cognitive abilities such as thought (dianoia) and 
knowledge {episteme and nous).^ 
However, Plato's silence on the relation between perception and the lower parts 
of the soul might indicate that Plato does not really want to attribute perception to the 
lower parts of the soul since he has not distinguished between perception and belief, but 
rather uses both terms almost interchangeably. In the Timaeus, a dialogue that is dated 
certainly after the Republic and after the Theaetetus, Plato clearly allocates the capacity 
of perception to the lower parts of the soul (69c5-d6). In the Timaeus, however, 
perception itself is not judgemental, but is presented as an irrational motion of the lower 
parts of the soul caused by the interaction between a sense organ and an external material 
object (64a2-65a5) ^ In the Republic, in my view, Plato is not eager to establish any clear 
relation between perception and the lower parts of the soul as he does in the Timaeus, 
probably because he wants to avoid attributing beliefs to these parts, something that the 
almost parallel use of the terms might suggest. That Plato uses the two terms in the same 
need not necessarily lead us to adopt the conclusion that in the Republic Plato holds a 
wrong view about perception and belief that he corrects when he comes to write the 
Theaetetus? 
' Bobonich 2002: 322. 
'See Silverman 1990: 148-175 and Johansen 2004: ch. 8 for further discussion on perception in the 
Timaeus. 
' See Cooper 1970: 127 who suggests that Plato was mistaken to say in the Republic that perception can say 
or report this or that. 
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(i) Perception and appearance 
At Theaetetus 184-186, where Socrates tries to show Theaetetus that perception is 
not knowledge, Plato distinguishes between perception and belief. At 184d7-185al0 he 
argues that the senses 'through which'* we perceive something cannot be the subjects 
even of the simplest judgement. Any predication of the form the 'x is F' exceeds the 
capacity of any sense. The soul is the only subject of any kind of judgement since it is the 
soul that has access with its own resources and independently of the senses to what Plato 
calls 'common' predicates, like being, or numbers and abstract terms such as ' l ike ' and 
'unlike' and also value terms such 'good' and 'bad' which are essential for the soul to 
form any kind of judgement 185al- 186all.^ Later on at 189d7-190a7 we are told that 
judgement is an internal discourse (logos) where the soul asks itself questions and answers 
them. This discourse takes place whatever the topic of the inquiry might be (peri Hon an 
skopei e7). This internal dialogue o f the soul takes place either when we reach a 
perceptual judgement about a physical object or when we reach a mathematical 
judgement e.g. '7+5=12'. The inner discourse o f the soul is exemplified further at 195a5-
196c9 in the model of the 'wax tablet'. Socrates, having rejected the 'other-judging' 
model as an inadequate explanation o f false judgements, turns to a new one according to 
which the soul contains a wax tablet or block where we imprint things that we have to 
* The 'through which' is expressed in Greek by the preposition dia and the genitive. See Bumyeat 1976 and 
also Frede 1987 
'Cooper op. cit.: 131-132 and Modrak 1981:41 cite the passage at 185b-c2 and suggest that there are cases 
when perception can form a judgement of the form 'x is F ' , namely when we ask whether something is 
'red' or 'sweet'. However, at 185el Theaetetus says, and Socrates agrees, that everything, including the 
predicate being, are accessed by the soul through its ovm resources. 
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remember. These things are extended from sensations that we had in the past to 
'concepts' or pieces of knowledge'° that we have acquired (191d4-8). The existence of 
such a tablet in the soul can explain how we can reach a false judgement about an 
external object that we perceive. I f for example we see Theaetetus from a distance and we 
misidentify him with Theodorus we have related what we perceive to the wrong imprint 
on the tablet because of the way the object is presented through the senses. But the wax 
tablet also accounts for other mistakes: when for example I can see Theaetetus clearly, 
but I judge wrongly that he is ugly because I have related him to the imprecise concept of 
'ugly' in my soul." Having an imprecise concept might mean that I do not really know 
what 'ugly' is, for instance, and I wrongly apply it to what I perceive.'^ The wax tablet 
then accounts both for mistakes that are due to the way the objects are illustrated to the 
soul through the senses and also for mistakes due to imprecise imprints in our souls. 
Having an imprecise imprint might mean that that I do not really know the very meaning 
of a concept stored in the tablet or that I totally lack the right concept. In both cases 
whether we reach a false or a right judgement, the judgement is the result of an inner 
dialogue of the soul. This inner discourse becomes explicit when we are not certain o f 
what we perceive, or when perception is undetermined, while it remains unnoticed when 
we can see something clearly. I f for instance Theaeteus is very close to me I do not have 
By 'concepts' or pieces of knowledge I translate the word ennoiais. 
" I agree here with McDowell 1973: 214-216, 218-219 and Sedley 2006: 136 n.23 who suggest that the 
wax tablet caters only for mistakes in perceptual judgements and not in conceptual judgements (compare 
Bumyeat 1990: 104-105 who argues that the model caters for both mistakes). However, a wax tablet of 
good quality plays some role in our ability to form a true perceptual judgement or a true appearance. The 
text at 194dl-7 suggests that good quality tablet is a feature of those who learn easily, avoid mistakes and 
are called wise. 
At 186c2-5 we are told that the concepts are not given, but they are acquired gradually (en chronoi) 
through education (paideia). What Plato means here is that all ordinary people normally acquire some 
concepts either through experience or through education; the proper investigation and the acquisition of the 
right concepts is something that takes time and is achieved only by experts or philosophers who follow the 
higher educational training of mathematics and dialectic. 
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to ask whether what I see is Theaetetus or Theodorus and it is also highly improbable that 
I shall misidentify him with Theodorus. However, even in these cases it is not perception 
that tells me 'this is Theaetetus'; rather it is the soul that relates what I see with the 
imprint Theaeteus. The inner discourse in that case remains unnoticed because it is 
restricted to one question. I can ask 'what is i t ' and I can immediately answer 'This is 
Theaetetus', but saying this is Theaetetus means that I have identified what I see not only 
as Theaetetus but also as a 'human being', 'a man', 'a unity' and so on. 
In the Philebus^^ we get an example that echoes the Theaetetus. At 38c5-e7 Plato 
describes someone who sees a shape next to a rock from a distance and starts wondering 
what it is. The person, Plato says, starts asking himself whether this is a man or a statue 
and he might answer either, rightly, that this a man or, wrongly, a statue. Plato has chosen 
this example in order to exemplify why judgement,''' which has been defined earlier on at 
3 8b 12-13 as the combination of memory and perception, is the result of an inner dialogue 
of the soul. In this example the activity of dianoia is made explicit since the person 
strives to reach some certainty about the object that is seeing. However, Plato says that 
what is next to the rock already appears as something, or ' is ' something, say, ' is ' an 
object or ' is ' a unity. According to the Theaetetus, as we have seen, 'being' is common to 
every thought, even to the minimal thought where we say that a 'colour is', which is 
beyond the capacity o f perception. When Plato says that 'there is something next to the 
rock' {esti to para ten petran) that appears (phantazomenon) this appearance, since it 
Philebus is widely accepted as postdating the Theaetetus. 
''' At 37al ff. Plato draws an analogy between pleasure and belief. In this analogy he recognizes two 
aspects ofdoxa. The doxazein which is the act of judging, or the activity of dianoia in the Theaetetus, and 
the doxazomenon which is the result of this activity. The latter is what can be either true or false while the 
former takes place whether or not we reach a true judgement (37al 1-12). 
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involves ' is ' , cannot be the result of perception, but should involve a belief'^ which in 
turn is the result of an inner dialogue of the soul. The dialogue in that case remains 
unnoticed, as if the belief comes from perception because we can immediately say that 
'something is', while the dialogue becomes explicit when we wonder whether 
'something is a man or a statue'.'^ In this passage Plato, in my view, clearly distinguishes 
between perception and appearance. Every appearance is structured by belief, which is 
the result of the soul's inner dialogue.'^ Perception on the other hand is part of what an 
appearance is, but it is not itself an appearance since it does not involve any belief Being 
part of an appearance, perception can of course determine the truth or the falsity of this 
appearance in the sense that an unclear or undetermined perception can partially explain 
the falsity of a judgement about a physical object. 
In the example of the walker in the Philebus and the model of the 'wax tablet' in 
the Theaetetus it is made clear that any judgement or any appearance we have about a 
physical object requires application of the commons like 'being', 'sameness', 'difference' 
etc. which are not available to perception, but to which the soul has access to by means of 
its own resources. Application o f the commons apart from access to them involves also 
some kind of thinking and reasoning which, as we have seen, takes the form of an 
unnoticed — in most cases — inner dialogue within the soul. This kind o f thinking refers 
Cf. for the same interpretation of this passage Delcomminette 2003: 216-137. In the Theaetetus when I 
misidentify Theaetetus with Theodorus I have already successfully related what I see to my imprint 
'human being', 'man' or 'unity' and I only falsely relate him to my imprint Theodorus due to distance. 
In the Sophist 264bl-2 Plato defines appearance (phainetai) as a combination of perception and belief 
which recalls what he says in the Philebus. In this Sophist passage and in agreement with the Theaetetus 
belief is the result of the inner discourse of the soul (ephane dianoia men autes pros heauten psuches 
dialogos, doxa de dianoias apoteleutesis a9-bl) while appearance is the combination of belief and 
perception [phainetai de ho legomen summeiksis aistheseds kai doxes bl-2). From the Philebus and the 
Sophist emerges that for Plato, unlike Aristotle, there is no difference between 'something seems so-and-so' 
and 'something is so-and-so'.When Plato writes that 'something phainetai as such' he means that 
'something is as such' to the person that has the appearance. In that sense any perceptual judgement is an 
appearance. For Aristotle's distinction between doxa and phantasia see De Anima 428bl-5. 
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usually to the way that ordinary people think when they form judgements and is restricted 
to a superficial application of the 'commons' to what they perceive as they cannot 
sufficiently recognize all the differences, similarities and interconnections between the 
common concepts that they apply to what they perceive. As the 'wax tablet' model 
indicates, this superficial application o f the commons can easily lead to false judgments. 
However, when Socrates and Theaetetus in the Theaetetus 201b6-210b3 try to find what 
should be added to true belief to become knowledge, we get an account of belief that 
includes more than the mere application of the 'commons'. In the 'Dream Theory' and 
particular in the Second 'Element' theory, true doxa plus logos is defined as a listing o f 
all the elements that constitute an object (206e6-207al). The important thing in the 
'Element' theory is that the elements are not necessarily material components but can be 
non-elementary constituents like formal features, qualities or any other features that we 
mention or apply to a physical object when we describe it. This is suggested by the text at 
209c5-10 where Socrates seems to consider as 'elements' of an object features like 
Theaetetus' 'snub nose'.'* 
The kind of thinking or reasoning that underlines a true doxa plus logos is not any 
longer the implicit application of concepts to what we perceive. We have seen that this 
That physical objects are aggregates of different elements echoes the passage at 157d-157c which ends 
with a definition of physical objects as athroismata of perceptible properties. The definition there of course 
emerges from the Heracletian theory. In the 'Element' theory Plato adds non-perceptible to perceptible 
features in order to accommodate statements about physical objects that include not only a list of their 
material components, but also features that are not perceptible. See Bumyeat 1990: 140 who considers 
Theaetetus' own snub nose as a constituent. See also Sedley 2006: 171 and n.32 who suggests that the 
constituents of the objects are to be understood formally and structurally and not in a narrowly material 
way as material components given to direct perception. See also Alcinous' Didaskalikos 156.5-14 where 
Alcinous suggests that the perceptible world is an aggregate {athroismata), which is judged by doxastic 
logos not without perception. This is an idea that comes mainly from the Timaeus 28a f f It is very probable 
though that Alcinous is also influenced by the text in the Theaetetus. (See Sedley 1996 for a very 
illuminating discussion on Alcinous'text and the relation between the Didaskalikos and Plato's 
epistemology in the Theaetetus and in the Timaeus). 
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superficial and 'unreflective' application, even it happens to be correct and includes some 
kind o f reasoning, can never be 'accountable'. A t the lower level o f the application of 
concepts, even i f some o f them are somehow available to the soul the soul rushes to its 
conclusions without a fu l l understanding o f the relations between all the elements of the 
object. By contrast in listing the 'elements' of the object one by one we do not simply 
form a sequence of names or concepts that we apply to a perceived sensible object, but 
we relate or synthesize them in an appropriate way. This is what the musician is doing at 
207b: the expert musician knows all the elements of his field and has an account of how 
these elements are related in order to form a whole. I f the elements can be understood 
formally and structurally then saying something about an object goes even beyond a mere 
listing o f the components; it is to grasp their interconnections and to understand how each 
element functions in the whole. Reasoning and thinking in that case would be a reference 
to a higher capacity of dianoia, not any longer as an internal dialogue o f the soul as it is 
at the superficial level of application, but as the higher cognitive capacity in the Republic 
which has to do with mathematics and arithmetic and starts turning the soul towards the 
realm of the intelligible.'^ What is important in the Theaetetus is that it is not perception 
itself that conceptualises or identifies objects as such, but the soul through the senses. In 
any case, as we have seen in the Philebus, that something appears 'as such', the 
appearance, involving perception is also conditioned by a belief according to which 
something is presented to the soul in a certain way. 
In addition the formation of the belief, i.e. the application of the commons to what 
is perceived, requires some kind of reasoning and thinking in the form of an inner 
" See Sedley 2006: 170-72 who suggests that what Plato probably has in mind in the second 'Element' 
theory is the physics of the Timaeus where complex bodies can be analysed all the way down to primary 
triangles. 
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dialogue of the soul. In the Republic, as part of Book lO's attack on imitative art, painting 
and poetry, Socrates appeals to a division of soul in order to identify the part or the parts 
over which imitative art exerts its power. At 602c-603b he tries first to identify the part o f 
the soul to which the visual art of painting appeals. Plato claims that when we experience 
optical illusions we often simultaneously believe that things are as they appear and that 
they are as calculation and measurement prove them to be: 
'the same magnitude does not appear {phainetai) the same because of sight {dia tes opseos) i f it is 
seen form distance or from close.. .again the same things are seen bent when they are in the water 
and straight when they are out of the water and concave or convex due to the deception of sight in 
relation to the colours and any sort of confusion {tarache) of this kind clearly takes place in our 
soul.. .Measuring, calculating and weighing do not appear to be pleasing aids in relation to these 
so that we are not guided by what appears to be bigger, smaller, greater in quantity and heavier, 
but by what was calculated, measured and weighed to be so?' (602c7-d9, my own translation)''" 
In the passage quoted it seems that something 'appears' as bent inside the water or 
straight outside it, not to the senses — to sight in this case — but to the soul, which is 
confused by the appearances.^' I f we take, for example, the case where a stick 'seems' to 
be bent in the water the stick appears to the soul in a certain way because perception in 
that case is insufficient. In the Philebus' example we have seen that a similar 
undetermined perception due to distance can give rise to a false appearance according to 
°^ The translation of the quoted texts from the Republic throughout this thesis is that of Shorey 1978 unless 
otherwise indicated. 
'^ See the analogy between the 'confusion' of the soul in the passage in the Republic and the uncertainty of 
the walker in the Philebus where he cannot say what is standing next to the rock due to distance. The 
walker is confused because before he comes to an assertion and says that something is a man or a statue 
what he sees appears to him both as man and a statue. 
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which something appears as a statue though it is a man. Since perception is susceptible to 
optical illusions — or other illusions, related to each of the senses — the soul can have 
false appearances because of this undetermined perception. I f the optical illusion is 
removed, i f for instance the stick, which is straight, is seen outside the water, the 
appearance wi l l be true. What is suggested by the passage, in my view, is that since 
perception itself is deceptive, so may be the appearances that involve perception. Plato 
points out the fact that the daily judgements of ordinary people many times turn out to be 
false because of an insufficient and deceptive perception. There is nothing in the text that 
makes us read it as i f perception says that something is 'so-and-so'. Instead the dia tes 
opseds at c8 gives more emphasis to the fact that it is 'because o f perception that 
sometimes something appears to the soul to be small, for instance, when it is seen from 
distance than that sight itself says that something is 'small' or' large'. I cannot see in this 
passage anything that prevents us from interpreting it in the light of the 'wax tablet'. The 
falsity or the truth of the appearance or the judgement depends on how the object is 
shown to the soul in each case through the senses. It does not seem that it is perception 
that says in each case either that the stick is 'bent' or 'straight', but the soul.^^ 
See also Alcibiades 129b5-130e7 where we are told explicitly that the soul, which is the proper agent, 
does everything by using the body. Whether the Alcibiades is a genuine Platonic dialogue or not the writer 
of the dialogue — possibly a member of the Old Academy — summarizes what was Plato's standard view. 
In the Phaedo, a dialogue that probably precedes the Republic, Plato very often uses the dia plus genitive 
for things that the soul is doing through the body. See for instance 79c 1-8 'Now we were not saying that 
whenever the soul uses the body (proschretai) to study anything either by seeing (dia tou horan) or hearing 
{dia tou akouein) or by any other sense {di' alles tinos aisheseds) — because that is to examine something 
through the senses {dia ton aistheseon) using the body {dia tou somatos) — then it is dragged by the body 
to towards things that are never constant...?'. We notice that in this passage in the Phaedo, where Socrates 
is explaining to Simmias what we mean when we say that the soul uses the body, Plato uses with some 
consistency the idiom. Even if in the Phaedo we do not get the detailed analysis of the Theaetetus it seems 
that we get more or less the same idea that it is the soul that is doing things; e.g. the soul perceives through 
the senses. As far as I know there is nowhere in the Phaedo that Plato writes that the senses 'say' things or 
report things. It seems that the soul is the proper subject of activities. It is true that the Phaedo seems to 
ascribe to the body the 'bodily' desires that in the Republic are located in the lower part of the soul (94b7-
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It is true, however, that Plato in the Republic treats in some places belief and 
perception with the same meaning and almost interchangeably and also, in Republic 
523alO-524a9, the 'finger passage', perception is said to be able to report (esemenen) 
that something is a finger.^^ Plato's strategy of using the terms with almost the same 
meaning even presenting in one passage perception as saying things can be explained by 
the fact that whenever Plato in the Republic uses the terms doxa or doxazein he associates 
both terms with the sensible world.^'' In each case that we form a judgement or we have 
an appearance about the external world perception is involved and in some cases it is one 
of the candidates that determines the truth or the falsity of our appearance the other being 
our grasp of all the terms that constitute a judgement about an external object. This close 
relation or verbal identity between perception and doxa in the Republic is another tool in 
Plato's toolkit with which he emphasizes his claim throughout the Republic about the 
instability and fallible character o f doxa; doxa is unstable and fallible as much as 
perception is. This of course does not mean that we cannot have true doxai, or at least 
temporarily true ones, about the sensible world. The expert in the Theaetetus and the 
expert/philosopher in the Republic can go beyond the limits and the fallible character o f 
perception and by using reasoning and calculation he can secure true beliefs. In the 
c l ) . But evidently it is not argued that the Phaedo wishes to treat the body virtually as the bearer of these 
desires. 
The judging language that Plato attributes to perception in the 'finger passage' is metaphorical and is 
consistent with his strategy in the Republic of treating doxa and perception as identical. What Plato tries to 
show to Glaucon is that in some cases where we do have a clear perception we can rely on the senses and 
we can safely say and without too much thinking that something is a 'finger'. On the other hand when 
perception does not provide a solid ground for saying whether something is 'large' or 'small' we have to 
resort to the aid of calculation. With the exception of the metaphorical use of judging terms I do not think 
that in the finger passage Plato says something that contradicts what he says in Book X or even in the 'wax 
tablet' presented in the Theaetetus. 
That doxa is the cognitive capacity associated primarily with the external world does not exclude the 
possibility that in the Republic we might have true doxai or true accounts about the realm of the intelligible. 
Socrates' own account about the Form of the Good in Books VI and V I l is what seems (phainetai) 506d8 to 
be so to him. 
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Theaetetus we have seen that reasoning consists in the systematic knowledge of all the 
'elements', both perceptible and not perceptible, and the similarities, the differences and 
the relations between the components that constitute an object. In the Republic within 
Plato's metaphysics and the introduction of the Forms counting and calculation is a 
reference to the mathematics and arithmetic which is the first subject in the education {R. 
522c5-8) designed to turn the soul towards the realm of the intelligible. In each case of 
course perception does not vanish, but its role in the formation of a doxa is seriously 
restricted or even limited to the level of a mere sensory awareness of something within 
the visual field. It is not through sight that the expert, unlike the walker in the Philebus, 
w i l l decide whether a stick is 'bent' or 'straight', but by reference to his calculating 
capacity with which he can recognize that the stick appears 'bent' because it is in the 
water. 
ii) The perceiving part of the soul 
I f we accept, as I have tried to show, that in Book X it is the soul that perceives 
through the senses and not perception, the next question that is raised is which part o f the 
soul is doing the perceiving. After the passage quoted above Plato postulates one part 
that is doing the calculation and the measurement following reasoning (logismos) and 
another part that goes by the appearances (602e4-603a6). Since we have simultaneously 
two opposite judgements, Plato claims that, according to the 'Principle o f Opposites'— 
the principle that Plato has also used in Book f V in the initial division of the soul — it 
cannot be the same part that is the bearer o f the opposite judgements, but must be two 
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distinct parts. The new division o f the soul in Book X and its relation to the first division 
in Book FV has been the subject o f different interpretations by scholars.^^ Those who 
support the view that the part that goes by the appearances is identical with the lower 
parts of the soul in R. IV have to explain how these parts can form appearances, i.e. how 
they can tell that something ' is ' or 'seems' as such. One way to answer the question is to 
follow what may be called the 'perception mediation' strategy. I f perception is 
judgemental and i f the lower parts have access to perception then the lower parts gain 
their judgmental capacity from perception. I have tried to show, so far, that even in Book 
X there is nothing that suggests that perception itself has the capacity to make judgements 
of the form 'x is F'.^^ Even i f we accept that primary sensibles like colours and flavours 
are within the capacity o f perception in the Theaetetus and hence in the Republic, in Book 
X it seems that the capacity of perception goes beyond the formation of the minimal 
proposition that 'this is red'; perception seems to be able to form more complicated 
judgements of the kind 'this is a stick' or even 'this is a bent stick'. 
I f we deny any judgemental capacity to perception, the other strategy is to assume 
that the lower parts themselves have the ability to form beliefs and appearances. The 
latter strategy is preferable to the first one since the soul remains the only subject of every 
activity and all the cognitive functions are carried out by it. However, I do not think that 
Plato in the Republic equips the lower parts of the soul with any sort of cognition. In the 
following chapter I discuss this claim in relation to the desires of the appetitive part of the 
It has been argued that a new non-rational part is here introduced (Janaway 1995: 144), that the nature of 
the non-rational part here is left undetermined (Bumyeat 1976: 34), that a division within the rational part 
is posited (Murphy 1951: 239-240, Nehamas 1982: 47-78, Bumyeat 1999: 223 and Sedley 2006: 113, n. 
40) and that the part that goes by the appearances is identical with the lower parts of the first division 
(Bamey 1992: 186-87 and Lorenz 2006: ch. 5). 
Even if we wish to make too much out of the 'finger passage' about the judgemental capacity of 
perception (see n. 22) in Book X it is a part of the soul that has the appearance and is deceived by it and 
not perception itself 
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soul and in the next part I try to disarm the suggestion that a judgemental capacity is 
available to the lower parts in the unjust souls in Books V I I and IX . Here I shall restrict 
myself to some general remarks about the need to attribute beliefs to the lower parts o f 
the soul, returning at the end to the argument in Book X. The assumption that the lower 
parts have beliefs, including normative and evaluative ones, presupposes an account o f 
belief in the Republic. On this matter we are in no better position than we are in the case 
of perception. 
Belief, like perception, as we have seen, is normally related to the sensible world, 
but we are not given a detailed mechanism that underlines the formation of doxa. 
Recently Lorenz has argued that: 
'In attributing beliefs to the non-rational part of the soul, Socrates has in mind mental states of 
considerable complexity which present things as being in some way or other and which, 
moreover, involve acceptance at a level of the soul below reason.. .They do not qualify as beliefs 
on Plato's account of beliefs which...is presented in the Theaetetus. According to the Republic's 
theory, they occur at a level of the soul at which it is unable to distinguish properiy even between 
such simple things as the large and the small, because it has not adequate data of what these 
things are.. ..They are very much like beliefs'.^' 
Lorenz's conclusion about the account of belief in the Republic comes from his own 
assumption that in Book X the parts that form the appearances are the lower parts of the 
soul and i f we can allow these parts to have beliefs then belief should be what Lorenz 
" Lorenz 2006: 72-73. It is not quite clear whether Lorenz claims that the notion of belief that we get, 
according to him, in Book X is what Plato thought about belief throughout the Republic. The way however, 
that he juxtaposes the Theaetetus and the Republic in the text that I quote suggests that according to him the 
notion of belief that we get in Book X is Plato's view in the whole Republic. 
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suggests. It would be rather odd to try to draw an account of belief in the Republic only 
from the text in Book X. Before going on I would like to make some remarks about the 
claim that Lorenz makes. Lorenz is influenced like others by Plato's tactic in the 
Republic of not distinguish between belief and perception. This is the only way to explain 
Lorenz's claim that belief cannot properly distinguish between large and small because it 
has no adequate data. Probably here Lorenz has in mind, apart from Book X, the 'finger 
passage', but there it is not belief that is unable to distinguish between large and small but 
perception. I cannot also understand Lorenz's claim that belief in the Republic cannot 
distinguish between large and small. It is true that i f belief is restricted to the sensible 
world it cannot grasp what it really is for an object to be small or large, but it can 
successfully represent to itself that one sensible object is bigger than another sensible 
object at a given time t i . The representational character of doxa lies in the fact that with 
doxa we represent the Forms through their sensibles instances. But also in the Theaetetus, 
as far as I understand it, doxa retains its representational character since it is about the 
sensible world which is a likeness of the Forms in the Republic. Plato's addition in the 
Theaetetus is that access to the 'commons' is essential i f any doxa can be reached. 
'Commons' though are not to be equated with the realm of the intelligible since these are 
accessible even to the ordinary people that can form doxai, either true or false, about a 
sensible object. 
Plato discusses belief mainly in Books V, V I and V I I in relation to knowledge 
and in the two latter Books also in relation to his ontological distinction between the 
sensible world and the intelligible world o f the Forms. Although in these Books we are 
not told what happens when we form doxai we can draw an account of what we can do 
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with doxa. What emerges from these Books is that at the stage of doxa we can say 
something about a sensible object and describe somehow the external world. I do not 
claim here that we should confine doxa to the sensible world. In the argument in Book V 
at 474a f f . it is not clear whether the different objects of knowledge and belief are those 
that determine the nature of its capacity. For the sake of my argument here I accept that 
doxa is a certain cognitive capacity which is fallible which enables us to speak about 
objects, say sensible objects, with some confidence saying that 'something x is F'. The 
lovers o f sound and sights, for instance, at R. 476 b say that some sights and sounds are 
beautiful. It does not matter i f they know what they speak about they believe, e.g. that 
some things are beautiful, and can distinguish them from other things that they believe 
are ugly. What they cannot do, of course, is to explain why the many beautiful things 
differ from the many ugly things, since they do not know what the 'ugly' is or what the 
'beautiful' is. 
Similarly the prisoners in the cave at 515a f f in the beginning talk about the 
images inside and gradually they are able to talk about the natural object. When they 
reach the state at which they can speak about the 'puppets', the level of pistis in the 
divided line (509d), they can also discriminate between the 'puppet' and its image 
although they cannot explain yet how they differ. At the level of eikasia or the level o f 
pistis that in the divided line are the two levels o f doxa, some kind o f thinking and some 
kind o f reasoning is involved. We are told that the prisoners even inside the cave where 
they encounter the images of the natural objects and try to recognize what they see, are 
engaged in a kind of dialogue that takes place between them (dialegesthai oioi t 'eien pros 
" On the idea that belief and knowledge are not defined by their objects see, among others, Fine 1990: 85-
115. For the opposite view see Gerson: 2003 ch. 4. 
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allelous 515b4-5). Again when in the beginning they see the objects that the images are 
of they are confused, and only when a crossexamination with the help of someone — 
probably the philosopher — is carried out (515c4-516bl), are they able to proceed at the 
level o f confidence to discriminate between the objects and the images. The kind o f 
dialogue at the stage of eikasia reminds us strongly of the inner dialogue o f the soul in 
the Theaetetus and the Philebus. The difference is that the walker in the Philebus, for 
instance, can distinguish between the image due to distance and the natural object 
because he is already at the stage that the prisoner w i l l be when he is released. The 
walker goes wrong due to an undetermined perception while the prisoner goes wrong 
because the images are the only things he can speak of. When he reaches the level of 
pistis he can discriminate between the two even i f he does not know yet why they differ. 
In the Theaetetus we see that the ' l ike ' and the 'unlike' are among the 'common' 
concepts that we use in order to form a judgement. Despite the fact that the divided line 
or the simile of the cave do not constitute Plato's statement on what is involved in the 
formation of beliefs, but exemplify the assent from lower cognitive states to the highest 
level of noesis, we can still trace elements of the mechanism of doxa that Plato explicitly 
mention in the Theaetetus}^ 
I f doxa involves thinking and reasoning then why should Plato make belief 
available to the lower parts of the soul (especially the appetitive part which is my main 
concern in this thesis)? In the initial division o f the soul in Book I V the part which is 
doing the reasoning and also the part with which we learn {manthanomen 436a9-10, 
^' See also the Timaeus 43c8-44c4. In this passage in the Timaeus we are told that the false judgements are 
the result of the distorted motions of the soul's circles composed of the Same and the Different. At an early 
stage the mind is unable to recognize properly the class of the Same and the Different saying that things are 
the same or different while they are not. Only later can the mind announce properly the class of the Same 
and the Difference and through educational training this state can be reinforced further. 
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580d9, 58lb6) is the reasoning part o f the soul. That the part with which we learn is 
described as logistikon indicates probably that this is the part that has all the cognitive 
capacities and through this part the progress from one cognitive state or a certain kind of 
thought to another can be attained. It might be objected though that the kind o f reasoning 
and thinking that Plato attributes to the logistikon is only the higher reasoning associated 
with episteme and noesis and with knowledge o f the Good and not the kind o f thinking at 
the level of doxa. It is true that we are told, for instance, at 442c5-6 that this part has 
episteme o f what is beneficial for every part and the whole. However, the capacity o f 
episteme does not have to exhaust all the functions o f this part. The higher capacity of 
reasoning could be the best function o f the reasoning part without excluding the fact that 
a lower capacity of everyday reasoning is another function o f the same part. Santas, 
recognizing the importance of the function argument at R. 352c f f maintains that 
'calculating is the exclusive function of reason',^*' that is, reason is the only ' tool ' of 
calculation. Santas' claim can still meet the objection that whenever Plato refers to 
calculation of the reasoning part he does not mean the normal everyday calculation, but 
he refers to the higher calculation that is related to arithmetic and mathematics and the 
higher activity of dianoia that starts turning the soul towards the intelligible objects 
(526a-b) This objection can be met easily since in the soul of the oligarch it is with the 
logistikon that the oligarch reasons how to gain more money (553d3-4).'" We cannot 
assume that in the case of the oligarch the kind of reasoning that is carried out by the 
logistikon is the more difficult and skilled kind of reasoning and thinking that is implied 
at R. 526a-b. Santas' claim can gain more strength i f we consider that in the Republic the 
Santas 2001: 123. 
'^ C f also at 519a 1-5 those who are clever, but not wise, and use reason to achieve things that are bad. 
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appetitive part of the soul is never presented as the part with which we reason, think or 
calculate. In Book IV and in the three instances that the appetitive part is defined (436b 1-
2, 439d6-7, 442a6-bl), it is associated with the bodily desires and in the last one with the 
desire for money. Desire, that is the appetites of hunger, thirst and any other bodily urge 
or impulse, exhausts the function of this part.''^  
Moreover, the tripartite soul for some reason vanishes in Books V, VI and VII 
where Plato speaks of different cognitive levels or capacities. In Book V, the Book that 
immediately follows after the division of the soul, there is no reference to lower parts of 
the soul in relation to doxa. Those who are willing to attribute beliefs or appearances to 
the lower parts will find it very difficult to explain the fact that in the Divided Line where 
eikasia has to do with shadows and images seen in the water and with everything that is 
presented to perception in an unclear way (509dlO-510a3) — something that anticipates 
the 'bent stick' in Book X — no explicit relation is made between this cognitive level and 
any lower part of the soul. Any explanation that a relation between the lower cognitive 
capacities and the lower parts of the soul in these Books is simply left implicit, is 
unsatisfactory, since the parts reappear in Books VII and IX where the topic is the 
motivational conflict that the unjust souls experience. Another explanation and, I submit, 
a rather more satisfactory one is that the lower parts disappear in the middle Books 
•"^  Fully-fledged desires, as I claim in the next chapter, are not the exclusive function of the appetitive part 
since these include also the belief that comes from reason. The view that the lower parts might have some 
cognitive capacities or that reason has appetite {epithumid) might find some support in the passage at 
580d5 f f where Plato claims that 'the three parts have also, it appears to me, three kind of pleasures, one 
peculiar to each other and similarly three appetites (epithumiai) and controls' (580d6-7). However, Plato 
never says that the lower parts have beliefs, on contrary the appetitive part is described in the terms that it 
has been described at Book IV, as the locus of the bodily desires (580d9-581al). More than that the 
appetite of the reasoning part is, as Plato claims at 581b6-8, the desire for 'truth'. It is not the case then that 
the logislikon has epithumiai in the sense that the soul has appetites in respect of the appetitive part of the 
soul. The desire for truth that Plato attributes to the reasoning part is nothing more than the knowledge of 
the Good that Plato has introduced in Book V I ; to know the Good and to desire the Good seems to be one 
and the same thing. (See the passage at 505e and also chapter five in this thesis). 
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because they are irrelevant to the theme. Plato does not need to refer to the lower parts of 
the soul since he has already defined the logistikon as the part with which we learn, 
reason and think. At any cognitive level then, either the level of eikasia or the level of 
noesis, all the cognitive activity is carried out by the logistikon. In the case of the unjust 
souls, by contrast, the parts reappear because they can partially explain the desires of the 
deviant characters. The desire of the democratic man, for instance, to drink wine till he 
gets totally drunk can be explained by his fully-fledged desire to drink wine which 
involves his belief that drinking wine is something pleasant for him at the moment and 
his simple or prime appetite for pleasant replenishment with drink. 
It would be striking, to return to Book X, that Plato despite the remarkable 
absence of the lower parts of the soul in the middle Books of the Republic reintroduces 
them in Book X with cognitive content. In my approach to the passage and in line with 
my claim that every cognitive activity is carried out by the reasoning part of the soul, I 
shall follow those who support the proposal that in the first division of Book X it is the 
logistikon that is divided into different parts or aspects. After the quoted passage in (i) 
above Plato claims at 602el-603a8 that: 
'But it would be the function of he reasoning part {logistikon) of the soul'. 
'Yes, this is true' 
'To this part (toutoi) that has measured and indicates that some things are greater or less than or 
equal to others at the same time there is an opposite appearance'.'" 
'Yes' 
" The translation at 602e4-6 has been the subject of much debate. In my translation I follow Sedley 2006: 
113 n. 40 and Bumyeat 1999: 223 who support that the toutoi at e4 refers to logistikon. 
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'And we did not say that it is impossible for the same thing to have contradictory behefs about the 
same thing at the same time?' 
'And we were right in saying so'. 
'The part then that judges against measurements cannot be the same as the part that judges 
according to them'. 
'No' 
'But the part that follows measurement and reasoning must be the best part of us'. 
'Of course' 
'The part then that contradicts it must be some inferior part in us' 
'Inevitably'. (My own translation) 
Having established this division between two parts, one that goes by the appearances and 
one that follows calculation Plato goes on at 603cllff to establish another division 
between one part that follows reason and another part that is drugged by passion and 
distress. He applies again the 'principle of opposites' as he does in the first division, but 
in a slightly different way that reminds us of the way that the principle is illustrated in 
Book IV. At 604al l-b2 we are told; 
'Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give away, 
to his grief is the bare feeling itself?' 
'True' 
'And where there are two opposites impulses in a man at the same time about the same thing we 
say that there must needs be two things in him' 
[ . . . ] 
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'Then we say the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason' 
'Obviously'. 
'And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and 
impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part 
of us, the associate of cowardice?' 
In both divisions the best part can be easily identified with the logistikon while in the 
second, the inferior part will be the one of the lower parts of the soul or probably a 
combination of the two lower parts of Book IV. The identification of the part that has 
caused different interpretations as we have seen is the inferior part of the first division. 
My brief approach to the argument follows those who support the view that the first 
division is within the reasoning part of the soul.^ '' Between the two inferior parts Plato 
wants to establish a relation though not an identity. That the two parts are not identical 
becomes clear in my view at 605a7-bl where Plato says that the poet is similar to the 
painter because his art appeals to a similar part [pros heteron toiouton homilei tes 
psuches) to the part to which the art of the painter appeals. I f Plato wanted to postulate an 
identity between the two he could have easily written at 605a9-10 pros tauton homilei tes 
psuches. The analogy starts with the bad effects that poetry and painting have on the soul. 
The latter that has to do with skiagraphia which is an analogue to the physical illusions 
that we encounter in the external world and affect the way that the natural objects are 
presented to us and the judgment we form about what we see. The former concerns the 
actions that are imitated by poetry and the motivational sources of these actions. 
See n. 24. 
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What relates both cases is that in both of them it is a distorted part {phaulon) in us 
to which each art appeals. The distorted part to which poetry appeals is identified with the 
emotional part that if left alone, can give rise to intense and irrational emotions. We can 
easily trace an inferior part or aspect or disposition within the logistikon if we think of the 
level oieikasia. Those who remain at this level inevitably can have only appearances and 
they cannot judge that a 'stick in the water is bent'. Plato's treatment of the two inferior 
parts in an analogy echoes his own thesis elsewhere in the Republic that the flourishing of 
the irrational intense emotions or appetites depends on the condition of the reasoning part 
of the soul^ ^ and vice versa since if let these emotions grow they can influence further the 
condition of the logistikon. The language of parts makes the analogy stronger. Since the 
one inferior part to which poetry appeals has to be identified with the emotional part, 
according to the initial division of the soul in R. FV, another analogous inferior part to 
which painting appeals should be posited. Of course Plato cannot say that it is the 
logistikon as a whole that goes by the appearances so he prefers to speak of a 'part' 
within the logistikon that is deceived by the way that things appear to the soul through the 
senses. That Plato uses the language of parts does not entail necessarily that the logisitkon 
is actually divided into parts in the way that the whole soul is divided in Book IV. It 
might not be the case that there is one part within the logostikon that is doing the 
calculation and another one that forms the appearances. It could be economical instead of 
subdividing further the reasoning part to say that it is the same part that does both. Those 
that remain at the level of eikasia can easily go by the appearances. On the contrary the 
philosopher that has knowledge and the reasoning part of his soul is in its best condition 
•'^  The best place that this view can be found is his own analysis of the unjust souls in Books VII and IX. 
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relies always on measurement and calculation and is not deceived by the way that things 
are presented to him through the senses. On this interpretation we can also avoid the 
problem that the principle of opposites might create. What the principle of opposites 
suggests is that we can have at the same time two contradictory beliefs that present the 
same thing in a different way. If, as I suggest, Plato's division of the reasoning part is 
merely rhetorical and he does not actually wish to divide it then we can also view the 
principle of opposites in this context. Plato does not want to say that we may have two 
opposites beliefs at the same time. He accepts however, that we may have one belief now 
and in an immediate period of retrospect we may recognize that that belief was wrong. 
To conclude, there is no clear evidence in the Republic that the lower parts of the 
soul are equipped with evaluative and normative beliefs or any kind of cognitive activity. 
My suggestion in this chapter has been that Plato does not necessarily hold the view in 
the Republic that perception is prepositional. We might not get the detailed and 
elaborated analysis of the Theaetetus, but we can still assume, especially in Book X, that 
Plato even in the Republic was not actually willingly to attribute to perception the 
capacity to form judgements. At the same time I have tried to show that thinking and 
reasoning are the exclusive capacities of the logistikon and, since all the cognitive states, 
even eikasia, involve some kind of thinking, these are capacities of the reasoning part 
only. What is probably left to the lower parts of the soul, especially the appetitive part, is 
perception, but perception deprived of any kind of cognitive capacities. Although the 
relation between the lower capacities is not made clear, Plato would have to accept that 
perception does affect the lower parts. This is a view that he expresses clearly in the 
Timaeus, as we have seen, where perception is defined as an irrational motion of the 
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irrational parts of the soul when soul encounters with external objects through the body 
{Tim. 43c4-7).^^ In the subsequent chapters of this thesis I shall try to show that this view 
of perception fits with my interpretation of the desires of the appetitive part of the soul. 
•'^  At Tim. 42a7 pleasure and distress are also caused by perception and at 64d f f Plato explains how pain 
and pleasure occur. In the last sentence at 43c4-7 Plato says 'That is no doubt why these motions as a group 
came afterwards to be called perceptions {aisthesis) as they are still called today'. Plato traces the view that 
perception is a motion to thinkers before him probably the Presocratics. The fact that Plato was familiar 
with this old view is an indication that this is the view that Plato holds about perception even before the 
Timaeus. 
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2, The desires of the appetitive part in R, TV. 
In the preceding chapter I have tried to argue that on the assumption that Plato in 
the Republic holds a view about belief and perception similar to the one that he proposes 
in the Theaetetus — and also in the Timeaus — the lower parts of the soul may not be 
able to form beliefs or even impressions of any sort. As result these parts and especially 
the appetitive part, which is my main concern in this thesis, are unable to view something 
in a certain way as large or small, thick or thin, pleasant or painful, good or bad. In this 
chapter I discuss how Plato conceives the nature and the function of the appetitive part of 
the soul and the appetites of this part in the initial division of the soul in Republic Book 
IV. I shall try to argue that since this part is deprived of any cognitive capacities the 
appetites that Plato attributes to this part cannot be fully-fledged desires but something 
like physical forces that on their own and without any rational mediation cannot motivate 
action. At the same time the irrationality that is assigned by Plato to this part of the soul 
is not the kind of irrationality that normally characterizes our normal desires and 
dispositions. 
At 434b9-dl Glaucon and Socrates have agreed that they have discovered what 
justice is in the city. Justice in the city can be achieved in so far as each class of the city, 
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that is, the guardians, the auxiliaries and the wealth making class, mind their own 
business and do not interfere with the job of the other classes. The conception of justice 
in the ideal city is directly related to the tripartite class structure so when Socrates goes 
on to define justice in the soul he is looking for three parts that correspond to the three 
classes."'^  
What follows is Socrates' argument, to which Glaucon agrees, that since we 
notice that different nations have different tendencies (435d9-436a3) then these 
tendencies should be present in each individual. The question that Socrates raises is 
whether we do all things with one thing or with more than one: 
T65e 5e r\bT] xaA,EJi6v, el t& amia zovzia E K a a x a npaxxoi^ev f[ xpiaiv ouaiv ixXXo aXXw-
|j.av8avon.Ev [xev etepcp, 9up.oi)fiE9a 8 E aXXco z&v E V T I | J , I V , eji iBunounEv 5' ah xpixcp T I V I 
Tciiv TCEpl tfiv xpocpfiv T E K a l yEvvTiCTiv fi5ovd)v K a i o o a T O ' U X C O V a5£X(pd, r\ oXri xfi v|f\)xfi 
EKaaxov auxwv 7tpaxxo|iev, oxav op^fiaco^Ev. 
'But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same 
thing or whether there are three things we do one thing with one and one with the other — leam 
with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another part, and yet with a third we desire the 
pleasures of nutrition and generation and the rest of the same kind, or whether it is with the entire 
soul' (436a8-b3) 
" Note however that at 435d2-4 Socrates recognizes that the methods that they will follow here may not be 
adequate to show whether the soul has indeed three parts or not and they may have to take a longer road of 
investigation {mokrolera kaipleidn hodos d3). For the implications of the longer road see chapter five. 
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To answer the question that he has addressed in the above text Socrates proceeds b y 
introducing the Principle of Opposites (436b8-cl) with two counter-arguments (436c8-
e6). The Principle of Opposites as Socrates states it is the following: 
'It is obvious that the same thing wi l l never do or suffer opposites (tanantia) in the same respect 
(kata tauten) and in relation to the same thing {pros tauten) at the same time. So if we ever find 
these contradictions in the functions of the mind them we shall know that it was not the same 
thing ftinctioning but a plurality'. (436b8-cl)''* 
Having stated the Principle of opposites Socrates goes on to speak at 437b 1-4 about 
opposites in desiring terms and at b6-c5 he lists a number of what we might call 'desiring 
states': 
T i ouv; fjv 8' eycb- 5n|/fiv K a i neivfjv icai oKm^ xixq in\Qx>\Liac„ icai aO TO eGeXeiv K a i T O 
Po-()A,ea9ai, o\) n d v x a tauxcx Eiq EKetvoc jioi av Geiriq xa. ei5r| x a vw5f) XexOevxa; oTov a e i 
xfiv xoO ETiiG'Oi.iouvxoq VDXTiv o\>x\ Tixoi EtpiEaGai qjTiaEK; E K E ' I V O U OV O C V eniGvufi, r\ 
TtpoodYEoGai xoOxo o a v |io<)X,rixai oi yevEoGai , r\ a v , KaG' oaov E G E J I E I xi o l jccpioGfjvai, 
ETiivEUEiv xoOxo Ttpoq ttuxTiv wajiEp xivoq Epcoxdivxoq, ETiopEYonEvriv auxou xfjq YEVEOECOq; 
" For a discussion of the Principle of Opposites see Bobonich 2002: 225-235, Woods 1987: 23-47, Stalley 
1975: 110-128, Robinson 1971: 38-48, Moline 1978: 1-20 and most recently Lorenz 2006: ch. 2. The 
principle of opposites has normally received great attention by the scholars and it has been supposed that its 
interpretation might cast light or even explain the way that Plato conceives the parts of the soul. Without 
wanting to undermine the 'formal' role of the principle in the whole argument for the tripartition of the soul 
I do not think that it is the principle or the counter-examples to the principle that Socrates is using that 
reveal something about the nature of the parts of the soul. In this chapter I omit any interpretation of the 
principle and I prefer to focus on the kind of the desires that Plato is using in the conflict between reason 
and appetite. It is the nature of these desires that indicate how Plato thought about the appetitive part of the 
soul. 
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From all these 'desiring states' at d 1-2 he comes to consider one kind of 'desiring' that 
has to do with our physical desires (epithumion) and fi^om these desires he chooses 
hunger and thirst as the most clear examples {enargestatas auton). In what follows at 
437d7-439a8 Plato is trying to specify the desire of thirst that he will use in the conflict 
that he describes at 439a9-c9 between a desire to drink and an aversion towards drinking 
in order to distinguish, according to the principle of opposites, between two parts of the 
soul that generate the opposite desires. 
It is important, in my view, to look at the kind of the physical desire that Plato is 
going to use in the conflict. At 437d6-e6 Socrates and Glaucon seek to define what is the 
nature of thirst and hunger: 
""Ap' oX)\, KotG' oaov S i y a eaxl, nXeovoq av xivoq ii oC Xt-^oyiZM e^lG^)^^a ev xfi v|/uxfl eir|, 
oTov b'wifo. eaxl 5'n|fa Spa ye GepjioO TCOTOU r\ v|/uxpo^ > ^ noXkov r\ 6X170^, K a i evi Xoyco 
noioO xivoqnwixaxoi;; r\ edv |^ ev xic; Gepixoxrii; x(p 51\|;EI npoafi, XTIV XOU v|/\)Xpov e7tiG\))ilav 
TipoCTTiapexoix' av, eav 6E vj/uxpoxri?, xfiv xov Qep^oa); Ectv 5e 8ia 7tA.fiGox)(; Tiapouolav 
noXXf) r\ b'wifa fi, xriv xou noXXoO nape^exai, eccv 8e oXiyTi, xrjv xou oXiyox); a\)x6 5e x6 
Sivj/fjv OX) \i.r\ Tioxe dXXou yevrixai eniGv^la i^  ovnep necpvicev, auxoO Ttrojiaxoq, K a i au x6 
neivfjv Ppd)^ axo<;; 
Socrates in this passage considers simple instances of thirst and hunger that 'as such' are 
for drink and food only and not for specific kind of drink or food, while their object is 
fixed only in virtue of their nature. The question that is raised, from Socrates' claim about 
the relation of what we might call 'simple' desires and 'simple' objects, is what kind of 
simple desires Socrates has in his mind at this point. One suggestion could be that in this 
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passage Socrates — or Plato — does not imply something about desire or the nature of 
desire, but he introduces another 'formal' principle in addition to the principle of 
opposites. This principle''^ can be understood as a principle that relates objects with 
attributes; what corresponds to a simple object is a simple attribute while at the same time 
what corresponds to a qualified object is complex or qualified attribute. This suggestion 
can find some support in the light of what follows at 438a7 f f and the analogy between 
knowledge in general, which has a general object, and knowledge of 'house building', 
which is a specific kind of knowledge having a specific object. The suggestion however, 
that in the passage at 437d6-e6 Plato simply introduces another formal principle without 
making any further claim seems to me rather implausible. If we accept that Plato is not 
doing anything more than introducing another 'formal' principle then, on the grounds that 
the simple desires mentioned in this passage are the desires that he is using to divide the 
soul, the division of the soul would be merely the result of two logical principles, the 
principle of opposites and the principle in this passage. More than that, if all we get in 
this passage is just the articulation of another formal principle of logic it will be rather 
odd that in what follows at 438a 1-6 Plato seems to reject a certain theory of desire — and 
human motivation — according to which every desire is for the good (a3-4). I shall come 
back to this passage in a moment. 
Let me return to the question of the simple desires that Socrates mentions in the 
passage quoted. We can fairly assume that Socrates by removing any qualification fi-om 
"Robinson 1971: 41-2 refers to the passage at 437d8-e6 as the 'Principle of Thirst Itself and he claims that 
this passage is a 'semantical' analysis and not 'psychology'. He supports the view that only when Plato 
comes to 438al-6 he 'reads some psychology meaning in it'. On the contrary I think that at 437d8-e6 Plato 
does not distinguish between semantics and psychology. Reeve 1988: 118-120 calls the same principle the 
'Principle of Qualification', which, according to him, is a logical principle. But in contrast with Robinson, 
Reeve accepts that the passage at 437d8-e6 is an illustration of a psychological relation. 
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the desire of thirst is trying to identify the urge or the inclination that we experience 
towards drinking in so far we are thirsty.''^ Instances of simple thirst, for example, could 
be reached if we remove from complex cases of thirst — where thirst in the presence of 
heat becomes a complex desire for cold drink (dl l -e l ) — the qualifier, which in that case 
could be another simple appetite; a simple desire of thirst as such combined with a simple 
desire for cold as such becomes a complex desire for cold drink."" Plato seems here to 
make use of a simple analogy between simple desires and simple objects on the one hand 
and combined desires and qualified objects on the other to show Glaucon that if we 
remove from a complex desire one of the simple desires what we get is simple appetite 
and simple object. The example with the qualifications 'hot' and 'cold' makes rather 
plausible this analogy if we think of the complex desire in terms of two simple appetites. 
What might create some problem, however, is the qualification of 'much' and 'little' that 
Plato adds at e3. What it would mean to add to a simple desire of thirst the qualification 
'much' or 'little'? Is the desire for 'much' drink, for instance, a combination of two 
simple appetites one for drink and another one for 'much'; it seems to me that something 
like this is highly improbable. It is this point that has probably led some people to read 
the whole passage in the light of a logical principle. However, Plato's intention here is to 
make a more general point according to which thirst as such or the inclination we 
experience when we are thirsty is simple in the sense that it cannot recognize certain 
objects or describe objects in a certain way. In other words the recognition of attributes 
See for instance Penner 1990: 59 and Cooper 1984: 9. See also Lovibond 1991: 48-49 and 
Anagnostopoulos 2006: 166-188. When this chapter was first drafted 1 was not aware of Anagnostopoulos' 
paper. Now I have to recognize that, with some exceptions, my argument in this chapter is close to what is 
in the core of her interpretation. 
Another case of complex desire of thirst in the same passage is thirst combined with much or little. In 
that case it is rather unclear if we can speak of a simple desire of much or little added to the appetite of 
thirst as such. Probably what Plato has in mind in that case is a kind of feeling or psychological state that 
accompanies and qualifies the desire of thirst as such. 
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such as 'hot', 'cold', 'much' or 'little' does not come with the inclination of thirst itself, 
but it is added form somewhere else. This is made clearer when Plato adds at 439a5-7 
the attributes 'good' and 'bad'; the simple inclination for drink is not directed towards 
something, a certain kind of drink, that is presented to it either as good or bad. 
Plato here in the Republic probably conceives these simple desires or inclinations 
as motions of the soul — or more precisely of a part of the soul — that are related 
somehow to pleasant sensations or bodily pains and so on. The simple desire of thirst, for 
instance, is motion towards the pleasant sensation that comes with replenishment and at 
the same time a kind of repulsion towards pain that is caused by a bodily lack. To 
describe the simple desires in that way is not to say that these desires are not directed 
towards any object; apparently, as Plato says, their object is just drink or replenishment 
with drink which is a pleasant sensation or feeling. We might say that the simple desires, 
being a motion of the soul can be described as a kind of reaction towards an 
unconceptualised awareness. This kind of motion can be understood as similar to the 
motion of perception when the soul — or a part of the soul — interacts with the body and 
with an external object. In the case of the simple desires this motion can be understood as 
a reaction to a pleasant sensation that comes with replenishment. One objection to my 
suggestion could be that Plato's simple desires are not explicitly presented in this text in 
the way that I have described. The term motion (kinesis), for instance, does not occur in 
the text. However, Plato would not deny that every desire and hence, the simple desires 
are motions within the soul. More than that, outside the Republic, we can find the idea 
that desire or inclination is a kind of motion towards pleasant or painful sensations. 
Consider, for instance, the passage at Timaeus 64a2-64b6 where pleasant and painful 
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affections are presented as unconcepualised movements of the non-rational part of the 
soul caused through bodily sensations.''^ Also at 77b5-c3 we are told that the appetitive 
part of the soul is 'devoid of belief and calculation, but does share in perception, pleasant 
and painful, together with desires (epithumidn)'. On the grounds that the lower parts of 
the soul in the Timaeus are deprived of any cognitive capacities, the movements of the 
soul are not directed towards objects represented in a certain way, but are irrational 
reactions related to pleasant or painful sensations.''^ 
At 438al-6 Plato tries to meet an objection against the point about the simple 
desires: 
M T I X O I xiq, Tjv 5' Eycb, doKEnxovq rmaq ovxaq GopuPTjCTTi, cbq ot)8Eiq jioxoC EniGu^et bXXa 
XpTioxoO noxoO, K a i o\) aixou dXXd xpTjOxou oixot). TtdvxEc; Y « P « P « "^^^ ayaQ&v 
E7iiG\)|xovaiv E l o\)v f] 8'iv|;a EniG\)|xia E a x i , xprioxoO a v Eir | E ' I X E Tim^axoi; E I X E aXXov ozov 
Eaxiv E7ii9\)|j,ia, K a i av aXXai O T J X C O . 
'Let no one then, said I, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody 
desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because all men desire good things, 
•"^  See Bobonich 2002: 322-327 for a very illuminating analysis of the movements of the lower parts of the 
soul. 
See also my claim in the preceding chapter where I claim we do not have to assume that, unlike the 
Timaeus, the lower parts of the soul in the Republic are able to form beliefs. The most clear statement about 
desires as irrational motions of the soul can be found in a work of Middle Platonism. Alcinous in 
Didaskalikos presents pathos as an irrational motion of the soul either towards something bad or good 
("EoTi Tolvuv nhQoc, K I V T I O K ; aXoyoq V U X T V ; in\ KaKW r\ (bq in' dyaGw. 32.2-3). If we accept that 
Alcinous' account of pathos resides in his understanding of Plato and his effort to give an outline of the 
Platonic philosophy, then his definition of pathos captures in my view Plato's claim in the Republic. 
Although we cannot say from which dialogue or dialogues Alcinous derives his claim — the Timaeus is 
possibly one candidate — the way that he puts his claim reflects Plato's point in the Republic. Note that 
according to Plato the simple desires cannot distinguish between bad and good things so they may directed 
towards either, while Alcinous says that they are either about something good or bad. Also at 32.4-5 
Alcinous allocates these motions of the soul to the irrational parts of the soul (xcbv dA-oycov if\<^ yuxfl^ 
Hepuv Kivriaeiq ). See also chapter three for a further analysis of this text by Alcinous. 
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and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similariy 
with other desires'. 
This passage has been interpreted by most scholars as a rejection of the Socratic view of 
human motivation and desire as this thesis appears in a number of dialogues preceding 
the Republic such as the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Lysis, the Euthydemus, the Meno 
and the Symposium.'^* According to the standard reading of the passage that has been 
proposed, Plato argues that: (1) we cannot say that everyone desires good drink or good 
food (2) on the grounds (ydp) that everyone desires good things,''^  since (3) there are 
desires which are neither for good nor for bad. Let us see first which is the Socratic thesis 
that Plato seems to reject. Since Plato's point is about physical desires such as thirst and 
hunger we can assume that he rejects a thesis according to which every desire including 
physical desires are for something good. By saying that thirst, for instance, is for 
something good Socrates probably means that when we want to drink, our fully-fledged 
desire of thirst is directed towards something that we take to be good or something that is 
represented to us either rightly or wrongly as good."^ In that sense every physical desire 
always involves a belief or a value-judgement according to which we take something to 
be in a certain way and which motivates us to act. Of course Socrates does not seem to 
See e.g. Penner 1990: 53 and 1971: 106-107, Irwin 1977: 191-3, WTiite 1979: 124-5, Murphy 1971: 28-9. 
For and opposite view see Hoffman 2003: 171-4 and Lovibond 1991: 48. Shorey 1963: 390 writes ad loc. 
that 'Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this 
passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink'. While I agree 
with Shorey that Plato is not repudiating the doctrine that all men desire the good 1 am not sure whether 1 
can understand Shorey's point in the second part of his comment. 
Adam 1920: 251 ad loc. comments 'the particle ara indicates that the supposed objector is quoting 
another's man view.' The usage of the particle ara and the formulation of the clause indicate clearly that 
the objection Plato has in mind is the Socratic — or his own earlier — view. ( C f Gorgias 468c5 ta gar 
agatha boulometha; Meno 77c 1-2 ou pontes, driste, dokousi soi ton agathon epithumein). 
* See chapter six where I argue that this is probably how Socrates conceives our physical desires in the 
Protagoras. 
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say that our physical desires are merely reduced to a value-judgement. In so far as we are 
thirsty we experience prior to our judgement a kind of feeling or inclination towards 
drinking which is associated with the pleasant sensation that comes from replenishment. 
This inclination although it is not a fully-fledged desire, gives rise to, or influences to 
some extent our belief according to which we represent something in a certain way as 
good or pleasant and so on. I f Plato's simple desires are these inclinations or urges 
towards something, as I have suggested, we do not have to assume that Plato's intention 
in this passage is to reject the Socratic thesis. On the standard reading o f the passage that 
I have outlined above, Plato is using (2) to reject (3) which is the Socratic thesis. On an 
alternative reading that I propose what Plato says is that from (2) 'on the grounds (gar) 
that everyone desires good things' we cannot infer (3) that ' i f thirst is a desire then it 
would be for good drink'. I f we read the passage in this way then Plato does not reject the 
Socratic thesis, but he warns Glaucon and the readers of a confijsion and a fallacy to 
which someone might commit himself i f he infers from the Socratic thesis that thirst as 
such or simple thirst is always for good drink and not for drink in general.'*^ Plato wants 
to make clear that it is another thing to say that everyone desires to get what is always 
good in the circumstances; hence everyone desires good drink or good food and it is 
another thing to say that the desire o f thirst as such or the inclination is always for 
something good. In the former case Plato would accept that this desire always involves a 
belief that transforms mere thirst for drink — or the inclination towards drinking — to 
If we try to formulate the supposed invalid argument it will have the following structure; 
1) if thirst is a desire (simple desire or inclination on Plato's definition at 437d6-e6). 
2) on the grounds that everyone desires good things (desire as fully-fledged desire towards 
something that we take to be good). 
3) then thirst would be a desire for good drink (simple desire or inclination). 
Plato, on my reading, does not reject (2), but he alerts us that (3) does not follow from (2). 
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thirst for good drink; however, his purpose at this point o f the argument is to abstract 
from this desire the kernel which is the simple desire o f thirst for drink in general. 
Someone might object that the interpretation that I am suggesting cannot find 
support in the text since Plato is using the term ETtiQunia in both cases. It is true that he is 
not using a special term to describe these simple desires or inclinations, which is 
probably what has led some people to read the text as a rejection of the Socratic thesis. 
The distinction however, at this point is not a matter of terminology but resides in the 
way that Plato has already defined the simple desires.'** More than that, the fact that this 
passage occurs in the middle of the argument about the simple desires (the whole 
argument is completed at 439a7) somehow supports the interpretation that I suggest. I f 
Plato's intention was to reject the Socratic view — or his own view in a number of 
dialogues outside the Republic — he could have done so after his description o f the 
conflicting desires at 439b-c and his conclusion about a distinct part in the soul that 
generates irrational desires. In that case he could have rejected the Socratic thesis on 
better grounds since he has proved that there is a distinct irrational part in the soul that 
generates all our ful l physical desires independently of reason or any thought. That the 
passage at 438al-6 appears in the middle of the argument that is going to prove the 
existence of this irrational part in the soul indicates, in my view, that this passage 
Kahn 1996: 262-63 has noticed that in a number of dialogues preceding the Republic and the tripartite 
complications of Book IV Plato is using epithumein, boulesthai, ethelein, and eran interchangeable to 
indicate the rational desire for the good. Kahn notices that there are two dialogues, the Gorgias and the 
Charmides, where Plato distinguishes between epithumein that indicates the bodily desires and boulesthai 
that refers to the rational desire. What Kahn probably means here is not that the term epithumein in these 
two dialogues indicates irrational desires, but that Plato reserves this term to refer to physical desires while 
boulesthai has to do with desires that are not necessarily bodily or do not involve our body like the desire 
for philosophy or the desire of the tyrants to rule. At any rate, if Plato outside the Gorgias and the 
Channides, as Kahn suggests, does not have a fixed term to refer to the bodily desires and to distinguish 
them from other desires, why should we expect him to use two different terms here in the Republic in order 
to distinguish between the fully-fledged desire of thirst and the inclination or the physical force which is 
part of this desire. 
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constitutes part of the argument, in the sense that Plato is trying to make clear what he is 
talking about, by removing a confusion that the Socratic thesis might create. 
II 
Plato's point about the simple desires or the inclinations and the clarification that 
he provides at 438a 1-6, as I have suggested, are important since he uses these simple 
desires to divide the soul into parts or aspects. The way that Plato now uses the simple 
desires in the rest of the argument at 439b f f reveals more things both about the nature of 
the simple desires and their role in human motivation and also about the role and the 
function of the appetitive part of the soul. Let us see first how Plato is describing the 
conflict: 
ToO 8iv|/(ovTO(; apa fi \|/t»XTi, ^aQ' oaov 6iv)/fi, OVK aXXo T I (JouXexai r\ Kieiv, K a i T O - U T O U 
opEYExai Kttl £711 T O O T O 6p\i^. 
Ax\ko\ 8TI. 
OuKOUv E l TtoTE Ti auTTiv avQtKKti 5i\|/cboav, ETEpov dv X I Ev avTr\ £ir\ amov xov 
5iv(5vToq Kttl dyovxoq wonEp Gripiov tni T O JtieTv; ou yap 5r\, (pa|XEv, T O yE avxo T W avxS) 
Eamov TtEpl T O a-UTO a.\ia TCtvavxla npdxToi. 
0\) ydp oiiv. 
"£2a7tEp YE oTnai xoO T O ^ O T O U O\) KaXcoq EXEi Xtyziv O T I amoO a.\ia ai XEipEq T O T O ^ O V 
diicoSoOvTai T E Kai TrpoCTEA-Kovxai, aXX' O T I OLXXX] \IEV r\ ctTtcoGouoa x^ i^ P. etEpa 5£ fi 
TipoaaYonEVTi. 
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navTCtnaoi ^ev ouv, ecpT). 
noxepov 8fi (pw^ev t i vaq eat iv oxe 5i\|/(ovxa(; OVK eGeXeiv T T I E I V ; 
K a i [laXa y', E<pr\, noXXoiic, Ka\ noXXaKiq. 
Ti ovv, e(pT|v eyui, <pair\ xiq av xowcov nepv; OVK eveivai i^ ev ev xfj v^ )X'n auxcbv x6 
icEX.evov,EVETvai 5 E X6 K C O X O O V T I I E T V , aXXo 6v K a i Kpaxof iv xoO KEXEUovxoq; 
"E)XOl7E, E(pTl, S O K E I . 
""Ap* ouv o\) x6 |xev K C O ^ W V xa xoiaOxa EyyiYVETai, oxav EyyEvrixai, E K Xoyia^oO, x a 8 E 
ayovxa K a i EA-Kovxa 5 i a naGrmctxiov X E m i voarmctxcov napaylyvexai; 
'The soul of the thirsty man, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns 
for this and its impulse is towards this. 
Obviously! 
Then i f anything draws it back when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which 
thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with same 
part of itself at the same time acts in the opposite ways about the same thing. 
We must admit that it does not. 
So I fancy it is not well said of the archer that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and 
draw it close, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that 
draws it to. 
By all means. 
Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes through thirsty refuse to drink? 
We are indeed, he said. 
What then, I said, should one affirm about them? It is not that there is something in the soul that 
bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids? 
I think so. 
47 
And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises fi-om calculations 
of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections and diseases?' (439a4-
dl). 
The kind o f conflict that Plato describes here is a bit odd. The desire for drinking is not 
the fully-fledged desire that involves a belief or a value-judgement according to which 
we consider that getting a specific kind of drink would be, for example, something good 
or pleasant in the circumstances. Instead of that, it is the simple desire or the inclination 
towards drinking that Plato has identified earlier on, which is not able to describe or 
represent objects in a certain way. Look for instance how the core of the conflict is 
described at c3: dipsontos-ouk ethelein, where the first indicates the feeling that someone 
experiences in so far as he is thirsty. At the same time the aversion towards drinking is 
not presented in terms of an opposite value-judgement according to which we think or 
know that getting a specific drink w i l l not be something good or pleasant to do; the 
opposite desire again takes the form of a general aversion towards drinking. It has been 
argued, as part o f a criticism against the kind of conflict that Plato is describing here, that 
he could have used a more typical kind of conflict where thirst, for instance, would be for 
something pleasant opposed to another desire for something good.^^ Penner, who has 
offered a very valuable and useful analysis of the kind o f conflict that Plato presents here, 
argues that what Plato needs, to get the required conflict of desires, are desires for 
particular objects or courses o f actions. These are the desires that Penner calls 'executive' 
See for instance Woods 1987: 41 and Penner 1990: 51-61. Penner who has offered a very valuable and 
useful analysis of the kind of conflict that Plato presents here, has argued that what Plato needs to get the 
required conflict of desires are desires for particular objects or courses of actions — what Penner calls 
'executive' desires that lead to action — and drives. According to Penner, Plato's mistake resides in the 
fact that he confuses drives with desires (59). 
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desires and are they only ones that can motivate action. According to Penner, Plato's 
mistake resides in the fact that he confuses drives with desiresr'^ Although I agree with 
Penner's distinction between 'executive' desires — or what I prefer to call fully-fledged 
desires — as the only desires that can lead to action and drives, I do not think that here 
Plato confuses drives and desires unwillingly. On the contrary he is ful ly aware that he is 
using drives or inclinations instead of fuIIy-fledged desires. I f his intention was to 
describe a conflict between a fully-fledged desire to drink and the aversion towards this 
desire then what was the point of the whole argument about the simple desires at 437d6-
e6? Plato could have described the conflict straightforwardly after the 'principle of 
opposites' and the passage at 437bl-cl where he lists various desiring states. 
However, Plato has chosen inclinations and not fully-fledged desires because this 
is what the conflict that he describes requires. By applying the 'principle of opposites' 
Plato can show that the desire towards drinking and the aversion should have different 
origins in the soul. A t 4 3 9 d l 0 - l l he concludes that the physical inclination to drink 
comes from 'affections and diseases' while the aversion is the result of reason. The 
question is what might be the further implications o f the way that Plato has chosen to 
describe this conflict. One immediate implication has to do with the nature o f the two 
parts of the soul the existence of which the example has proved. Plato maintains that the 
inclination towards drinking has its source in affections and diseases while the appetitive 
part is rendered irrational. On the other hand, the part that is doing all the calculation and 
the measurement is the reasoning part of the soul. By saying that the inclination towards 
drinking comes from 'affections and diseases' Plato presumably does not mean that our 
fully-fledged desire for drink or food is merely the result of 'affections and diseases'. 
Penner 1990: 57-58. 
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What is the result of affection is just the urge towards drinking when we are thirsty. Our 
fully-fledged desire for a specific kind of drink, however involves always some value-
judgement according to which drinking or getting a specific kind of drink is presented to 
us as something good to do in the circumstances. Besides, our fully-fledged desires are 
those that motivate us to take a certain course of action by specifying the content of this 
action and not the impulse. Let us assume that someone feels thirsty, for instance, and 
decides to go for a glass of water thinking that in this case getting a glass of water is 
something 'good' to do. In that case what motivates the agent to get the glass of water is 
not just a simple inclination towards drinking, but also a judgement according to which 
the agent views his getting a glass of water as something good, pleasant or whatever. I f 
the person had not thought of getting the water in any particular way the pure inclination 
would not be enough to motivate action. 
Since Plato has allocated the inclinations to the appetitive part o f the soul, it 
seems that this part, normally, is not able on its own to motivate action. I f we return to 
the kind of conflict that Plato has described we are not actually told whether the person 
drinks or not in the end. The only think that we are told is that in so far as the soul is 
thirsty it wants or is inclined to drink.^' We get a picture of a certain motion that the soul 
experiences towards drinking, but it remains open whether this motion leads the soul to 
drink or not. On the assumption that what might have stopped this motion is the aversion 
that comes from reason, Plato seems to imply that the simple inclination of thirst may 
start moving the soul towards something, but this movement cannot be completed 
" Note again that Plato is using here a variety of desiring terms like bouletai, oregelai, horma, to denote 
the soul's inclination towards something. This is another indication that the terminology does not indicate 
anything about the kind of desire that Plato has in mind. Since here the reference is the physical desire of 
thirst someone would expect Plato to have written epithumei. (See also n. 48). 
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without the 'assent' o f reason.This is not to say o f course that the appetitive part does 
not have any the power to motivate action, but that this power is normally exercised 
through the involvement of reason. In the description of the conflict however, Plato does 
not explicitly say that this first movement of the soul, which is the result of affections, 
needs reason's involvement in order to be completed. However, when Plato goes on to 
describe the harmonious soul we are told at 442c4-7 that reason should be in charge, 
knowing what is beneficial for the whole soul and each part o f it. The question is what 
would it mean for reason to know what is beneficial for the appetitive part of the soul. I f 
my interpretation is correct so far, what Plato has proved is that the appetitive part of the 
soul generates physical impulses towards drinking or eafing and is irrational. One way 
that reason could be said to know what is beneficial for this part is to transform these 
impulses into fully-fledged desires which are directed towards the right objects. That 
reason's rule and power can be understood in that way is implied somehow at 442bl0-c3 
when Plato says that 'Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this 
part in him, when, namely his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures the 
rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared'. Although here Plato 
refers to the spirited part of the soul, we might say that also in the case of the appetitive 
part reason decides what should be desired and what should not. Besides at 442a4-b3 we 
" I do not use the term 'assent' here with the strict meaning that the term (sugkatathesis) has in the Stoics. 
However, I am inclined to believe that the way that Plato argues, in my view, about the appetitive part of 
the soul and the simple desires or the inclinations reflects — or is very close to — the psychology of 
Posidonius as he is presented by Galen in PHP Books 4 and 5. It seems to me that the pathetikai kineseis of 
Posidonius are very close to the simple desires that Plato introduces here in the Republic. It might be the 
case, i f we believe the account of Galen about Posidonius, that this was how Posidonius may have 
interpreted the role of the appetitive part of the soul and the 'desires' of this part in Plato. The latter of 
course is just an assumption the support of which goes beyond this thesis. For a very illuminating 
discussion on Posidonius and emotions and his relation with Chrysippus and the orthodox Stoicism, see 
among others. Cooper 1998: 71-111, Gill 1998: 114-148, Sorabji 1998: 149-169. On Galen's psychology 
see, among others, Hankinson 1991: 197-233 and 1993:184-222. 
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are told that 'reason and spirit should take care of the appetitive part so that it does not 
become strong and large by being filled too much with the bodily pleasures'. What Plato 
probably means here is that reason decides which of the bodily physical impulses w i l l be 
satisfied or in other words which of them wi l l be transformed into fully-fledged desire for 
specific objects that fu l f i l the needs o f the desiring part of the soul in the best way. 
The recognition of an appetitive element in the soul that according to Plato is 
alogiston does not necessarily imply that our normal physical desires for specific things 
are also irrational. The appetitive part of the soul is described as alogiston on the grounds 
that the various impulses of this part are motions of the soul that have their source in 
affections such as pleasant sensations or pains. In that sense the rise of these impulses is 
not explained by reference to any kind of thinking or reasoning, but by reference to our 
bodily nature and the way that our bodies affect the soul." Although these inclinations 
constitute the raw material of our ful l desires, the latter are shaped under the rule o f 
reason and they cannot be irrational in the sense that the appetitive part and the 
inclinations that belong to this part are. In one sense, alogiston, might mean without any 
kind of thought, language and belief This is the sense that the appetitive part is 
alogiston}'^ There is however, another sense according to which we can say that a person, 
for instance, is alogistos; in this sense alogistos would not mean that a person cannot 
"it might be argued that the appetitive part of the soul is not irrational in the sense that it is totally deprived 
of any kind of reasoning and calculation. Price 1995: 61-62, for instance, argues that the passage at 436a 
suggests mean-end reasoning on behalf of the appetitive part. At this passage Plato says that 'we desire 
with a third one {tritoi tin!) the pleasures associated with nutrition and generation'. According to Price 
'[I]n the instance of consciously desiring to drink in order to experience the pleasure of satisfying thirst 
appetite's reasoning achieves an adaptation of instinct' (my own itahcs). In the light of my argument in the 
preceding chapter if the appetitive part is not able to form any kind of beliefs it seems to me that it is more 
difficult to attribute to this part the capacity of means-end reasoning. In Book IV at least and in view of 
what Plato suggests about the simple desires it is not the appetitive part that achieves the adaptation of an 
instinct but, as I have tried to argue, the reasoning part of the soul. 
See 439b4 where the appetitive part that pushes the soul towards drinking is presented as an animal (/JO 
sper theriou). See also 589bl-2. 
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think or that is deprived from any cognitive capacities, but that he is foolish or 
unreasonable." Our fu l l physical desires that are shaped by reason cannot be irrational in 
the first sense since they involve reason's guidance. They can be however, irrational in 
the sense o f being unreasonable i f they are falsely directed by reason towards the wrong 
objects. In that case the rationality or the irrationality of our desires does not depend so 
much on the nature o f our inclinations that are generated in the appetitive part, but on the 
condition of the reasoning part of the soul.^^ 
M y claim is that the kind of irrationality that Plato assigns to the appetitive part of 
the soul as such is not the kind of irrationality that underlines our fu l l desires and our 
actions. To put it in other words, the unreasonable character of some of our physical 
desires is not explained so much by the existence of an irrational appetitive part in us, but 
by the condidon of the soul, that is, the way that the parts interact and are related to each 
other. It is true however, that we cannot deny the strength that Plato attributes to the 
appetitive part and hence the influence that it has or may have on reason and, as a result, 
on the formation of our ful l desires. I f the conflict that Plato has described shows 
anything it shows at least that the impulse has the adequate power to start the soul 
moving in one direction no matter i f this movement normally needs reason's involvement 
in order to be completed. The strength that the appefitive part has qua part is, in my view, 
the most important consequence that the tripartition of the soul has on human motivation 
and action. The appetitive part, being a distinct part within the soul can influence reason 
— especially when reason is not in its best condition — and put in danger the harmony 
" See e.g. Apology 37c. At the same time logismos might mean either the common human capacity of 
language, thought and belief or some kind of more difficult and elaborated thinking; for the latter notion of 
the term see Republic 526b where logismos has to do with mathematics and arithmetic. 
" See also chapter five where I try to argue that all the full physical desires of the philosopher are rational 
as a result of reason's knowledge. 
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among the parts of the soul. This may happen, for example, when under the influence of a 
very strong impulse we fail to perform the right calculation and form a ful l desire that is 
directed towards the wrong object. However, even in that case the irrationality of our 
choice resides in the fact that we thought passionately under the influence o f the impulse 
and we form the wrong desire. 
The effect that the strength o f the appetitive part may have in our choices seems 
to go beyond the immediate influence it has in the formation o f the fully-fledged physical 
desires. Although the appetitive part in Book IV is directly related to bodily desires and 
pleasures we notice that Plato appeals to this part to 'explain' the wrong choices of the 
deviant characters in Books V I I I and IX. In a following chapter of this thesis I shall try to 
argue that in his description of unjust souls (at least in three of them) Plato is using the 
appetitive part in a metaphorical way to emphasize the unreasonable way that some 
people think and decide to act." In each case however, in our actions, our choices and 
even in our ful l physical desires such as thirst and hunger, this part does not manifest 
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itself as such, but in relation to the rest parts of the soul and the soul as a whole. 
The sharp distinction between appetite and reason, and the relevant distinction 
between what is rational and irrational that Plato postulates in Book IV, reflects in some 
way the reasonable and unreasonable character o f our actions and our dispositions, We do 
not have to assume however, that when we act in a wrong and unreasonable way we do 
so in respect of one part of the soul and not in respect o f the whole soul as the compound 
" See also chapter four. 
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At the same time the existence of an appetitive part in the soul and the strength of the impulses of this 
part can explain even 'extreme' cases of human behaviour and human action. We get such a case at 439e4-
440a4 where Plato describes the case of Leontius who acts on his irrational impulse to look at the dead 
bodies in front of him although his reason dictates him not to do so. Plato could have said, as I try to argue 
in a subsequent chapter of this thesis, that these although these cases happen as a matter of fact this is not 
how human beings normally act when they are free to choose what to do. 
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of the three parts. I f we return to our ful l physical desires it seems, as I have tried to 
argue, that even these desires are not formed merely by an irrational appetitive part in the 
soul and they are not purely appetitive in their nature. They involve reason's guidance 
that directs them towards objects that we view as good, pleasant and so on. While we 
cannot get rid of our appetitive nature and the irrationality of our impulses and instincts, 
we can avoid having unreasonable desires through the improvement of our reasoning 
capacities. In the ideal harmonious soul of the philosopher, as argue in a subsequent 
chapter o f this thesis, where reason functions in the best way, it is highly improbable that 
the philosopher w i l l ever form unreasonable appetitive desires. 
PART TWO 
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3. The case of Leontius (/?. 439e5-a3) and akrasia. 
In Republic 439d6 f f Socrates argues for the existence of a third part within the 
soul, the thumoeides, distinct from the reasoning and the appetitive parts. Plato presents at 
439e5-a3 the story o f someone called Leontius to eliminate Glaucon's assumption at 439e5 
that this third part with which we get angry could be of the same kind (homophues) with the 
appetitive part: 
'AXX', fjv 5' iy6), noxt ctKowaq t i Ttioxeuoo T O U T O J ' (bq ccpa AEovcioq 6 'AyA-aicavoq aviwv IK 
rieipaicoq vno T O Popeiov xetxoq E K X O I ; , aiaGonevoq veKpouq Tiapa T W Stmio) icei^evo'u<;, a\ia )iev 
i5eTv eTtiGu^oT, a ^ a 5E av SuaxEpa ivo i K a i anoxpETtoi m v i o v , K a i XECOI; ^ E V ^dxoixo X E K a l 
7iapaKaA.\)7ixoixo, KpaxoujiEvoq 5' ovv iino xfiq E7ii9\)^'iaq, S i E X K u a a q xo-ui; 6(p9aXno<)<;, 
7ipoa8pa^(bv npoq xouq vEKpoix;, '"ISoi) uixiv," E(pri, "w KaKo5a'i)4.ovE(;, E|X7tX,iia0rixE xov KaXov 
QEccnaxcq. 
But, I said, I once heard a story which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from 
Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall, becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place 
of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and an aversion, and that for a time he 
resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all his desire, with staring eyes he rushed up 
to the corpses and cried, 'There, wretches, take your fell of the fine spectacle!' (439e5-440a4) 
The story of Leontius seems to contradict my claim in the first part o f this thesis where I have 
tried to suggest that the 'simple' desires cannot lead to action unless they are informed by 
reason. In the story o f Leontius a non-rafional desire on its own seems to have adequate 
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motivational force to lead Leontius to take a certain course of action against reason. Moreover 
this extraordinary story seems to mark a clear case o f akrasia, normally translated in English as 
'weakness of w i l l ' , since Leontius acts on a non-rational desire and against his best judgement. 
In this chapter I shall try to show first that that Plato, through the story of Leontius, suggests 
that actions, which are the result merely of a non-rational desire are not voluntary actions. In 
that case we do not have to do with akrasia translated as weakness, but with compulsion. I f I 
am right, then, Plato could accept that the simple 'appetites' that he has used to divide the 
reasoning from the appetitive part can lead to action only in some extreme cases when the 
person cannot do otherwise and is 'forced' somehow by the strength of the appetite or the 
inclination to take a certain course of action unwillingly. 
The kind of akrasia that the story of Leontius seems to imply is what we might call 
akrasia in the strict sense. On this strict sense of akrasia at the very moment of action the 
agent acts counter to his own best judgement. This strict sense of akrasia is best expressed by 
Davidson in his influential essay 'How is weakness of the wi l l possible?'' According to him 
we say that a person acts incontinently ' i f and only if: a) the agent does x intentionally; b) the 
agent believes there is an alternative action open to him; and c) the agent judges that, all things 
considered, it would be better to do y than to do x'.^ There is also a broader sense oi akrasia 
where the person does not follow a previous decision he has made but the moment he acts he 
' Davidson 1980: 21-42. 
^Davidson 1980: 22. 
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wants to do or he believes that he wants to do what he does more. An example can make the 
distinction between the two cases clearer. Let us suppose that someone gives in to his desire 
for his best friend's wife. In that case two things may be going on. On the broader sense of 
akrasia the person has decided and he is committed to his decision that indulging his desire for 
his best friend's wife is not an appropriate thing for him to do. When he does indulge his 
desire, he has changed his mind, and the very moment he acts he wants more to indulge the 
desire more rather than he does not want to. On the strict sense o f akrasia we could say at the 
very moment of indulging his fi-iend's wife the person still wanted more not to do so than he 
wanted to do. According to Davidson then the person acts intentionally counter to his decision 
to which he is still committed. 
For modem philosophers like Davidson, in the case of any action done by the person 
when there is no external force acting upon the person at the time of the action and there are 
reasons - including beliefs, judgements and desires — in respect of which the person does an 
action, the action is done voluntarily or intentionally.^ On this interpretation, Leontius' action 
to look at the dead bodies is a voluntary action, since he acts on a desire to look at them and he 
is fi-ee to refi-ain fi-om looking. This explanation of voluntary actions, held by Davidson and 
others, can be traced back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. At 1110a9 f f Aristotle illustrates 
mixed actions that 'make one doubt whether they are voluntary or 'counter-voluntary' 
(1110a8-9), with the case o f the ship captain who throws things overboard in a storm: 
^ I use intentionally and voluntarily as having the same meaning. Someone acts voluntary or intentionally when 
someone does something and he has some reasons for doing it, where reasons include judgement, belief, decision 
and desire. Moreover someone acts voluntarily or intentionally when the source of the action rests within the 
agent and the agent has factual knowledge. ( C f Aristotle's NE 1109b30 ff. and EE 1223a23 f f ) . 
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' . . . no one throws goods away whereas i f it is a condition of saving oneself and the rest of what is on 
board, any sensible person would do it. Such actions, then, are mixed, but they look as i f they belong 
more to the class of the voluntary, for actions in question are desired at the time of acting, and the end 
for which actions are done varies with the occasion...And a person acts voluntarily in the cases in 
question; (1110a9-15 trans. Rowe my own italics).'' 
It is clear in the above text that for Aristotle an action can be called voluntary in so far as the 
person has some reasons at the time of acting to take the course o f action. We can formulate 
Aristotle's claim in the following way: A does x voluntarily i f and only i f A's beliefs and 
desires are reasons for doing x ' . The ship owner has reasons to throw things overboard 
believing that he wi l l save himself and his ship and desires to do what he does; hence his 
action, under the certain circumstances, is a voluntary action. 
In the Platonic story of Leontius, on the other hand, Leontius has no reasons, other than 
his appetitive desire, to look at the dead bodies. At the very time he looks at the bodies he is 
still committed to his belief that it is a shameful thing to do. On the Aristotelian account in the 
text quoted, Leontius' action is voluntary since the desire he acts on is something within 
himself. For Davidson, cases of akrasia in the strict sense, like the one that the Leontius' story 
tells us about, are also puzzling.^ Davidson has to explain how a voluntary action can be in 
conflict with person's practical decisions. At the same time it is not part of Davidson's account 
that the desire that Leontius experiences to look at the bodies is distinct from his judgement not 
In the quoted text I have omitted purposely the next two lines 15-17, where Aristotle adds one of the other two 
conditions that account for voluntary actions, that the source of the action is within the agent. What Aristotle 
stresses, in my view, in the quoted text is that an action done by rational decision, even if this decision does not 
meet the agent's general rational plan (no one wants to throw goods away), is a voluntary action. 
'These cases are also puzzling for Socrates and early Stoics that share with Davidson the analysis of action that 
faces problems concerning akrasia in the strict sense. 
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to look at them. For Davidson, i f there is a conflict between two desires or preferences then 
both of the conflicting desires are rational. It is in that sense that action as a result of any of the 
two conflicting desires is voluntary or intentional action. Plato in the Republic and Aristotle 
provide a different account to explain such cases.^  I f there is a conflict between a person's 
decisions and actions then the actions are caused by another power within the person. For Plato 
and Aristotle non-rational desires can motivate someone to act against his best judgement^. But 
here, in my view, lies a difference between the two and also between Plato and Davidson. For 
Plato in Republic, unlike Davidson and Aristotle, such actions are not voluntary. My 
suggestion is that Plato considers actions done in virtue of a non-rational desire 'counter-
voluntary'. What follows this claim is the further suggestion that for Plato when someone acts 
on a non-rational desire sometimes or in some extreme cases this desire is like an 'alien' force 
within the person that compels him to take a course of action against his rational decision and 
his evaluation. 
Such a reading of course cannot be supported merely from the illustrated case of 
Leontius. In the story that Plato describes, Leontius is overcome by a non-rational desire, but 
there is no evidence in the text that Leontius acts involuntarily and that he is under compulsion. 
More than that, nowhere in the Republic does Plato make a distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary actions. There is only one passage at 412el-413c3, which has remained largely 
'At this point 1 do not claim that Plato's division of the soul intends to provide another explanation or even a 
response to the Socratic denial of akrasia in the so called early dialogues (esp. in the Protagoras). My claim is 
that Plato's acceptance of non-rational desires gives us a better account of human action that can also 
accommodate extreme cases of human behaviour, like the one described in the story of Leontius, that Socrates 
purposely leaves out. 
' In Aristotle's explanation of akrasia, as 1 shall try to explain briefly in the text, it is not merely a non-rational 
desire that goes against someone's best judgement, but a pair of a non-rational desire and a belief which together 
constitute a motivational set. 
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unnoticed in the literature , where Plato carefully reminds us that no one goes wrong will ingly 
when in abandoning his true beliefs about the good and succumbing to pleasures and pains. 
Plato explains that people often change their minds involuntarily (akontes) either because they 
are persuaded to do so or because of fear, grief and pleasure (413b4-7, b8-c3). But from this 
position we should not infer that the actions which are done directly under the influence of an 
emotion or a non-rational desire with no involvement or intervention o f beliefs are also 
involuntary. To put it in other words, Plato here seems to argue for involuntary actions in 
respect of false beliefs that can be formed by arguments and through persuasion or by the 
affection o f some emotions, but he does not say that actions which are done directly by non-
rational desires are also involuntary. At any rate, i f Plato's view here is a restatement of the 
Socratic thesis. The Socrates of the Protagoras and the Gorgias does recognize non-rational 
desires that operate independently of the agent's judgement.^ 
However we can find some evidence that Plato considers actions done by non-rational 
desires non-voluntary in the philosophical tradition after him. There are at least three 
occasions, two in Aristotle's Ethics and another one in the Didaskalikos written either by 
Albinus or 'Alcinous', '" where it seems that the view that actions done by the non-rational 
parts of the soul are non-voluntary actions is attributed to Plato. Let us start first with Aristotle. 
At Nicomachean Ethics 1109b30-l 11 lb3 he distinguishes between voluntary and counter-
* For a reference to this passage see: Penner 2005: 158 n. 3. 
'in the end of this chapter I shall try to make clear that in Republic Plato provides a twofold explanation of 
involuntariness. Involuntary actions can be explained either by reference to false beliefs (which is the thesis that 
Plato's Socrates holds in the dialogues preceding Republic) or by reference to non-rational desires. 
'"There is a dispute about the author of the Didaskalikos. Usually the author of the Didaskalikos, who is named in 
the manuscripts as 'Alkinoos' has been identified with the Middle-Platonist philosopher Albinus. But John Dillon 
in his Alcinous The Handbook of Platonism argues that probably Albinus and Alcinous are not names for the same 
person and that someone called Alcinous is the real author of this work. (See Dillon 1993: ix-xiii). After Dillon's 
book, as far as I know, it is widely accepted that the author is Alcinous. 
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voluntary actions. In general, actions which are done by force or ignorance are considered by 
Aristotle as counter-voluntary (1109b35-ll lOal) . On the other hand, a person acts voluntarily 
when the 'origin of moving his instrumental parts is in himself, and i f the origin (arche) of 
something is in himself (en autoi), it depends on himself (ep' autoi) whether he does this thing 
or not' (1110all5-18). Later on at l l l l a 2 2 - 2 5 , when Aristotle summarizes his claim about 
voluntary and counter-voluntary actions, he objects against those who say {isos gar ou kalos 
legetai) that things done because o f appetite {epithumid) and temper {thumos) are counter 
voluntary. Here, in my view, by legetai Aristotle refers back to Plato's Republic. This 
assumption of course might face two objections: the general question of how far we can always 
rely on Aristotle's understanding of the philosophers before him — especially Plato — and 
the ambiguity o f the reference at this point that is generated by Aristotle's practice o f not 
naming his predecessors in his ethical treatises." I think that Aristotle does read Plato correctly 
at this point. That the reference is to Plato is made clear, I think, by the usage of the terms 
thumos and epithumia that Plato uses for the lower parts o f the soul in Republic and that 
Aristotle takes over from him to name two of the three species o f orexis in De Anima 414bl. 
There is an analogous, though more elaborate, reference in the Eudemian Ethics. At EE 
1223a23 f f . Aristotle discusses which actions count as voluntary and which as counter-
voluntary. His account in EE is almost the same as that in NE with the exception that in EE 
there is one more condition, compulsion, beyond force and ignorance that accounts for 
counter-voluntary actions. Compulsion is used to render the term bia that Aristotle uses in EE 
to refer to external force. In EE there are two ways that we can speak of compulsion. In the 
" Before NE 111 la25 there is only one reference by name to Plato at 1095a32 and one more to Speusippus at 
1096b7. 
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case of the controlled and the uncontrolled man, we could say that each of them acts under 
compulsion since they act on one motive and against another one. The self-controlled man acts 
under the force of rational calculation that drags him away from the pleasures while the 
uncontrolled acts under the force of appetite that is going contrary to his rational faculty 
(1224a31-36). Of course Aristotle denies that any of them acts under true compulsion and 
hence the actions are counter-voluntary. We could say, Aristotle argues at 1224b26-29, that 
each part acts under compulsion because of the presence of the other, but we cannot say the 
same for the whole soul. The whole soul both of the self-controlled and the incontinent man 
acts not under compulsion and hence voluntarily. 
But there is also another way in which people are said (legontai) to act under 
compulsion. Aristotle considers those cases when someone does something bad and he is faced 
with flogging or imprisonment or execution i f he does not do it (1225a3-6). It seems that here, 
unlike NE, Aristotle accepts the idea that: 
ouTco yap avayKal^oixevoq K a i [ ^ T J pipe npct^ei, TI O U (pvoei, o t a v KaKov ctyaGou E V E K C f\ 
H,E'I^OVO<; mKoO d7toA,\)aeoo(; npaxxTi, Kai OCKCOV ye- oi) yap e(p' avxS) xama. 8i6 Kal TOY epcjTa 
TtoX^ol ctKouoiov Ti9eaCTiv, K a l Gu^ovg ev'iotjq K a i za (puaiKd, oxi iox^pd K a i •OTtep TTIV (pumv-
' i t is when someone does something bad for the sake of something good, or for avoidance of a greater 
evil, that someone acts by necessity and under compulsion or at all events not according to nature; and 
of course he acts non-voluntary, because these things does not rest with himself. For that reason many 
reckon even love counter-voluntary and some forms of anger and the natural impulses, because they 
are strong and beyond nature' (1225al7-21, my own translation and italics). 
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I think that the last part in italics constitutes a reference back to Plato. Again here, as in NE, we 
are faced with the difficulty o f the anonymous reference (polloi). However, there are hints that 
make us think that Aristotle is referring to Plato and his immediate successors in the Early 
Academy.'^ That the philosopher here might be — or is — Plato can be supported by the usage 
of eros in the same line. The word occurs at least another two times in EE once at 1229a21 and 
at 1245a24 with the meaning of the non-rational sexual desire. In Plato the same word is also 
used to denote the non-rational sensual desire, or even more all the non-rational desires of the 
appetitive part of the soul. Two obvious instances of this usage of eros are to be found in 
Phaedrus 238c4 where eros designates the desire without rational judgement and in Republic 
573b8 where Eros is associated with the up springing o f all the non-rational desires in the soul 
of the tyrant. 
Apart from the use of the word eros by Aristotle which might lead us to see a reference 
to Plato, Aristotle's explanation of me eph' hautoi captures, I think, how the polloi would 
consider actions done through eros counter-voluntary actions. Things that do not rest within 
the self of the agent are explained by what the nature of someone is capable to bear {ho he 
autou phusis hoia te pherein 1225a26). Here Aristotle does not explicitly mention what kind of 
things the nature of someone cannot bear. But earlier on at 1224b29 ff . he argues that both 
reason (logos) and appetite (epithumia) are natural properties and accompany us from birth. By 
saying that appetites are natural properties Aristotle refers, in my view, to those 'normal' 
'^Cf. for a similar formulation DA. 432a24-26: 'xpbTiov y&p t iva aneipa (paive-cai, ical o-o n6vov a tiveq 
Xiyovax Siop'i^ovxeq, A . O 7 I O T H C 6 V K Q I GopvKOV Kai eniGujiriTiKOV, oi be T O Xoyov E ^ O V Kai to aXoyov.' It 
is clear that by the indefinite pronoun in the plural (xiveq) Aristotle refers here to Plato and the oral 
tradition in the Early Academy. 
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desires that every person experiences throughout his life; hunger and thirst are two clear 
examples of these desires. We are justified, then, in identifying the things that 'the nature o f 
someone can bear' with those appetites which are properties of human nature. On the other 
hand there are some strong and excessive impulses like the ones that the polloi mention that are 
beyond human nature (huper ten phusin 1225a22); these are presumably the impulses that 
human nature 'cannot bear'.''' In the following lines Aristotle claims that such impulses are 
outside the agent (med' esti tes ekeinou phusei orekseds... ouk eph' hautoi 1225a26-27) and 
concludes that the actions {erga) done by these impulses are not within the agent {ouk eph' 
hemin eisin aSl).'"' Thus, according to Aristotle when the source o f some actions does not rest 
within the agent, these actions are not voluntary. This, is of course, Aristotle's view and cannot 
be attributed directly to Plato. However, the reference to his predecessors indicates that what 
Aristotle suggests here is a view that some other thinkers before him — either Plato or the 
members o f the Old Academy — used to hold. 
The second, and most important, reference comes from Didaskalikos. No matter who is 
the real author, the text is a genuine work of Middle-Platonism and a reliable source of how 
Middle-Platonists were reading P l a t o . I n chapter 32 A., having devoted the two previous 
chapters to discuss the virtues, comes to describe the emotions: 
"Eaxi Toivuv 7ta6o<; Kivriai(; ixko'^oc, V^Xfl? ^'i "^"^  KaKW r\ (bq in a.yaQ(a. "AXoyoc, yik\ ouv 
EipExai KivriCTiq, oTi o\) KpioEic; x a naQt] O\)8E 56^ai, aXXa xmv aXoyav if\q \\ivxr\c, ^Epcov 
C f also NE. 1148bl5 f f , where Aristotle argues that there are some things, which are pleasant according to 
nature {hedea phusei). 
The same holds if something is done by logismos or dianoia when these principles do not belong to the nature 
of the agent (1225a27-30) 
" I refer to the author as A. adopting Dillon's strategy in Dillon: 1993. The translation of the quoted texts from 
Didaskalikos is that of Dillon 1993 unless otherwise indicated. 
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Kivfioetq- Ev Yap z& naQr\x\.K(i) zf\c, \^\)xr\c, avviazaiai, Kai za. i]\xe.ZEpoL 'ipya o\)6' e(p' fmtv. 
" A K O W I yovv ev rmiv eyy ivETai noXXdKK; Kal d v x i T E i v o u a i v 
'An emotion is an irrational motion of the soul, in response either to something bad or to something 
good. It is called an irrational motion because emotions are neither judgements nor opinions, but rather 
motions of the irrational parts of the soul; for they come about in the affective part of the soul, and they 
are not really our actions, nor under our control. At any rate, they often come about without our 
wishing and indeed despite our resistance ' (32.1.3-8, my own italics). 
I have put in italics the second section o f the quoted text which indicates, in my view, how A. 
understands Plato's treatment of those actions that come from the irrational parts of the soul.'^ 
My suggestion is that in this passage A. seems to support the hypothesis that the actions, which 
are done as a result of the emotions of the irrational parts of the soul are counter- voluntary 
{akousi). But caution is needed here. An alternative reading of the Greek does not support this 
view. Dillon comments ad loc. that: ' A l l that A. means here is that a sudden pang of distress or 
fear, for example, is not properly to be counted as an act of ours. What happens after that, 
however (i.e. whether we resist the emotion or not), is our responsibility'.'^ According to 
Dillon, as far as I understand him, what A. says is that it is only the stirring up of the emotions 
that is involuntary and not up to us, but not the action that these emotions might produce. 
Dillon draws his explanation only from the corrupted text in the lines 5-7 where he supplies an 
The first part of the quoted text is a reference, which supports my claim that for Plato the lower parts of the soul 
are deprived of beliefs (doxai). I have argued briefly for this claim in the first part of this essay. 
"Dil lon 1993: 194. 
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(oude) in the missing text after kai and he rightly translates 'they are not really our actions, nor 
under our control', but he omits what follows. 
The following sentences (Akousi goun eggignetai en hemin pollakis kai antiteinousi) in 
the lines 7-8 supports, in my view, the reading that I suggest. Dillon translates here ' A t any rate 
they (sc. the passions) often come about without our wishing {akousi) and despite our 
resistance {antiteinousiy. But the text here and Dillon's translation are at odds with the second 
part of his comment. This sentence is introduced by A. as evidence of what had already been 
said.'* A. claims that the emotions are not our own actions because in many cases {pollakis) 
they awake without our wish and despite our resistance {antiteinousi). While Dillon proposes 
that it is our responsibility whether we decide to resist the emotion or not the text says that we 
do resist, but the emotion comes about despite our resistance. This is further explained in the 
following lines (8-12) where A. argues that 'sometimes {esth' hote) even if we know that the 
sensations presented to us are neither unpleasant not pleasant, nor yet worthy of fear 
nevertheless we are driven by them {ouden hetton agometha) which would not be the case had 
they (sc. the passions) been judgements' (translation adapted, my own italics). On this 
explanation even i f we know sometimes that we should not allow the awaking o f certain 
emotions in the end these emotions not only arise independently of our judgements but also go 
against our judgements, and they persist despite our resistance {antiteinousi) and are capable of 
motivating us towards certain actions {agometha)}'^ What A. describes here is a conflict 
The goun here is used to introduce a sentence, which is evidence for a preceding statement. C f Denniston 1954: 
451 ii. 
" The verb agometha in the passive voice with the supplement up' auton is indicative, I think, of the strength of 
some emotions when they arise and their capability to lead us towards actions despite our resistance and our wish. 
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between judgements and emotions.Such a conflict does not stress the mere fact that emotions 
in general arise independently of our judgements (something that we can draw i f we can draw 
only from the lines 5-7), but it suggests that in many cases they go against our judgements and 
lead us towards actions that we do not really want to do. It is in that sense that both the 
awakening o f some emotions and the actions that these emotions might produce despite our 
resistance are against our wish (akousi). Of course the stirring up of every emotion is not 
always in conflict with judgement. A. would argue that moderate anger (15ff.), for instance, 
does not arise against our judgement. On the contrary when someone goes to war he wants to 
feel angry to a reasonable degree in order to be able to fight his enemies. In that case also, the 
emotion of anger arises independently of our judgement in the sense that it is a non-rational 
motion of the soul, but it does not go against our judgement since we judge that we want to 
have this right kind of moderate anger in the sight o f our enemies in the battlefield. 
Before leaving the two references from Aristotle and the Didaskalikos I would like to 
make some concluding remarks. Aristotle uses negative criteria both in EE and A^^ to define 
voluntary and counter-voluntary actions. An action is not voluntary i f it is done through 
ignorance or under external force. Aristotle provides a more positive account in EE concluding 
that 'the voluntary is a matter of acting with some thought' (1224a7). In NE actions done from 
passion are voluntary actions since the source that moves the agent is within himself. In EE he 
holds a more nuanced view according to which actions done from fear might be counter-
voluntary. In the same work he seems to accept the view that actions done by impulses that 
human nature cannot bear are somewhat like actions done by an external force and hence 
°^ That A. speaks of a conflict between emotions and judgements becomes clear by reference to Ch. 24. 43-46 
where A. explicitly claims that reason and the affective parts of the soul 'occupy different locations because they 
are found in conflict'. 
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counter-voluntary. What is important for my argument is the fact that both in A^^ and EE 
Aristotle seems to attribute to Plato the view that actions done by appetite and spirit (A'£) or by 
some impulses that human nature cannot bear {EE) are counter-voluntary. Of course we cannot 
make out too much of this passage of Aristotle. Even i f , as I suggest, Aristotle refers to Plato in 
both works, the reference is abbreviated and we are not given an account of what Plato means 
by saying that the these actions are involuntary. In the Didaskalikos on the other hand, we find 
a more illuminating reading of Plato. We have seen that A., according to my interpretation o f 
the quoted text, makes the following claims: a) emotions arise independently of our 
judgements, b) many times they go against our judgements despite our resistance and our wish, 
and c) they can initiate actions which in turn are done against our wish {akousi). On the 
grounds that the text is a genuine work of Middle-Platonism and that this is how A. reads 
Plato, (b) and (c) give us some evidence that Plato would consider actions, which are done by 
emotions involuntary actions. I f we return to the story of Leontius we see that Leontius 
experiences a non-rational sexual desire to look at the dead bodies in front of him. In the text it 
is quite clear that this desire goes against his rational decision not to look at them. I f we rely on 
how A. reads Plato in the Didaskalikos Leontius is doing something that is against his wish 
and does not really want to do; hence Leontius does not act willingly. 
I I 
Eariier on in this chapter I have made the further suggestion that in those cases where 
an involuntary action is explained only by reference to the strength of a non-rational desire. 
70 
Plato would say that the agent acts under psychological compulsion. In the Greek text there is 
verbal evidence that probably supports the idea of compulsion. At 440b I Plato says that 
sometimes the appetites constrain (biazontai) reason. The same term occurs at 413b9 (see 
above) where Plato says that people are constrained (biasthentes) by fear and grief and that 
they form false beliefs involuntarily. At 4I3b9 the constraint of fear or grief makes someone 
form false beliefs and act in respect of them. In the case o f Leontius, the constraint of a non-
rational desire can lead directly to action without the mediation of any belief. For such an 
action to occur three conditions should be fulfi l led: a) the agent knows fully that he should do 
X, b) the agent experiences a strong desire to do y that arises independently of his knowledge 
and goes against it, c) the agent wants to, but cannot resist, this desire. The case of Leontius 
meets all the three conditions. He experiences a strong desire to look at the dead bodies that 
comes from his appetitive part of his soul; at the same time he knows that he should not look at 
the dead bodies; he tries to resist his non-rational desire by all means (Plato's language is 
indicative o f his effort to resist 'machoito', 'parakaluptoito' 440a 1), but in the end he is driven 
by his desire against his knowledge. 
This idea of psychological compulsion has been suggested by Santas^' in his effort to 
save the Socratic thesis on the denial o f akrasia in Protagoras. He maintains that Plato's 
Socrates in the Protagoras 'seems to run together strength [o f desire] and value estimate; when 
for instance, he [Socrates] considers an objection that might be understood to imply that 
strength o f desire varies with variation of distance from the object o f the desire, he understands 
it rather to imply that the agent's estimate of the value of the object varies with distance. The 
" Santas 1966: 1-32. 
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whole confusion is made easier to fall into by the fact that strength is not entirely independent 
of value e s t i m a t e ' . I n those cases according to Santas that we can determine the strength of a 
desire independently o f the agent's knowledge of his action and independently o f his value 
estimate then we could say that the agent was not psychologically able to refrain from doing 
this certain a c t i o n . I do not know how far Santas had in his mind the Platonic story of 
Leontius when he was endorsing the idea of compulsion to meet an objection to the Socratic 
thesis. In fact it does not seem that he borrows the idea of compulsion from Plato. However the 
way that Santas argues for compulsion captures, I think, what Plato suggests with the story of 
Leontius. 
The idea of compulsion that Santas suggests and to which I resort to interpret the story 
24 
of Leontius has met with some criticism. Penner attacks compulsion in the Santas paper by 
saying that '[w]hat Plato and Aristotle think of as irrational desires which can, nevertheless, 
result in voluntary actions, Santas called compulsions hoping thereby to save the Socratic 
thesis that no one errs willingly...Obviously Plato and Aristotle would not have availed 
themselves of Santas's word "compulsions". For that would have completely destroyed the 
account of akrasia they offer as a rival to Socrates'.Penner rests his criticism on two further 
claims in the same paper. First he believes that Plato seems to confuse the generalized simple 
non-rational desires with executive non-rational desires for particular objects.^^ In the 
preceding chapter I have argued that Plato is ful ly aware of this distinction between drives and 
what Penner calls executive non-rational desires. In Book IV he deliberately speaks of a 
Santas 1966: 29. 
" Santas 1966: 30-31. 
Penner 1990: 51-52, n. 15. 
Indeed Plato does avail himself of the word 'compulsion'. See biazontai above in the main text. 
'*Penner 1990: 59. 
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conflict between simple non-rational desires and executive rational desires because this kind of 
conflict serves better his aim of dividing the soul. The second, and most important, claim that 
supports Penner's criticism against the idea o f compulsion is that Plato does not only confuse 
drives with non-rational desires for particular objects, but also, according to Penner, Plato 
maintains that someone is acting voluntarily when he acts merely on a non-rational simple 
desire.^' I have argued so far in this chapter that Plato — unlike Aristotle — would consider 
those actions done by the non-rational parts of the soul involuntarily. It is clear in the text that 
Leontius acts on a non-rational desire that comes entirely from the appetitive part o f his soul. 
The fact that Leontius' sensual desire has a specific object, that is, the dead bodies in front of 
him, does not make this desire different in its nature from the simple generalised desires o f 
thirst, hunger and sex that Plato has described earlier on at 437d ff . That Leontius' desire is 
directed towards a specific object is quite incidental; it is just in the presence o f the dead 
bodies that Leontius perceives {aisthomenos) through his eyes that these bodies become the 
specific object o f his simple generalized sensual desire. I f so, then Leontius acts involuntarily 
on a blind non-rafional desire against his knowledge. The notion of involuntariness, that 
Penner fails to see in his criticism against Santas and the latter does not mention when he 
introduces the idea of compulsion, allows us to say that Plato does not abandon at least one of 
the Socratic theses namely that no one goes wrong willingly. But now Plato can explain 
unwillingness by reference either to false beliefs (see above) or to simple non-rational desires. 
However, despite the fact that Leontius is acting involuntary, his action can be 
described as a 'clear-eyed akratic action' that rejects the other Socratic thesis that akrasia of 
" Penner 1990: 50. 
^' That this is a view that Plato himself does not hold is now clear to Penner in Penner and Rowe 2005: 222-223, 
n.40. 
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the strict sense, or synchronic-belief akrasia as Penner calls it, never happens. The case of 
Leontius tells us that this kind of akrasia is a possibility. At this point i f we combine the 
involuntariness of Leontius' action with the fact that he tries to resist his desire, but he cannot, 
we might end up saying that what Plato describes is not a real case o f akrasia, but the 
phenomenon of human behaviour that we call compulsion. Although the mere fact that 
Leontius is overcome by his desire can be labeled akrasia in the literal meaning o f the Greek 
29 
term it is rather striking that this is an account of akrasia that Plato offers to replace the 
account that he puts in Socrates' mouth in Protagoras and those dialogues that by stylometric 
criteria precede Republic. What is striking is that while Socrates seems to argue in Protagoras 
that when someone ful ly knows what to do it is impossible to go wrong, Plato through the story 
of Leontius argues for exactly the opposite; Leontius does fully know what to do nevertheless 
he goes wrong. 
Plato's claim, i f we take it to be an explanation of akrasia, becomes stranger i f we look 
on how Aristotle explains akrasia. Aristotle in his own explanation of akrasia,^^ as far as I 
understand him, seems to claim that i f someone goes wrong then he does not fully exercise his 
knowledge. What Aristotle suggests is that in the case o f the incontinent man a part of his 
practical syllogism, either the particular premise or the conclusion of the syllogism, remain 
inactive. Aristotle explains the action o f the incontinent man by reference to a non-rational 
^' Akrates literarily means someone who is powerless or does not have power or command over a thing. In the 
abstract moral sense which is to be found in Aristotle, according to LSJ , the term means 'without command over 
oneself or one's passions'. 
^"/Vf 1146b3I-36, I I46b36-1147al0, l l 47a l l -24 and mainly 1147a24-bl9. For a detailed discussion of 
Aristotle's explanation of akrasia see Kenny 1966: 163-184, Santas 1969: 162-189, Robinson 1977: 79-91. 
Despite some slightly differences in their interpretation all of them seem to agree that when real akrasia happens 
the incontinent man does not exercise a part of his knowledge. 
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desire and an opinion (doxa).^^ The opinion that accompanies the desire is probably the 
premise of the syllogism that the incontinent man exercises. On Aristotle's explanation it 
seems that, although all the premises and the conclusion of the syllogism are present in the 
incontinent man at the time he acts, only one part of the syllogism (the opinion that 
accompanies the desire) is activated. On this explanation Aristotle would argue that the kind of 
akrasia that the story o f Leontius describes is not a reality. It would be impossible for Aristotle 
that someone might ful ly know what to do and exercise his knowledge completely and yet goes 
wrong. Leontius does not only know what he should do but it seems that he exercises his 
knowledge completely. In the description of the story Leontius does not act on a belief that 
tells him 'looking at the dead bodies is something pleasant, and these are dead bodies'. A l l that 
Leontius knows or believes is that he should not look at the dead bodies and while this 
knowledge or belief comes entirely from the reasoning part of his soul, the opposite non-
rational desire that Leontius acts on emerges from the appetitive part of his soul. That he 
exercises his knowledge completely can be justified by the fact that he tries to resist his desire 
to look at them. On the other hand, although the incontinent man in Aristotle experiences an 
inner conflict, since his non-rational desire goes against his knowledge, it is not true of the 
incontinent man that he tries to resist his desire/opinion motive in the way that Leontius does. 
This lack of resistance on the part of the incontinent man is due to the fact that he does not 
ful ly exercise his knowledge when he is under the influence of passion. We could say that 
Aristotle follows to some extent Socrates by claiming that the so-called cases of akrasia are in 
some sense cases of ignorance or of failure in respect of the agent to exercise his knowledge 
C f N E 1145b9-15 where Aristotle says that the incontinent acts according to desire and 1147a3l f f . where he 
explicitly supplies the non-rational desire with a belief that directs the desire towards a specific object {hoti pan 
glukii hedu, touti de glukii). 
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completely.^^ We are left then with the Platonic account, which totally overlooks the role of 
ignorance in the explanation of akrasia. This is why I suggest that the story of Leontius marks 
a case of compulsion,^^ which, Plato would argue, is not the same thing as real akrasia. 
Gary Watson in a fascinating paper^" tries to explain why weakness is not a case of 
compulsion. Watson argues that: 
'there are capabilities and skills of resistance which are acquired in the normal course of socialization 
and practice, and which we hold one another responsible for acquiring and maintaining. Weak agents 
fall short of standards of 'reasonable and normal' self control (for which we hold them responsible), 
whereas compulsive agents are motivated by desires which they could not resist even if they meet those 
standards. That is why we focus on the weakness of the agent in the one case (it is the agent's fault), 
but on the power of the contrary motivation in the compulsive case. And this view allows explanation 
in terms of weakness of will to be significantly different from explanations in terms of compulsion. In 
the case of weakness, one acts contrary to one's better judgement because one has failed to meet 
Cf. Santas 1969: 184-189 for a discussion on the differences and the similarities of the Socratic and the 
Aristotelian explanation. Note also that when Aristotle comes to explain akrasia at 1145bff. he starts his 
discussion by a reference to the Socratic account of Protagoras and not to the Plato of Republic. The reference 
to Socrates is justified because Aristotle might have thought that it is Socrates who tried to give a successful, 
though not adequate, explanation of akrasia. Probably Aristotle does not think that the story Leontius is a real 
case of akrasia. 
By compulsion or compulsive behaviour I mean that someone is compelled to act in a certain way by a 
motivating source other than his value-judgements, his beliefs and his practical reasoning. In Plato the non-
rational desires of the lower parts of the soul are distinct motivating forces that, in some cases, can do this job as 
the story of Leontius tells us. Aristotle seems to suggest (see below in the main text) that compulsion might be the 
result of disease or disorder. In general, to say that someone is under compulsion is to explain someone's action 
by reference merely to a non-rational desire that goes against not only his best judgement of what to do in a 
particular situation, but goes against his judgement overall. The simple fact that these irrational motivating forces 
are present in the soul does not entail that the person is under compulsion, it is only when a person acts on this 
motivating source that we say that the person acts on a compulsive desire that he cannot resist. 
Watson 1977: 316-319. 
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standard of reasonable or moral self control; whereas this explanation does not hold of compulsive 
behaviour' (my italics).^' 
I have decided to quote this text at length because I think it captures in the best way the 
difference between weakness and compulsion. I do not know to what extent, i f any, Watson 
relies for his analysis on his reading of Plato and especially on the case o f Leontius. However 
the parallel between the quoted text, especially the words in italics, and the case o f Leontius is 
striking. Watson claims that the compulsive agents could not resist even i f they meet certain 
standards while the weak person does not resist because he fails to meet these standards. We 
have seen that Leontius acquires all these capabilities and skills o f resistance, but he cannot 
resist the excessive blind desire that he experiences. It might be the case that Aristotle himself 
was aware of this distinction between akrasia and compulsion. Watson in the same paper,^^ a 
few lines before the quoted text, cites a text from NE 1150b7 ff . , where Aristotle claims that 
'For it is not surprising i f someone gives in to strong excessive pleasures or pains, but rather 
something one tends to feel sympathy for, i f he is overcome despite struggling against 
them...but it is surprising i f someone is overcome by pleasures or pains that most people can 
withstand, and is unable to struggle against these unless it is because of some natural, 
congenital factor (or because of disease)'. It is not clear what Aristotle means by 'strong 
excessive pleasures or pains'. There is some evidence that he may refer to these morbid 
dispositions towards pleasant things, which result from habituation, like the disposition to 
sexual activity with other males (1148b27-28). Aristotle says at b34-35 that no one would call 
^' Watson 1977: 331-332. 
" Watson 1977: 331. 
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un-self-controlled those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habituation and he adds at 
1149al3-15 that there are some people who have these traits without being overcome by them, 
but it is also possible to be overcome by them and not just have them. We may assume that 
Aristotle refers to those morbid conditions at 1150b7 where he says that someone is overcome 
by 'excessive pleasures and pains'. In any case whatever Aristotle means by 'excessive 
pleasures and pains', I think that the passage at 1150b7 ff. suggests a distinction between 
weakness and compulsion where the latter is explained in respect of very strong and irresistible 
desires while the former, following Aristotle's explanation of akrasia, is due to the agent's 
failure to exercise his knowledge completely and to avoid being overcome by his pleasures. I f 
Aristotle recognizes that there are actions which are done under the influence of a very strong 
desire that the agent cannot resist, it remains questionable how far these actions for Aristotle 
are counter-voluntary. In NE, as we have seen, it seems that all actions done by appetite or 
anger are voluntary actions, while in EE Aristotle seems to argue that some actions done by 
excessive desires that human nature cannot bear could be counter-voluntary actions. But i f we 
interpret Aristotle saying that only normal adults are responsible for their voluntary actions," 
we could say that compulsive agents act voluntarily but they are not in some sense responsible 
for going wrong because they do not act out o f thought and decision. For Plato on the other 
hand, as I have argued, actions done under compulsion are involuntary actions. 
The story of Leontius then within the context of book IV and Plato's recognition o f 
simple non-rational desires does not necessarily imply an explanatory account of akrasia. On 
the grounds that Leontius is acting involuntary and tries to resist with all his power, we are 
" I follow here Irwin and his interpretation on voluntary actions and responsibility in Aristotle in Irwin 1980: 117-
155. 
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allowed to read the story as a case of compulsion. Although such cases fall under the 
description of akrasia in the literal meaning of the term, they are not explained in terms of 
weak knowledge or ignorance on behalf of the agent, but they find their explanation in the 
presence of an excessive non-rational desire that the agent cannot resist. It is true though that 
compulsive behaviour is the result, as Aristotle seems to claim, o f habituation. Plato would 
agree with Aristotle that someone can always regulate his desires and avoid letting them grow 
to compulsive and irresistible desires. At the same time Plato would accept that cases like the 
one that the story of Leontius describes are a possibility.^^ The acceptance of such cases makes 
him more pessimistic about human nature compared with what Socrates says in Protagoras. 
But at the same time in Republic he is not will ing to abandon the Socratic thesis. He still thinks 
that normal human behaviour can be explained in terms of beliefs, which are usually formed 
and are affected by the non-rational desires of the lower parts of the soul (esp. the appetitive 
part). This becomes apparent in his discussion of the unjust souls and the way that the deviant 
characters are motivated towards their choices in Books V I I and IX to which I turn in the 
following chapter. 
In the beginning o f this chapter, I have noticed that the case o f Leontius might 
contradict my claim in earlier chapters of this thesis that the desires of the appetitive part of the 
soul are 'simple'. In the first part of this thesis I have supported the idea that the 'simple' 
desires or the pure inclinations are not shaped by reason, and they cannot recognize specific 
objects. This is in line with my claim in the same part, that the appetitive part is deprived of 
" I am not keen on the idea that Plato introduces the story of Leontius ad hoc to serve his aim to distinguish the 
spirited from the appetitive part of the soul. Socrates clearly indicates at 439be5 that he believes the story that 
follows. It is true though that Plato uses the story because it describes a sharp conflict between reason and 
appetite that serves Plato's argument for the kind of the division of the soul in Book IV. 
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any judgemental capacities and is unable to 'say' that something is 'such and such'. In the case 
of the Leontius, however, his appetite is directed towards a certain object something that might 
indicate that the appetitive part can recognize objects and can form judgments. One way to 
meet this difficulty would be to assume that Leontius' desire is not a 'simple' appetite, but I 
think this is not a satisfactory solution. The similarity between the conflict that Plato describes 
in the case of the 'thirsty man' and the case of Leontius is striking. In the case o f Leontius we 
get again a conflict the between a desire that comes form reason and a desire that derives from 
the appetitive part of the soul and goes against reason. The only difference is that in the story 
of Leontius reason is backed up by spirit. The other solution is to say that the case of Leontius 
goes against my claim about the non-cognitive character o f the appetitive part and indicates 
that this part is capable of saying things and recognizing objects. But Plato is very careful in 
his illustration of the story to say that it is Leontius that 'sees' the dead bodies {aisthomenos 
vekrous para toi demidi keimenous 439e7) and the appetitive part of his soul. 
I think that the aisthomenos provides a hint towards a plausible answer. The example o f 
the 'thirsty man' who wants to drink at 439a9 ff . is just an abstraction that serves Plato's aim 
of distinguishing between the two parts of the soul; the focus in this example are on the parts o f 
the soul as two distinct sources o f motivation and not the person having a soul with three parts. 
In the same manner that we could say that we never experience actual desires o f thirst in the 
way that the simple inclination of thirst is presented in the example, the inclination itself is not 
something that occurs in respect of the appetitive part of the soul in isolation. To make my 
point more clearly; i f the 'simple' thirst is, as I have suggested in the first part of this thesis,^^ 
" See chapter two. 
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an irrational movement in relation to bodily sensations — either pleasant or painful — that we 
experience, then the experience of these sensations belongs to the whole soul or the person and 
not only to one part o f it. In the case of Leontius it is the person that recognizes the dead bodies 
in front of him and feels attracted towards them. It is true however, that the non-rational 
motion towards the dead bodies springs from the appetitive part of the soul just as Leontius' 
ability to recognize that there are some bodies in front o f him belongs to the reasoning part o f 
the soul. Thus, the pure inclination that Leontius experiences is not different from the simple 
desire for drink that Plato has described earlier on. The story exemplifies how these 
inclinations occur in actual cases and what is the effect that they might have on the person that 
experiences them. On the contrary through the example o f the 'thirsty man' Plato tries to 
identify the source of these inclinations and to describe their nature. 
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4. Deviant Characters and Appetite. 
At the end o f Book FV (445a5-b5), Plato and Glaucon have agreed that the just person 
is better o f f than the unjust. In the just soul of Book FV each part is doing its own job with 
reason being in charge and taking care of the whole soul (441e4-6). At 445c6 Plato mentions 
that there are four types of vice and four unjust souls that deviate from the above definition. 
But at this point instead of giving an elaborate account of each type, he goes on to discuss the 
arrangements of the rulers of the ideal city and their education, which in turn leads him to the 
epistemology and the metaphysics of Books V - V I I . It is only in Books V I I I and IX that he 
returns to the issue he mentioned in Book V I and discusses the four types o f vice in the soul: 
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Rather than simply classifying the four types o f 
vice in the soul, Plato presents them as a series of moral degeneration starting with timocracy 
and ending with tyranny. The timocrat devotes his whole life to the pursuit of honour. His son, 
the oligarch, values money as the ultimate end of his life and does everything to acquire it. The 
son of the oligarch, the democratic character, satisfies equally the necessary and the 
unnecessary desires. The last type in the series of the characters, the tyrant, exercises every 
kind of desires even the most lawless ones. In all the deviant characters one of the lower parts 
appears to be in charge instead of reason. In the timocratic man it is the spirited part that rules 
the whole soul, while in the three remaining types the satisfaction or the constraint of various 
kinds of appetitive desires gives priority to the appetitive part over reason. In this chapter I 
attempt a sketch of the way that Plato describes this degeneration. My aim is to try to show 
how the lower parts of the soul, especially the appetitive part, influence the person and lead 
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him to the wrong choices. M y claim is that that the unreasonable choices of these characters 
are the result of an improper function of the reasoning part, which, after a stage, is further 
affected by the lower parts. 
Let me start first with the timocratic man. The way that Plato describes the shift from 
reason to spirit in the soul of the timocrat suggests, in my view, that the descent of the soul 
begins when the person forms the wrong beliefs and fails to choose the right plan in his life. 
At 549e2-550b7 Plato describes how the timocrat comes to turn over the government in his 
soul to the spirited part: 
OiaGa oSv, fjv 8' eycb, 6xi K O I oi oiKe'cai z&v xoiouxcov evioTe XaQpa. jipoq xouq VEIC, xoiauxa 
Xeyovaiv, oi 5oKoOvxe(; euvoi E i v a i , K a i edv xvva i5u)aiv r\ ocpeiXovxa xpTlH"'^". V l^n 
eiie^epxexai 6 naxx\p, r[ xi aXko otSiKoOvxa, 8iaKeXe\)ovxai bn<aq, enEvSdv ctvfip yevT\xai, 
xi^copfiaexai ndvxaq tovq xoiouxovq K a i ctvfip n.aA,Xov e a x a i xoO nazp6<;. m l e^icbv exepa 
xoiauxa ctKo-uei K a i opa, xouq ^ev xd avxwv npdxxovxaq ev xfj n6Xt\ r\XiQiox)(; xe Ka^ou^evouq 
K a i ev amKpcp Xoya ovxaq, xouq 5e xd aiix&v xnivmtvovq xe K a i e7taivo\)|xevot)q. xoxe 6f| 6 
veoq itdvxa xd xoiaOxa dKOUcov xe K a i opcov, K a i a u xoug xov naxpoq X6yov<^ dKoucov xe K a i 
opcov xd e7tixri8e\)|a,axa aviox) tyyvQEv napd xd xcov dXX.(ov, eXK6|a.evo<; -UTI' ducpoxepcov xouxcov, 
xoO jaev naxpo^ amov x6 A-oyioxiKov ev xfj v ^ x f l dpSovxoq xe K a i au^ovxoi;, xwv 8e dXXcov x6 xe 
eniGuixrixiKOv K a i x6 0vnoei8e(;, 8id x6 \ir\ KaKou dv8p69 eivai X T I V tpuaiv, 6niX.iai(; 8e xaii; xcov 
aXX(x>v KaKaTq KexpfjaQai, eiq x6 |a,eaov eX.K6)Aevoq vn' dmpoxepcov xouxcov rj^Ge, K a i xfiv ev 
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tavzS) apxTiv 7tape8coKe z& neacp xe K a l (piXoviKO) Kal 9unoei8eT, Kai eyeveTo -uyriXocppcov xe K O I 
(piA.oxijioq dvTip. 
'You are aware, then, I said, that the very house-slaves of such men, i f they are loyal and friendly 
privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and i f they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer 
whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood 
and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the boy goes out he hears and sees the same 
sort of thing. Men who mind their own affairs in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in 
slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honoured and praised. Then it is that 
the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and 
with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father 
watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle in his soul and the others the appetitive and 
the passionate; and he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications, 
under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the 
intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of 
honour'. 
We see that the timocrat turns the lead in his soul over to the spirited part of the soul since he 
has been persuaded by the arguments of the servants and his mother and has failed to follow 
the words of his father. By saying that the timocratic person has been persuaded to value 
honour by the people that surround him, Plato probably means that the person has come to 
think or to believe that honour is something worth pursuing. Hence, the timocratic person has 
formed a belief according to which he has decided, as we are told, to make political honour the 
ultimate end in his life. However, two immediate questions may rise. First: why has he chosen 
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to follow the instructions of those that tell him that honour is something worth pursuing and 
not the words of his father? Second: why, as I am inclined to argue, are the words of his 
mother and the servants of the house received by the reasoning part of the soul and not by the 
two lower parts? (The way that the text describes how the different arguments affect the soul 
may suggest that the words of the father are accepted by the reasoning part while those of the 
rest of the people by are accepted the lower, the spirited part). Let us take up the first question. 
At 377a-c where Plato describes the first stage of education, he maintains that the young 
children should be exposed only to those stories that are appropriate and infuse the right 
beliefs: 
'we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole false but there is truth also in 
it.. .Do you know then that the beginning in every task is the chief thing especially for any creature that 
is young and tender...Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance 
stories...and so to take into their minds opinions for the most past contrary to those what we shall think 
desirable for them to hold when they grow up?' 377a2-b8 
On the grounds of what Plato claims about the right intellectual development of the children 
even at an early stage of their lives, it is not surprising that the timocrat who as a young person 
is being exposed (6 veoq ndv-ca xdt Toiauxa ctKouov xe Kal opdiv) to what the rest of the people tell 
him is persuaded by them and finally forms wrong beliefs. Probably Plato thought, as the 
passage on the education of the young children suggests, that at an early stage when children 
do not have the capacity to distinguish between what is true and false, any kind of bad 
influence on them should be avoided. The timocrat, without being by nature of a bad 
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disposition, is deceived by what he hears fi-om the people around him and forms the wrong 
beliefs. 
Let me turn now to the second question. In the light of what I have proposed in the 
earlier chapters of this thesis, the lower parts of the soul, and especially the appetitive part, 
seem to be deprived of any kind of cognition and reasoning. Consequently it seems rather 
difficult to think that these parts can understand the arguments or the words of those that try to 
persuade the young person. But even i f we accept that these parts are equipped with some 
reasoning and can understand the arguments, we come up with another difficulty. In that case 
we have to assume that the reasoning part, by accepting the words o f the father, forms the right 
beliefs while the appetitive part, being influenced by the other set of arguments, forms the 
wrong beliefs. On this picture how and why does the spirited part take the lead in the soul? We 
may assume that a conflict between the two takes place and the spirited part wins. However, 
such a conflict is not suggested in the text. More than that, even in Book FV where Plato 
introduces the division of the soul, it does not seem that spirit and reason are in conflict in the 
way that reason and appetite are. On the contrary, spirit is presented as an ally to reason in the 
effort of the latter to control appetite. In any case, the picture according to which spirit takes 
the lead o f the soul by its own devices seems to me merely metaphorical and it could not be 
what Plato thought. More than that, towards the end of the passage quoted at 549e2-550b7, 
Plato seems to suggest that it is the person that decides to turn over the government of his soul 
to the spirited part ( m i ir\v ev eamm ctpxfiv napibwKE xG> (XEOCO T E Kai ipiA-oviKcp KOX 0U|ioei5eT).'"' 
See Price 1995: 54 who suggests that 'Mental parts should not be taken to be subjects of mental activities...for 
a subject of an activity cannot also be the aspect of another subject in respect of which this subject performs it'. 
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The next type, the oligarch, is described as someone who, because of his father's 
misfortunes, decides to 'seat in the throne (of his soul) the appetitive part and money-loving 
part' (553c5-6), making money-earning the ultimate end of his life. In the case of the oligarch, 
we are not told exactly how this type comes to value earning money more than honour. 
However, the shift fi-om one end to another can be explained again in terms of beliefs. The 
oligarch has changed his beliefs about what should be valued more in comparison to his father, 
the timocratic man, who has been persuaded that the pursuit of honour is the best end. The 
oligarch however does not change his beliefs by means of persuasion but by means o f some 
external 'force' that compels him to think in a certain way. At 553b7-c7 where the shift is 
described, we are told that the oligarch decided to make money-earning the end in his life 
because he felt fear seeing his father losing all his fortune: 'I8d)v 5E yz, 5> cpiA,E, xaOxa KOCV 
7ca9d)v Kai anoXiaac, xcc ovxa, Seiaaq oT|xai tvQvq EJti KCtpaXfiv wGet &K XOV 9p6vo\) xoO ev xfi 
eauxou \|/t)xfi (pi^oxin'iav xe Kai x6 0^)^oel8e(; EKeTvo' (553b7-cl). It is not surprising that Plato 
considers fear as something that can make someone change his beliefs. Consider the passage at 
412e4-413c3 in Book I I I where Plato suggests to Glaucon that the true guardians should be 
proved strong against any kind o f influence that might change their beliefs. According to Plato 
there are two ways that someone might be 'forced' to change his/her beliefs. One way is by 
means of persuasion or forgetfulness: 
TpayiKcbq, fjv 8' eyoj, Kiv8t)VEU(o XeyEiv. KKantvxai^ ^ev yap xohc, |aExa7teiCT0Evxaq XEyco Kai xobt; 
e7ciA,av9avo)XEvo\)(;, oxi xwv fiev xpovoq, xwv 8E \6yoq E^aipoufiEvoq Xav9avEi- vuv yap nov 
Hav9avei(;;' 
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'I must be talking in high tragic style, I said, by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean 
those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument 
strips them unawareness of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not?' (413b4-7) 
Another reason that someone might change his/her beliefs is because of an external force: 
Tovq |XTiv YoriTE\)9evi;a(;, cbq iy&\ia\., K & V at) cpairiq eivai oi av ^ETaSo^dacoaiv f\ \)(p' TiSovfjq 
K T I X T I G E V T E ? TI vnb (p6po\) xi SEiaavtEq. 
'Well then, by those who are constrained or force 1 mean those whom some pain or suffering compels 
them to change their minds' (413cl-3)'" 
The oligarch apparently belongs to those that have changed their beliefs because of fear. We 
notice again that the oligarch in the light of false beliefs and a further distortion of his 
reasoning part has decided to pursue another end in his life turning the rule in his soul to the 
appetitive part. 
It might be objected again that it is not the person that takes this decision in the light of 
his reasoning part, but that the appetitive part knocks out reason and supplies its own ends. In 
the case of the oligarch, the view that the appetitive part of the soul chooses the ends instead of 
the reasoning part can find some support at 553dl-7. Plato claims that in the soul of the 
oligarch the appetitive part 'under this domination w i l l force the rational and spirited principles 
to crouch lowly to right and left as slaves, and wi l l allow the one to calculate and consider 
For this second way according to which someone might be forced to change his mind, see also the preceding 
chapter of this part. 
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nothing but the ways of making more money from a little, and the other to admire and honour 
nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and 
whatever contributes to i t ' . On one suggestion, the appetitive part here can be understood as 
being able to supply its own ends without the help of reason and hence to motivate the person 
to acquire more money. The only role that is left to reason is to find out the means towards the 
satisfaction o f that end, that is, the means to acquire more money. Bobonich who has advanced 
this interpretation'*^ suggests that since Plato assigns the desire for money to the appetitive part 
o f the soul (442a5-7) it seems that this part can understand that money is the means towards 
the satisfaction of other bodily desires. On this assumption, Bobonich suggests a rather 
complicated reading of this passage. According to him, since the appetitive part can understand 
that money lead to the satisfaction of the rest of the desires, it enslaves reason to find out the 
best means for the acquisition of money. But i f the appetitive part has the capacity for the first 
means-end relation, that is, money as the means towards the satisfaction o f the bodily desires, 
why it is unable to take also the second step and to find the best means to acquire more 
money?''^ 
See Bobonich 2002; 534-536 n. 47. For Bobonich this is a passage that supports his claim that the lower parts 
of the soul can have beliefs or some kind of reasoning (see also chapter one of this essay.). Irwin 1995:284-287 
suggests a more complicated picture on which the appetitive part uses the reasoning part to find the most 
efficiency means towards certain ends. Even on that picture Irwin accepts that the appetitive part is capable of 
supplying its own ends and finding the adequate means by appealing to reason 
It is true that Bobonich's claim can find some support at 580dlO-58Ia where Plato claims that the appetitive 
part is also called philochrematon because all the bodily desires are satisfied through money {dia chrematon). But 
I cannot see why we have to put to much weight in this passage and to assume that Plato attributes the capacity of 
means-end reasoning to the appetitive part of the soul. On the grounds that Plato has already allocated the desire 
of money to the appetitive part at 442a5-7 in the initial division of the soul where the appetitive part is presented 
as irrational it would be strange that here in Book VII this part becomes capable of some kind of thought. What 
probably Plato had in mind was something like that: since the acquisition of the 'goods' that will satisfy the bodily 
appetites is achieved through money, the desire for money although not appetitive in its nature is strongly 
associated with the bodily appetites. In that case it is not that the appetitive part desires money, but the person 
who has formed wrong beliefs and has become attached to the satisfaction of the bodily needs. In chapter two I 
have suggested that the existence of the appetitive part and the strength that Plato attributes to it can explain to 
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Another, and more simple explanation, is to say that the person in respect of his false 
beliefs comes to think that money-earning is the ultimate end that he can pursue in his life. 
Once he has put the end he is using reason to find the best means towards this end. That it is 
the person that decides what to do in respect of the reasoning part of the soul and the beliefs 
that belong to this part is implied in my view at 554cl 1-d where we are told how the oligarch 
decides, in some cases, to restrict the bad desires. 
'^Ap' G U V oi) xouxa) SfjXov 6xi E V xoiq aXXoii^ at)|4,poA,aioi(; 6 xoioOxoq, E V O T I ; Et)5oKin.Et 8oKcbv 
5'iKaioi; E i v a i , E T H E I K E X x ivi EauxoO piqt K C X E X E V aKXac, KaKdc, EniBv\iiaq Evouaaq, ou nEiGcov 6xi 
OVK d | iEivov, ox)5' fmEpdiv Xoyw, aXX' avdyKTi K a i (poPcp, itEpl xfiq dXXrii; o u a i a q xpE|xa)v; 
'And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, 
he by some better element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within, not 
persuading them that it 'is better not' not taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling 
for his possessions generally'. 
This passage suggests two things: a) the beliefs with which the oligarch decides to restrain 
some of his appetites seem to belong to another part of the soul (enieiKeT xivl eautou), and not to 
the same that generates the 'bad' desires. It is worth noting that he decides to restrain the 'bad' 
desires in the light of the same beliefs that he decided to make money-earning the ultimate end 
some extent the unreasonable character not only of our physical bodily desires but of all our desires and choices. 
Plato wants to emphasize that the desire of the oligarch for money, though not appetitive in its nature, can be 
explained in terms of false beliefs and a distorted reasoning part of the soul, and the influence that the appetitive 
part has on the soul. See also below in the main text and the desire of the democratic man to do some philosophy. 
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of his l ife (avdyK-n K Q I (p6P(p, nepi Tfjq aXXry; oxi&mc, xpencov;)."'' I f now these beliefs according to 
which he decides to restrain his desires do not belong to the appetitive part, as the text 
suggests, how is it possible that the beliefs on which he has made his decision to pursue money 
belong to this part? b) we are told that the oligarch in respect o f his better part 'forcibly keeps' 
down the evil desires. This picture alludes to the description in book IV where reason controls 
the appetitive part. Thus, we have good reasons to assume that this better part to which the 
beliefs of the oligarch belong is the reasoning part of the soul. 
The third type in this series of degeneration, the democratic man, is described as 
someone who like the oligarch has turned the government of his soul to the appetifive part, but 
unlike the oligarch, who in some cases restrains some of his appetites, the democratic man 
satisfies any kind o f appetite: 
OuKoOv, rjv 8' e y w , K a i 5ia^fj x6 KaG' f ^ E p a v OUTCO xotpi^o^iEvoq Tfj 7tpooni7txo\)CTT| En\Qv\iia., T O T E 
jXEv I^EO-OCOV K a i KaTa^)Xo•u^£vo(;, avQic, 8E vSponoTcov K a i K a T i c r x v a i v o ^ E v o q , T O T E 5' aC 
yy>\ivall,6\iE\>o<;, E a x i v 5' O T E apycov K a i ndvTtov a ^ E ^ c i v , T O T E 5' cbq E V (piXooocpia S i a T p i p w v . 
noXXa.K\.c, 5E J t o X i T E U E T a i , K a i avarniSuv o T i a v T U X T I ^ey^i '^ ^ T t p d T T E r K d v n o x E T i v a q 
7toXE|a,iKO\)<; ^riXman, zavxr\ cpEpETai , TI xpTmoTiaTiKOUt;, Ej t i T O O T ' au. K a i O I J T E Tiq TCt^ii; oi>T£ 
c t v d y K r i ETtEOTiv a u T o v Tm pio), aXX' r[5x)v XE 5ri K a i eA,Ev9Epiov K a i f iaKapiov KaX&v T O V piov 
TOVTOv xpf\xa\ a\)x& 8id TiavToq. 
Note how the oligarch comes to make money-eaming the ultimate end of his life "ISrnv 5e ye, & cpiXe, taOxa 
Kai Jiaetbv Kai anoXeoac, i d ovxa, Seioaq oTjiai eu0i)q eni Ke(paA,fiv cbOet E K X O U 6p6vo\) xov ev xfi eauxou 
v|/\)xfl <piXoxi)iiav xe Kai x6 9v)Hoei5eq' (553d7-cl). 
91 
'And does he not, I said, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the 
day, now wine biding and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute and again drinking 
only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all 
things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for 
politics and bounces up and says and does whatever enters his head. And i f military men excite his 
emulation, thither he rushes, and i f moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion 
to his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves 
to it to the end' (561c6-d8) 
It is striking that although in the democratic man the appetitive part of his soul is said to 
be in charge the desires that he satisfies are not all of them appetitive ones. His desire for 
philosophy or his desire for politics have nothing to do with the bodily pleasures that Plato 
normally associates with the appetitive part of the soul. On the contrary these desires may be 
said to be desires that belong to the reasoning part of the soul.'*' This is evidence, and in my 
view strong evidence, that when the soul descends from its ideal state it is not the case that one 
of the lower parts takes the place of reason and rules over the other three, satisfying its own 
desires. We have noticed that in the case of the timocratic man and in the case of the oligarch 
the shift from one type of person to the other — or from one condition of the soul to another — 
is not merely a 'psychological' process where one part of the soul takes control over the other 
two. It is not that either spirit or appetite knocks out reason and sets a plan of life or fixes 
certain ends according to their own devices. The shift seems to be the choice o f the person who 
"'See Scott 2000: 23 who claims that '[H]is pursuit of some short of intellectual interest (though not, in Plato's 
sense, philosophy) suggests that he is someone for whom discovery can occasionally be a goal and he satisfies 
rational desires'. 
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decides to satisfy the desires of one part of the soul. We see that the handing over to one part o f 
the soul rather than to another follows, in both cases, the person's decision to value the desires 
of this part more. I f the rational choice precedes the psychological domination of one part over 
the other, then it is the rational part of the soul that values and promotes the desires either o f 
the spirited or the appetitive part. The picture of the unjust souls where one o f the lower parts 
seems to take the lead of the whole soul is, in my view, merely metaphorical and emphasizes 
the unreasonable character o f some of our desires and our choices because of a distorted and 
imperfect reasoning part. 
I I 
In the first part of this thesis I have suggested that the sharp distinction between reason 
and appetite or between rationality and irrationality is not normally manifested in actual souls. 
This is not to say that these parts do not influence in some way or another our choices, but they 
are not the parts that lead us towards the wrong choices. What leads these people astray are 
their false beliefs and their attainment to what they have falsely believed to be the right end. As 
a result all the choices o f the unjust persons are made in the light of what they believe to be the 
ultimate end and at the same time their lives are organized in the light of this end. I f we look at 
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how the oUgarch restrains the unnecessary desires'*^ we notice that the oligarch does so by 
reference to his beliefs according to which he has made money-earning the ultimate end in his 
life. The just person where reason is in its best function would draw the distinction between 
necessary and unnecessary desires by reference to his knowledge about the goodness and 
badness of these desires."^ The fact that the oligarch's rational part is distorted and is infused 
by wrong beliefs explains his failure in the end to gain ful l control over his unnecessary desires 
and to shift to the democratic man: 
K a l nozk ol[iai x6 br\\ioKpax\Kb\i -unexcbpriae xcp oA-iyapxiKO), m i tivec; TCOV ETCiSumcov a i 
|xev 8iE(p9dpriO(xv, a l 5e K a i e^EKeaov, al8oO(; Tivoq EYYEvo^evriq E V xfi zov V E O U \)/Dxfi, K a i 
KaTEKOCTufiGri jia^iv 
AuGiq 5E oTnai xcov EKTiEaouatov E7cv0U)a.i(bv aXXai •U7iOTpE(p6|j.evai avyyevtiq bi 
avETtiCTtrmoauvriv Tpocpfjq itaxpoq noXXai T E Kai ioxupai EyEvovxo 
TzXzm&aai bx] ol\iai mxE^aPov xfiv xou V E O U xfji; vi/vxfjq aKponoXiv, aioGonEvai 
KEvrivfiaGriixaxcov T E m i ETtixTiSE-Ojaaxcov KaXwv Kai Xoytov dXriGcov, ov 5T) apiaxoi (ppovpoi X E 
Kai (puXttKEi; E V dvSpcav GEotpiXwv Eiai 8iavoiai(;. 
'And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites 
having been destroyed and others expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young 
man's soul and order is restored... 
"* At 558d8-559d2 necessary desires are said to be those that we cannot get rid of and are beneficial. The desire 
for bread {sitou), for example, is one that someone cannot get rid of while he is alive and is also beneficial since it 
contributes to his survival. But there are also desires that fall under the necessary ones and do not fulfil both 
conditions. The desire for 'prepared meal' (opsou) at 559b6 is beneficial because it promotes health but someone 
can still survive without it. 
See more about that in the following chapter. 
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And sometimes other broods of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place 
owing to the father's ignorance of true education and wax numerous and strong... 
And in the end, I suppose, seize the citadel of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied 
by studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians in 
the mind of men who are dear to the gods' (560a4-c9) 
In his turn the democratic man makes his dominant value the satisfaction of both the necessary 
and the unnecessary desires. In Plato's description the democratic man makes use of the 
democratic political devices o f rotation in office and selection by lot (561b2-5) to decide which 
desire he wi l l satisfy every day. Presumably, Plato does not mean that the democratic man's 
decision which desire he w i l l satisfy first and which second is completely irrational. Probably 
he w i l l satisfy first the most intense desires and those which are essential for his survival like 
thirst and hunger, and then the unnecessary ones. What Plato criticizes is not so much the way 
that the democrat decides which desire to satisfy first and which second, but he criticizes, as 
Santas claims,''* a version of the human good. What is essential — and for Plato irrational or 
as I prefer to call it 'unreasonable'^— in this version of human good is that the person, for 
instance the democratic man, decides which desire to satisfy by reference to the strength or the 
intension of the desire rather than by reference to its goodness or badness. Although he uses his 
instrumental reasoning to find the means for the satisfaction of his desires or even to decide 
which desire to satisfy first and which second, he is deprived of considerations of the goodness 
of the desires and their objects and in that way he fails to bring order and rationality in his 
choices. 
Santas 2001: 67 
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We see that the shift from the oligarch to the democratic man and from that one to the 
stage of the tyrant is an easy process since the former has started acting on a desire o f the 
appetitive part of the soul. Becoming attached to 'appetite', the oligarch becomes further 
attached to the unnecessary ones in the case of the democratic man and even to the lawless 
ones in the case of the tyrant: 
ac, naXm eixev So^aq E K naidoq nepl KaX&\ te K a i aloxpwv, Tccq SiKaiaq novounevaq, a i 
vEcoaxi EK SouA-Eiaq XEA.'ujiEvai, 8op\J(popoSaai xov "Epiota, KpaTTiaouoi ^.E-t' E K E ' I V O U , a i 
npoTEpov lAEv ovap E X U O V T O E V iinvcp, O T E rjv avxoq E X I hno vo^oiq T E K a i jtaxpv 
5ri|4,OKpaxou)4.Evo(; E V Eauxw-
' . . . in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the hounorable and the base, the 
opinions accounted just, will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated and released, which, 
serving as body-guards of the ruling passion will prevail in alliance with i t— I mean the opinions that 
formerly were freed form restraint in sleep, when being still under the control of his father and the laws' 
(574d5-el).'" 
At these three stages of degeneration, that of the oligarch, the democrat and the tyrant the 
rational part of the soul is further affected by the growth of a number of appetitive desires that 
the person either tries to control occasionally or does not control at all. Plato's point through 
the description of these three types in the ranking of the deviant characters is that in so far as 
•"Note that even in the case of the tyrant the person decides to satisfy the lawless desires because he has changed 
his beliefs about what is good and bad. For the lawless desires that rise in the dream at 571c ff. and the case of the 
tyrant see also the next chapter. 
96 
someone acts on a appetite with no reference to the goodness o f the appetite then he can easily 
be overwhelmed by a number o f appetites and start satisfying all of them. We have seen that 
the rational part of the timocrat and the oligarch in the first place, is affected by wrong beliefs 
which come either by argument and persuasion in the case of the former or from fear in the 
case o f the latter. Plato claims'*^ that, since the reasoning part of the oligarch is affected by 
wrong beliefs about what is good to pursue and is not in its best condition, the shift to the 
democratic man and the satisfaction of the necessary and the unnecessary desires can easily 
happen. 
To understand why the shift is easy we have to look how the oligarch restrains his 
desires. In the passage at 554cl l -d that I have quoted above we see that in some cases he 
considers that some of his desires are 'bad' because they wi l l put in danger his fortune and he 
tries to constrain them, while on other occasions when his fortune is not in danger he goes on 
to satisfy these desires. The criterion according to which the oligarch decides which desires 
should be satisfied and which should be constrained is his belief that money-earning is the best 
thing to pursue in his life. In other words the oligarch has a false conception about what is 
good or bad. In the case o f the oligarch it is not made explicit that his failure to keep an order 
in his life and his choices is the result of his false beliefs and his misconception of what is good 
or the real good for him. However, at 554d9-e6 we are told that this type o f person 'would not 
be really one, but in some sort a double man' and at the same time 'the true virtue o f a soul in 
union and harmony with itself would escape him' . This is a clear reference back to Book IV 
and the harmony of real just soul where the three parts come together and become one under 
See 560a9-b2, 560b7-561a4. 
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the rule of reason (443c9-444a2). In the following chapter of this part I describe which should 
be the condition of the reasoning part in order to be able to rule in a normative way so that real 
harmony is achieved in the soul. My point there is that in the ideal harmonious soul reason is 
not only in charge, but, as the passage at 442c4-7 suggests, should also have knowledge o f 
what is good and bad for each part of the soul and the soul as a whole. The person whose 
reasoning part has this knowledge o f good and bad — or knowledge of the Good — can 
achieve complete order in his soul by thinking rational thoughts and making the right choices. 
In the opening paragraph of this chapter I have mentioned that Plato postpones the discussion 
of the unjust souls in the end o f Book IV and takes on the topic again after the discussion of the 
epistemology and the metaphysics of Books V - V I I . This strategy of course is not accidental 
and is in line with the whole argument of the Republic and the initial question that Socrates has 
addressed in Book I about the definition of justice. The descent of the soul from a stage of real 
justice and harmony to various stages o f disharmony and injustice can be explained by 
reference to lack of knowledge between good and bad. It is interesting that lack o f knowledge 
of good and bad is what marks the first stage of descent in the case o f the timocrat. We have 
seen that the soul of the timocrat, being under the bad influence of people in his environment, 
is implanted with wrong beliefs, and he chooses to make honour the ultimate end o f his life. It 
seems that soul's descent from an ideal state towards worse conditions begins when reason 
lacks knowledge o f good and bad and fails to direct each part of the soul and the soul as a 
whole towards the right ends. 
This lack of knowledge explains why the shift fi-om one stage to another becomes an 
easy process. The oligarch fails to keep order in his choices because he does not have 
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knowledge, but his reasoning part is infused by wrong beliefs. Since he decides which desires 
he wi l l satisfy by reference to beliefs that are not stable and change from time to time 
according to the circumstances, it is possible that at some point he may decide to start 
satisfying all his desires, both the necessary and the unnecessary ones, and shift to the 
democrat. Similarly the democrat, as we have seen, since he decides to satisfy his desires by 
reference to the intensity of each desire and not by reference to its goodness, descends to the 
next stage where he satisfies all the intensive desires including the lawless ones. Of course, 
once the reasoning part of the soul has been infused with the wrong beliefs and becomes weak, 
it can be further affected. In the case of the timocrat it seems that his failure to acquire the right 
beliefs and to organize his life accordingly resides only in factors which are external to him. As 
we are told, the timocrat has not developed any bad dispositions, which might have affected his 
beliefs. The same happens more or less with the oligarch. However, the tyrant is said to 
become such a person 'either by nature or by habits or by both' (573c8),^' something which 
suggests that the previous attachment to the appetites when the soul was at the stage of the 
democrat had affected further the beliefs o f this person and as a result he decides to satisfy any 
kind of desire. The case of the tyrant seems to imply that the descent o f the soul is not just a 
descent of the reasoning part o f the soul from its best condition to a worse one, but a descent 
that has also to do with the involvement of the rest of the parts o f the soul and their relation to 
the reasoning part. A t any rate this why the unjust souls, even metaphorically, as I have 
suggested, are presented by Plato as being governed by one of the lower parts of the soul. 
" Shorey translates habits the term epitedeumasi and nature the term pinisei. At 550b4 in the description of the 
timocrat he translates the term phusin as 'dispositions' something which brings the meaning of the term close to 
he meaning of epitedeunasi in the passage at 537c8. It is unclear what exactly Plato means by phusis here. 
Probably he wants to say that the disorder in the soul of the tyrant cannot be the result only of bad education, but 
also the result of a natural defect. 
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Let us see, however, the motivational role of these parts, especially the appetitive part, 
in the unjust souls. In Book I V where we get the initial division of the soul and the initial 
characterization of the parts of the soul, we have seen that the appetitive part is associated with 
the bodily desires such as hunger, thirst, sensual desire and the rest. In my analysis of Plato's 
argument for the tripartition o f the soul (see chapter two) I have tried to suggest that one way 
that the appetitive part of the soul can be conceived is as the locus of the irrational motions o f 
the soul that start moving the soul towards one direction. In this picture, these motions 
constitute the core elements of our fully-fledged physical desires, which are shaped by the 
involvement o f reason and are directed towards specific objects that wi l l satisfy our needs. The 
above picture emerges from the conflict that Plato has used in Book FV to separate reason from 
appetite and his argument about the simple desires. However, as I have suggested there, the 
role of the appetitive part as the locus of the irrational motions of the soul remains unnoticed in 
our fully-fledged desires since these desires with the involvement of reason do not belong to 
one part, but to the whole soul. On this interpretation Plato retains for the appetitive part of the 
soul one role according to which this part represents our appetitive nature, that is, all the bodily 
inclinations that we experience. These inclinations are not the result of any kind of thought or 
belief, but are irrational motions that emerge from pleasant sensations or bodily pains and so 
on. At the same time since these inclinations arise in a distinct part o f the soul other than 
reason and do not involve any kind o f thinking or reasoning, exfreme cases of human 
behaviour or action, like the one described in the case of Leontius, can be explained by 
reference to this role of the appetitive part o f the soul. 
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However, the appetidve part of the soul is used by Plato in his description of the 
deviant characters in another way and without the purely 'bestial' character that it has in the 
argument for tripartition. Let us look at the appetites of these unjust types that this part is 
supposed to rule in their soul. The oligarch apart from the desire for money (see above) 
satisfies either some necessary or unnecessary 'appetites', as we have seen, according to the 
circumstances. In each case all these appetites that the oligarch has and satisfies do not have 
the character of pure inclinations, but they are shaped by his beliefs about what is best for him 
to do in each case. When we are told at 554dl-2 that in some cases he restrains some 'bad' 
desires {kakas epithumias), these are possibly well shaped desires for certain things that the 
oligarch would like to acquire. On certain occasions however, they are considered to be 'bad' 
because he believes that satisfying them or getting the objects o f these desires would be 
something that may harm him in the circumstances. More than that, it is not clear that these 
desires are only bodily ones and have to do with the satisfaction of bodily pleasures. It is true 
that when Plato distinguishes between necessary and unnecessary desires, arguing that the 
oligarch, unlike the democrat satisfies the former and usually restrains the latter, he is using the 
example of the physical desire for food (558da4-559cl). Nevertheless we can fairly assume 
that the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires is not restricted only to bodily 
desires. One desire which is classified as necessary because, for instance, it is beneficial — one 
of the criteria according to which Plato classifies desires as necessary and unnecessary (b3 
6)— could be any kind o f desire, either bodily or not, the satisfaction o f which is thought by 
the person as something good or beneficial under certain circumstances. 
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That the unjust types whose soul is said to be governed by the appetitive part do not 
only satisfy bodily appetites is made clear, as we have seen, in the case of the democrat. The 
democrat, among other bodily desires, is also said to satisfy from time to time his desire for 
doing philosophy or politics. Presumably his desire for philosophy or politics is not peculiar to 
the appetitive part of his soul but seems to be more a desire of the reasoning part. Of course 
even in those cases that the democratic person is devoted to some kind of philosophy, his 
desire to do philosophy, though not peculiar to the reasoning part of the soul, is not a fully 
'rational' desire in the sense that the democrat has not value this activity by reference to its 
goodness. In contrast to the real philosopher who finds real and pure pleasure in intellectual 
contemplation throughout his whole life and desires the truth which is the object o f this activity 
(485d3-4), the democratic person satisfies a preference of the moment.^^ At the same time we 
have seen that the shift from one stage to another is marked by a relevant change of beliefs in 
respect o f the person as to what is best for him to do in his life. The democrat, for instance, has 
set as his ultimate end the satisfaction of any kind of preference or desire that he may have. In 
that sense all his particular desires, either bodily or not, are instances of what the person has 
believed to be the best thing for him to do. In other words every desire or action of the 
democratic man manifests or reflects his attachment or his commitment to a certain value 
system according to which he acts. In that sense what motivates the democratic person towards 
action is not only the appetitive part, and especially the appetitive part with the role that Plato 
" Alcibiades, as Plato presents him especially in Symposium (212d3-213a2), is a good example of someone who 
resembles the image of the democratic man in the Republic. Alcibiades bursts in the house of Agathon completely 
drunk the time that Socrates has finished his own speech followed probably by some lovers of him. Alcibiades' 
speech, an encomium to Socrates, contributes almost nothing to the philosophical account of love that Socrates 
gave in his own speech. It shows that, unlike Socrates, Alcibiades conceives philosophy as a kind of superficial 
'intellectual' entertainment. Philosophy for him is not an activity to which he devotes all his life and through 
which he is trying to attain knowledge of the real Good, but is a pleasant activity of the moment. 
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assigns to it in Book IV, but the whole soul; his desire to do philosophy or his desire to drink 
t i l l he gets drunk though different in their very nature belong to his whole soul — as the 
compound of three parts — and are shaped by his general beliefs about what is overall best for 
him. The democrat does not act either on a simple appetitive inclination or on a desire that 
comes entirely from reason. In each case he takes a certain course of action, he acts according 
to particular beliefs, which are issued by some general value-judgements about what is good 
overall. 
In his description o f the deviant characters it seems that, although Plato retains a kind 
of 'partition' of the soul he abandons the sharp distinction between reason and appetite that he 
introduced in Book IV. The appetites of these unjust souls that the appetitive part is said to be 
in charge o f are not 'irrational' in the sense that our inclinations are. On the contrary as we 
have seen they are the result of certain beliefs that the persons hold. More than that, the 
oligarch is not presented as being 'double' and not 'one' in the same sense that Leontius could 
be described as 'double'. The oligarch does not experience a kind o f conflict where a totally 
irrational drive pushes him towards one direcfion that he cannot resist. The oligarch is 'double' 
because he changes his mind and he cannot impose any order in his choices. In that sense the 
desires o f the oligarch, like those o f the democrat or even the tyrant are not irrational because 
they are not the result of any thought or belief, they are rather unreasonable because they are 
shaped and organized by the false beliefs that all these types hold. 
This is why the souls of the democrat, the oligarch and the tyrant are presented by Plato 
as being governed by the appefitive part. The 'government' of the appetitive part does not 
imply either that this part actually takes the lead in the soul or that these persons satisfy only 
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the physical 'appetites' that emerge form this part. The picture o f the soul as being ruled by the 
appetitive part is just a metaphorical illustration, as I have suggested, of the disorder in the 
choices of these persons. This is not to say, of course, that Plato would deny the role that he 
assigned to the appetitive part in Book IV. In the unjust souls — and also in the just soul as I 
argue in the following chapter — the appetitive part retains its role as the locus o f the bodily 
inclinations that boot our fully-fledged physical desires. This role can explain, for instance, 
why some of these persons experience more intense physical desires that they sometimes find 
it diff icult to resfrain. However, in Books V I I and IX, we get a metaphorical enlargement o f 
this part and the irrational character of the inclinations that belong to it. In other words Plato 
alludes to the kind of irrationality that this part has in Book FV in order to emphasize the 
unreasonable character that the choices and the desires o f some persons have. At the same time 
although the souls of the unjust persons are not presented to be divided in the way that the soul 
appears in Book IV since all their desires are shaped and informed by their beliefs and belong 
to the whole soul, the metaphor of the parts shows how 'fragmented' they can become. The 
real disharmony of these souls however, resides in the improper function of reason and the fact 
that their reasoning capacities are never developed correctly; they are so degraded and 
fragmented as to be almost entirely focused on the attainment of what they are falsely believed 
to be the best for them. 
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5. The Appetitive Part and the Philosopher. 
In his discussion of the deviant characters Plato describes the various types who are 
focused on enjoying the pleasures o f the lower parts o f the soul and gratifying the relevant 
desires. We see that all of them have a misinformed concepdon of the good and are attached to 
the immediate pleasures that come fi-om the satisfaction of their appetites. The constant 
pandering to the desires of the appedtive part of the soul has distorted further the condidon of 
the reasoning part and their concepdon of value. This distortion is described through a series o f 
stages o f degeneration starting with the timocradc man and ending with the tyrant who satisfies 
even the lawless appetites. Presumably the unjust types of soul are not the Platonic ideal and in 
general Plato appears to be committed to an account of our nature which encourages us to 
idendfy ourselves with the radonal part of the soul which takes care of the lower parts. In this 
normative account of the soul, where reason rules, the fulfilment of the needs of the radonal 
soul is what fulf i ls best the nature not only of the reasoning part but also of the two lower parts. 
Since it is impossible, at least while the soul is incamated,^^ to rid ourselves endrely o f our 
appetites and the influence o f the lower parts, especially the appetidve part, the appedtes 
should at least be controlled and eliminated as far as possible. Such an idendfication with the 
radonal part is necessary for the proper harmony of the parts of the soul that Plato emphatically 
" The soul is treated by Plato as incarnated in the first nine Books of the Republic. There is a question, however, 
about the lower parts in the immortal disembodied soul in Book X. It would be reasonable to suggest that the soul 
in its disembodied state does not have any of the lower parts and the desires that derive from these parts; the soul 
without the body could not be, for instance, either thirsty or hungry. There is though a problematic passage at 
612a where Plato seems to suggest that the soul in its real disembodied state could be either single (monoeides) or 
manifold (polueides). The problem has to do with the meaning of the polueides. If the polueides is a reference to 
the parts of the soul when the soul is incarnated then how the existence of the appetitive part can be explained in 
the disembodied state of the soul? 
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suggests in Book IV.^"* The philosopher is that type of person who actually achieves this 
identification with the reasoning part of the soul and the real harmony among the parts. In this 
chapter I shall fry to describe how this harmony is achieved in the soul o f the philosopher in 
relation mainly to the appetites of the appetitive part of the soul. I shall try to propose that what 
emerges from Plato's description of the philosopher can be seen to provide broad support for 
my claim throughout this thesis about the nature of the desires of the appetitive part and the 
function of this part. 
At 485d we are offered a picture of the soul of the lover o f knowledge. Plato maintains 
that 'the true lover o f knowledge must from childhood be most of all a striver after the truth in 
every form (pases aletheiasY (d3-4). The desire for the truth in every respect can, according to 
Plato, weaken the rest o f the desires: 'when in a man the desires incline strongly towards one 
thing, they are weakened for other things like a sfream that has been diverted into another 
channel' (d6-8). At this point Plato does not explain exactly how the rest o f the desires can be 
weakened or redirected in the face o f the desire for knowledge. The only thing that we get in 
the text is that the sfrength of reason's desires {sphodra dV) weakens the rest of the desires that 
the philosopher might experience. The language of sfrength, of course, that Plato uses here 
may leave room for a possible conflict, of the kind that Plato has described in Book FV, 
between desires. What if , for example, an appetite is sfronger than reason's desire for the truth 
" See e.g. 442d4-dl. 
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and knowledge? Plato seems to rule out this possibility since he suggests that 'when a man's 
desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning (mathemata) and all that sort o f 
thing, they w i l l be, I suppose, only with the pleasures o f the soul in itself and wi l l be 
indifferent to those o f which the body is the instrument, i f someone is a true philosopher and 
not a sham' (dlO-el). In the passage quoted it seems that the desire for learning cannot be 
overcome by any other desire no matter how strong the latter might be. The desire for learning 
here, in my view, is nothing more than a reference to the desire for the Good at 505a. It might 
be the case that since reason has been trained to aim at learning in general and to seek every 
kind of study and knowledge, it turns finally towards the Good which is, as Plato suggests at 
505a, the megiston mathema.^^ I wi l l return to the passage at 505a in the second section of this 
chapter. The important thing at the moment is that at 485d Plato makes the strong claim that 
the rest of the appetites are in conformity with reason's desire when reason fulf i ls its best 
function and it is in its best condition, that is, when reason desires to learn the whole truth and 
strives to attain knowledge. Plato believes that the person whose reason is in that state wi l l 
never prefer the satisfaction of the bodily appetites and the relevant pleasures that accompany 
these desires to the pure pleasures of intellectual contemplation.^^ 
" See also 475c6-8 where the main feature of the philosopher is that he does not feel any distaste for any kind of 
study but he strives for any kind of knowledge that he can get. 
Plato's point here accords with the idea of harmony in Book IV. The real harmony between the parts in Book 
fV does not depend merely on the fact that reason is in charge but the harmony requires that reason is in charge 
and has also knowledge and episteme of what is beneficial for each part of the soul and the soul as a whole 
(442c4-7). Presumably young persons that have not yet acquired knowledge and cannot distinguish between what 
is beneficial and harmful cannot achieve real harmony. Plato claims at 441a7-bl that 'one can see in children, that 
they are from their very birth full of high spirit, but as for reason, some of them to my thinking never participate 
in it and the majority quite late'. This of course does not mean that young people or even some adults do not 
follow reason at all or they are totally deprived of the reasoning part of the soul. The point is, in my view, that not 
everyone can achieve the higher capacities of reason that can secure a real harmony. See also the first and the 
second stage of education in Books II and VII respectively. Those — the majority — that go through the first 
stage accept some beliefs unreflectively and they can easily be deceived by their intense appetites since the 
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It remains questionable however what Plato means when he claims that the rest of the 
desires are weakened in the face of reason's desire towards learning. Does he mean that all the 
bodily appetites, for instance, disappear, something that the ekleipoien at 485dl2 might 
suggest, or that some of them remain and are redirected under the rule o f reason towards what 
is good and beneficial for the whole soul? I think that the latter seems a more plausible answer. 
First Plato cannot deny that the philosopher in this life does experience and satisfy some of the 
appetites. Since Plato's treatment of the ideal soul of the philosopher has to do with the 
embodied soul it would be at least odd for him to claim that the philosopher does not 
experience hunger, thirst or sensual desire that are associated with the appetitive part of the 
soul. Second i f the real philosopher is totally deprived of all the appetites, the acclaimed 
harmony of the soul loses its importance. In Book IV Plato has emphasized the role of reason 
in the harmonious soul as the part that has knowledge and takes care o f each part of the soul 
and the soul as a whole (see n. 56). I f now in the soul of the philosopher there is no question 
about the satisfaction of the desires of the appetitive part o f the soul, the role of reason as the 
part that rules and takes care o f the whole soul is diminished to a considerable extent. The 
question, of course, is which appetites would Plato allow in the ideal soul. We can assume that 
the philosopher does experience, satisfies and gets pleasure from those appetites that Plato calls 
at 559a f f necessary desires. In this passage Plato distinguishes between two categories of 
necessary desires: the desires that someone cannot get rid o f f {has te ouk an hoioi t' eimen 
apotrepsai) and those desires the satisfaction of which is beneficial {hosai apoteloumenai 
reasoning part is not yet in its best condition. Only a minority of the citizens that will become the future 
philosophers are able to go through the second phase of education and acquire the analytic and critical powers of 
reason will have real knowledge and achieve true harmony in their souls (see more on this below in the present 
chapter). 
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dphelousin). At 558 b3-4 we get two examples of each category. Plato claims that the desire 
for food (sitou) is necessary because we die unless we satisfy it and it is also beneficial. At the 
same time the desire for well cooked food (opsou) is only beneficial in so far as its satisfaction 
leads to a healthy body. Although Plato distinguishes between necessary and unnecessary 
desires in two respects, we notice that in each case the satisfaction of the necessary desires is 
beneficial for the person." On the other hand, Plato suggests that we should get rid of 
{apallatesthai blO) the unnecessary desires, which are harmful both for the soul and the body. 
Plato suggests that the unnecessary desires for excess of food should be regulated and trained 
somehow fi-om childhood (kolazomane ek neon kai paideuomene 559b8-l 1). This is in line, I 
think, with 485d3-el and Plato's claim that in the soul of the real lover of wisdom who desires 
the whole truth from childhood {ek neou) the rest of the desires are weakened and in the end 
they disappear. Both passages share the view that, when a person fi-om an early age is under an 
educational programme that aims at the development o f the rational capacities, the person 
learns to form only these desires that are beneficial and gradually he gets rid of the harmful and 
unnecessary ones. It is true of course, as I suggest later in this chapter, that only those who 
have the capacity to go through the higher stage of education that includes arithmetic and 
" If we assume that the necessary desires are the appetites that philosopher normally has, in the hght of the 
philosopher's knowledge of the good, we might say that these desires are not beneficial because they are 
necessary but they are necessary because they are beneficial. In the text Plato does not use the term anagkaiai in 
the strict meaning as the desires that we cannot get rid of The desire for well cooked food is anagkaia although 
this is a desire that we can live without. In the light of the Good and the knowledge of the Good even the desires 
the satisfaction of which keep as live are beneficial because the person who has knowledge of the Good has 
valued the preservation of life as something worth pursuing. In that case that someone, say the philosopher, does 
not think that being alive is something good for him the desire for bread (sitou) will not be necessary anymore. 
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dialectic can reach that level of rational contemplation that pauses entirely any interest in the 
58 
satisfaction o f the unnecessary appetites. 
The idea that the satisfaction of some desires — the necessary ones — is not at odds 
with the ideal soul is also suggested in the discussion about the priority of the intellectual 
pleasures of the philosopher at 583c ff . Socrates criticizes the behaviour of those that enjoy and 
are focused on bodily delights and pleasures (586a) and suggests that only the fulfilment of the 
needs of the rational soul is what fulf i ls us best according to our nature {ei ara to plerousthai 
ton phusei prosekonton hedu esti 585cl l ) . In addition, at 586d4-e2 he claims that only the 
philosophical just soul, ruled by reason, enjoys the pleasures of the lower parts since only with 
the guidance of reason w i l l each part — and the soul as a whole — 'enjoy' the best and truest 
of its own pleasures, in so far as is possible' (d6-e2). It seems that the philosopher does not 
only enjoy the pleasures fi-om the satisfaction of the bodily appetites but he is the only one that 
can get true pleasure from them. Socrates' acceptance at this point that the philosopher gets 
pleasure from the bodily appetites is something that the argument requires since some 
comparability is necessary between the two kind of pleasures — intellectual and bodily ones 
— for the comparison o f the lives in terms of their pleasurability. At the same time, as a matter 
of fact, Plato cannot deny that everyone, including the philosopher, does get some pleasant 
feeling when eating and drinking, no matter i f the pleasure is not truly pure. Socrates is careful 
at this point to add the restriction ' in so far is possible to be true' {hos hoion te autais aletheis 
Cf. also 519b-c about the pleasurability of rational contemplation and the diminish interesting of the rest of the 
sensual pleasures. See also the ascent passage in the Symposium 210-211 where Plato seems to make the same 
point. At 21 Id the Mantinean woman says to Socrates that since someone has finally contemplated the essential 
beauty he can go on to live even without food and drink. Note, however, the ei pos hoion t' en at 21 ld7 which 
suggests that Plato does not really think that it is possible for someone to live without satisfying the necessary 
desires for food and drink. 
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labein d8, las beltistas kai eis to dunaton tas alethestatas 587a2) since he cannot accept that 
the bodily pleasures even the best ones are true pleasures in the sense that the intellectual ones 
are. At any rate, the point is that Plato does not only accept that the philosopher can enjoy 
some bodily pleasures — at least those which are 'best'— but also that he is the only one that 
can have true bodily pleasures. 
The passage at 571a ff . in Book IX however, where Plato starts the discussion of the 
soul o f the tyrant, the last o f the deviant characters in the series o f the unjust souls, might 
create some difficulty about the desires that the philosopher has. The passage seems to suggest 
that the unnecessary desires - or better an extreme kind of these desires that Plato calls 
paranomoi at b4 — might occur to everyone including the philosopher {kinduneuousi men 
panti eggignesthai b4-5): 
taxiv 5e xoSe. -ccov \ir\ ocvayKaicov Ti5ovcbv -ce Kai ETtiGuixicjv SOKOUO'I xiveq \io\ evvai napctvoiioi, 
a'i iciv5\)vEX)o\)ai ,^ev EYyiYVEoGai navxi, KoXa^6n,Evai 5£ i)n6 TE xtbv vo^ icov Kai xwv pEXxiovcov 
E7ti0t)|a.id)v n,Exa X6yo\) EV'ICOV \iiv dvGpwncov ti navxanaciv dnaXXaxxEoGai r\ oXiyai XEinEcrGai 
Kai doGEVEiq, xcbv 5E ia^DpoxEpai Kai nXziovq. 
'Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to 
be found in us all, but which, when controlled by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, 
can in some men altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak remain, while in others the 
remnant is stronger and more numerous' (571b3-cl). 
I l l 
I do not think that Plato here suggests that the real philosopher might actually experience these 
paranomoi desires through out his life. It is true however that kinduneousi here, in view of the 
panti, seems to mark the possibility that these desires might arise in everyone. Since every 
soul, including the soul of the philosopher, has the appetitive part, it is logically possible that 
these desires may arise in every soul. They never actually occur when reason is in its best 
condition and is directed towards the truth. However, Plato seems to suggest that the rise of the 
paronomoi desires is not always an actuality when he says that 'when (these desires) controlled 
(kolazomenai) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, they can in some men 
be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others they 
are strong and numerous' (b5-8) .'^ Presumably the philosopher belongs to those that get rid o f 
these desires entirely. The passage at 571c3-572a9 explains in my view under which conditions 
— or better under which condition of the soul — these desires may rise. At 571c3-d5 we are 
told that the paranomoi desires occur in the state of dreaming when the appetitive part is totally 
released from the guard o f reason and the person under the influence o f the desiring part wants 
to have sex with the image o f his mother or with the images of any god and animal that appear 
in his d r e a m . O n the other hand when the person is still awake and there is order in his soul 
{hugieinos lis echei autos hautou kai sophronos d7-8): 
"Note that it is only the tyrant (571b ff.) that actually experiences and decides to satisfy the paranomoi desires. 
Plato presents the way that the lawless desires rise at 571c3-d5: 'T6tq nepi T6V iinvov, fjv 5' EYCI), ^yeipon^vaq, 
oxav TO pev aXKo Tfjq \C\)XTI<; EUST), 6aov A.07iaTiK6v Kai ripepov Kai dp^ov eKcivox), to 5fe GripidiSdq te Kai 
&7piov, 11 o'lTcov \\ p.fe8Ti<; TIXTIOGEV, OKipTgi xe Kai ancoodpevov T6V unvov ^TITTI Ifevai Kai d7t07iip7tA,dvai ih 
a-bxou nflr)- OTCT9' OTI navta ev tffl TOIOUTCO TOA.p9t noietv, dx; dji6 ndoriq A.eA,up£vov xe Kai hnv[K\a.y\ii\o\ 
aiox^vriq Kai (ppovfjaeajq. prixpi te yap enixeipeiv neiYVOoGai, cbq oi'etai, ouSev 6KV£T, dA,A.tp te otcpoOv 
dv9p(biitov Kai Gewv Kai Gripluv, piaicpoveiv te otioOv, Ppwpat6q te anixzoQav ^T|6ev6q- Kai evi A-oyo) 
ome dvoiaq oii)8ev eXXeinei oiit' dvaiox^ovtlai;'. It might be the case that the subject doing all these things is 
the appetitive part of the soul. If so then the appetitive part can be seen as a proper agent that is able to shape 
fully-fledged desires, a view that I deny in this chapter and throughout this thesis. Instead of that, the passage 
might invite another interpretation according to which the subject is the person and not the appetitive part. Jowett 
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" Kai E\c, xov UTtvov IT] x6 XoyioxiKov \ie.\ EyEipaq EauxoO Kai kmv&aac, Xoywv KaX&v Kai 
aKEij/Ecov, Eiq auvvoiav awoq ai)xu) cwpiKoi^ Evoq, x6 £7ti9u)xrixiK6v 8^ UTIXE Ev8El(jt 8o\)q ^T1XE 
7tA,rianovTi, oncoq av KOi)Ari0fi Kai \ir\ TtapEXH 96pt)|iov xu pEXxioxw x«tpov r\ 'kvno\)\ie\o\/, aXX' Egt 
auxo Ka9' auxo novov KaGapov OKOTtEXv Kai opEyEoGal xou aiaGdvEoGai 6 ^fi OI8EV, xi xcbv 
yEyovoxoov T I OVXCOV TI Kai H,EX-A,6VX(OV. 
'he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and 
attaining to clear self consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his 
appetitive part, so it may be lulled to sleep and not disturb the better part by its pleasures or pain, but 
may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards an apprehend some of the things 
unknown to it, past present or future' (571d7-572a3). 
The two states of dreaming and waking are possibly a metaphor for two sates of the soul. The 
state of waking corresponds to the ideal soul where reason is strong and has knowledge while 
and Campbell 1894: V. Ill 408, note to the text at 571 c, suggest that at enixeipeTv 'from the irrational element of 
human nature we here pass insensibly to the person in whom it is active'. I totally agree with Jowett and Campbell 
that the subject of the verb here cannot be the part, but the person. However, I think that the shift from the part to 
the person occurs earlier on at noieiv. Note the analogy between the 6xi ndvta ev xm xoiovxtp X O X J I Q I noveiv 
here and the oToe' 6xi xfjq x' dA-Tieeiaq ev xtp xoiouxcp jidA.ioxa anxExai at 572a8 where in the latter the 
reference is clearly to the person and to the reasoning part. Hence the meaning at 571c3-d5 is that the person in 
his dreams and under the influence of the appetitive has the desires that Plato describes. The picture of the 
appetitive part here and the way that it motivates the person is probably a metaphorical illustration for what 
happens in the soul of the tyrant that has these lawless desires. 
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the state of dreaming illustrates a sate of ignorance^' which is a feature of all the unjust souls. 
We might say then that the unnecessary (paranomoi) desires disappear and never emerge when 
the person under the power o f reason seeks the truth and satisfies only those necessary 
appetites so that the appetitive part is kept calm and harmony is achieved in the soul. On the 
other they may occur, as they actually do in the tyrant, in this soul where reason is weak and is 
under the influence o f the appetitive part of the soul. 
I I 
The pictorial account o f harmony in the soul of the philosopher, especially in the last 
mentioned passage casts some light on the notion of harmony that Plato has initially introduced 
in Book IV and the role that the parts o f the soul play in the harmonious soul. We notice that in 
the philosophical soul harmony depends almost entirely on the power of the reasoning part of 
the soul that conditions the lower parts, especially the desiring part. When reason is in its best 
condition and aims at the truth real harmony can be achieved in the soul. In Book FV the 
harmonious and just soul is presented as the result of an 'agreement' among the parts that 
reason should rule: 
'Then do not we call him sophrona when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious 
agreement {sumphonia), when reason and its subordinates are all agreed {homodoxosi) that reason 
should rule and there is no conflict among them?' (442b9-dl) 
See the analogy between the state of dreaming here and Plato's claim at 476c 1-5 where those that cannot 
distinguish between the real objects and their images are presented as being in a state of dreaming. 
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We are not told however how this agreement among the parts can be reached. The homodoxosi 
at 442dl might indicate that the agreement is the result o f a 'dialogue' that takes place among 
the parts of the soul.^^ The idea of dialogue as a mean towards an 'agreement' among the parts 
loses its strength i f we look at the way that the spirited part of the soul and reason are presented 
as being in harmony. At 441d7-442a2 we are told that music and athletic education nourishes 
the reasoning part with fine speeches and instructions {logois te kalois kai mathemasi) while it 
relaxes the spirited part with the rhythm. The passage here refers back to 410a-412a where 
Plato suggests that gymnastic and music aim at the harmonization of the spirited and the 
philosophical elements of the soul. Both passages reflect the first stage of education at 376 f f 
Plato claims that the 'the love of wisdom and high spirit and quickness and strength w i l l be 
combined for us in the nature o f him who is to be a good and true guardian for the city' 
(376c4-6) and goes on to introduce gymnastic as the appropriate training for the body and 
music for the education of the soul (376el-3). Music, according to Plato, includes those fables 
that are told to the future guardians and shape their souls by imposing the right beliefs (379a 
f f . ) . It is important that at this stage of education the young people of the city should be 
exposed only to those stories that wi l l infuse in their souls the right opinions and avoid 
inappropriate stories told by the poets (377-378). The aim of this phase of education is that the 
guardians wi l l achieve an equilibrium between spirit and wisdom by training both the soul and 
the body. However, it is mainly and above all the education of the mind that w i l l determine the 
nature of the guardians. Plato makes this point explicitly at 376b 12- c2 where he suggests that 
'^I have suggested some reasons throughout this thesis for supposing that the idea of the 'dialogue' among the 
parts is merely metaphorical and not something that Plato really means. The idea of a dialogue among the parts 
cannot be supported unless we accept that the parts have beliefs. In earlier chapters of this thesis (see esp. chapters 
one and two) I have tried to show that Plato does not attribute beliefs or any other cognitive abilities to the lower 
parts of the soul and especially not to the appetitive part. 
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'then we may not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that i f he is to be in some sort 
gentle to friends and familiar he must be by nature a lover of wisdom {philosophon) and o f 
learning {philomathe)T It seems that although gymnasfic is important for the training of the 
body it is actually the condition of the mind that wi l l make some citizen true guardians. 
When Plato describes the appetites in the soul o f the philosopher at 485d-e we see that 
the rest o f the appetites diminish when the lover o f wisdom from an early age {ek neou d3-4) is 
focused on learning. We notice that this kind of learning starts at the first phase o f education 
where a development of the reasoning part goes in parallel with the development o f certain 
dispositions that are related to certain responses towards anger or pleasure.^^ At 401e4-402a4 
Plato concludes that those that have gone through this phase o f education: 
'would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its 
growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while 
still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason comes, the man educated in that 
way would be the first to welcome it recognizing it through affinity'.^'* 
We have also seen that at 410a-412a music and gymnastics are introduced by Plato as 
the means towards a harmony within the person something to which Plato also alludes at 
441d7-442a2 in Book IV^^ when he speaks about the harmony between spirit and r e a s o n . I t 
" See 376a-c. 
When Plato says that that 'are unable to apprehend the reason' he does mean that people at this educational 
stage are unreasonable, but that they cannot still say why some things are good, for instance, while some others 
are bad. They do not have a criterion to which they can appeal in order to explain the difference between the good 
and the bad things. This criterion will become available to them only through the knowledge of the Good. 
Note that at 441d7-442a2 gymnastic is not mentioned since now spirit does not belong to the body but it is part 
of the soul. 
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might be the case that, according to Plato, a kind of harmony can be achieved from an early 
age when the person through the development of some understanding of the ethical norms of 
right and wrong can habituate his emotional responses. In his description of that phase of 
education o f course Plato has not divided yet the soul into parts. He accepts that there are 
different elements in human nature, but these elements are not presented as conflicting 'parts' 
that belong to the soul. The distinction is much more between the body and the soul rather than 
between different aspects o f the soul itself (see 376 f f . ) . What is important is the fact that the 
harmony at that stage is not the result of any 'agreement' among the different elements that 
constitute human nature, but the outcome of the training that concerns the whole person as the 
compound of soul and body.^^ It would be actually odd for Plato to say that the body and the 
soul agree in something. More than that the education and the training o f the person, as the 
passage at 376bl2-d2 suggests, refers mainly to the development of some rational, although 
unreflective, capacities that lead the person to shape certain dispositions with the aid of reason. 
The account of harmony that Plato has presented in the first phase of education is no 
longer sufficient any more his for aims in Book IV. Reason in the first stage o f education has a 
" Plato retains music also in the second phase of education along with mathematics and he recommends that the 
harmony of music 'is useful for the investigation of the beautiful and the good' (531c6-7). 
" I disagree with Gill 1985: 8-12 in his otherwise illuminating discussion of the education of the character, that 
the first stage of education concerns the spirited element. Despite the fact the Plato does use the terms thumoeides 
and philosophon at 375-6 we do not have to assume that he uses them as they appear in the argument for the 
division of the soul in book FV. If we suppose that Plato refers to the person as the compound of the body and the 
soul and not to different parts of the soul then we can face Gill's worry that the first stage of the education 'makes 
sense as a training of the thumoeides in a way that it does not as a training for the epithumetikon' (11). What Plato 
says about the thumoeides can be applied also to the epithumetikon. In the same way that the natural spiritness that 
can be also met in the animals can be trained and transformed to bravery the natural inclination of thirst and 
hunger can be transformed into a full-fledged desire for food and drink. I agree however with Gill's view that the 
appetitive element cannot be as such cannot be trained (11 and 19-21). What can be trained especially in the light 
of the tripartite soul is not the appetitive part itself as the locus of all the bodily inclinations but the whole soul as 
a composite of different elements (see also below in the text). That Plato in the first stage focuses on the spirited 
element does not mention the epithumetikon might be explained further by the fact that this stage of education is 
designed primarly for the guardians who should develop the right amount of spirit. 
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passive role and accepts uncritically the beliefs and the opinions that are illustrated in the 
stories (377a f f . ) . In Book IV, by contrast, the harmony of the soul seems to require knowledge 
and episteme. A t 442b4-7 Plato calls this 'small' part that rules sophon and he says that this 
part should have episteme about what is beneficial for each part of the soul and the soul as a 
whole. Mere belief that accounts during the first educational phase for the ethical development 
of the person is not adequate any more for what Plato wants to present in Book I V as the real 
harmony and justice in the soul. The problem is that in Book FV we are not told what the 
knowledge is that wi l l promote the real harmony and justice in the soul. While Plato has 
described how right beliefs can be implanted in the souls of the young children through the 
stories told by the instructors in the first stage of education, in Book IV there is nothing on the 
acquisition of knowledge. This is a task that Plato wi l l take on in the subsequent Books V, V I 
and V I I . 
However, it seems that he is not unaware in Book IV of the fact that unless knowledge 
has been defined the harmony and the role that he wishes to attribute to reason in the just soul 
cannot be supported. We notice that at 435d3 Socrates warns Glaucon that they might need a 
'longer road' (makrotera hodos) to find out whether the soul has the three parts or not. 
Socrates does not relate the 'longer road' directly to the question of knowledge; what the 
longer investigation might show is whether the present account of the soul with the three parts 
is true or not. But the two questions, as I shall try to show in the end, are not unconnected. It 
has been argued^* that Socrates takes up the 'longer road' at 504b2 ff . {makrotera periodos) 
and relates it to the Good. What Plato has described as reason's knowledge of what is 
68 See among others Cooper 1996: 142-143 and Adam 1963: 244 note to text at 435d. 
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beneficial for each part of the soul and the soul as whole in Book IV is what he calls now at 
505a the 'Form of the Good' which is the megiston mathema and makes everything else useful, 
beneficial and just: 
enei OTI ye y\ xoO ccyaGoO i5ea n,eyioxov )i6.Qx\\ia, noK'ka.K\c, ccKfiKoaq, fj 6fi Kai 5'iKaia Kai 
laXko. 7rpoaxpriadn,eva xpTioijia Kai d)(peA-ip,a ylyvExai. Kai vOv CTxe56v oTaG' oti |a.eA,\co TOOXO 
Xeyeiv, Kai npoq xovxco oxi autfiv oux iKavwq IOIAEV E I 8 E ^T) I'a^ev, avEU 5E xauxriq E I 6xi 
lidXiaxa laXKa. ETiiaxain^EGa, oTaG' 8xi O\)6EV f ^ t v oqiEXoq, ©ojiEp o\)5' E I KEKxfip,EGd xi dvEU xou 
dyaGoO. i i die.\ xi nX.Eov Eivai Ttaoav Kxfjmv eKxfjoGai, ]x,y\ H,EVXOI dyaGfiv; r\ Jidvxa xa^Xa 
(ppovEiv dvEU xou dyaGoO, KaA.6v 8 E Kai dyaGov IATISEV (ppovEiv; Md Ai' O\)K Eycoy', Ecptj. 
'For you have often heard that the greatest thing to leam is the idea of the good by reference to which 
just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this 
is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And i f we 
do not know it, then even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so 
well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail without 
the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit in possessing everything except that 
which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing 
nothing that is fair and good? No, by Zeus, I do not' (505a2-b3). 
119 
i f reason acquires knowledge of the Good then harmony in the soul can be achieved since 
reason wi l l know what is really beneficial for the soul and the parts.^' In the light of the above 
interpretation it is not surprising that at 505e Plato claims that the 'every soul aims at the good 
and does (prattei) everything in the sake of i t ' . It seems now that it is the soul, and not just 
reason that desires the Good and does everything for the sake of the Good. Caudon is needed 
here. By every soul Plato does not mean every soul as it manifests itself in each individual 
person. The souls of the unjust types, as we have seen, do not desire what is Good and do not 
do everything for the sake of the Good. Probably Plato refers here to the soul as it should be 
that is, the ideal soul of the philosopher. In the soul of the philosopher the endorsement o f 
every action occurs in the light of fu l l knowledge about its goodness and it is reason's desire 
for knowledge that integrates the object of any desire into the person's conception of what is 
good. The philosopher who knows the Good values everything around him, including his own 
psychic events such as the desires that stem from the appetitive part of the soul, in the light of a 
comparison between that thing and the Good itself. The knowledge o f the Good that is 
introduced in Book V I and the description of the second phase of education in Book V I I 
improves the model of the first educational stage and adds to the account of the acquired 
rational capacities of that stage in a way that now the desires o f the person that has knowledge 
are not shaped by unreflective beliefs and are not directed towards what the person merely 
*'Note that also at 376d6-7 Socrates says to Adeimantus that the definition of the just and the unjust city may 
require a longer argument {ei makrotera tuganei ousa). The longer argument here will help them to find out what 
is justice in the city which in turn depends on how those that will rule in the city should be educated (threpsontai 
de de hemin houtoi kai paideusontai Una tropon) 376c8-9. Thus the 'megiston malhema' will not show only what 
it is for the soul to be just, but also what it is for the city to be actually just. The 'longer road" will prove that 
justice in the city depends ultimately on knowledge of the good which is what makes the soul of the philosophers-
rulers just. 
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believes — either rightly or falsely — to be good, but they are informed by knowledge and are 
guided by the active power of reason to what is really good for the whole soul.™ 
Unfortunately Plato does not provide any concrete account of what it is about the Good 
that makes everything else good. Instead o f that Socrates speculates about the Good and offers 
the analogies and the parallels of the cave, the sun and the divided line. What is then the object 
of the philosopher's knowledge and what does the philosopher know when he has knowledge 
of the Good? I am not going here to attempt an answer to this difficult question. For the 
purpose of my argument in this section we might follow Cooper's claim^' that the Good is the 
perfect example of an ordered whole whose orderliness is explained by the mathematical 
relationship among its parts. The philosopher that has knowledge o f the Good or aims at it 
applies this complete order in the nature of the Good to the physical events of the world 
including his own choices, actions and desires. We have seen that the lover o f wisdom can 
achieve complete order and harmony in his own soul by thinking rational thoughts and 
satisfying the rafionally controlled appetites that stem from the appetitive part of the soul. The 
Good as the object of knowledge and the object of the soul's desire is the criterion according to 
which everything else can be said to be neither good nor bad. It is in that sense that knowledge 
of the Good can secure the real harmony of the soul that Plato has so emphatically introduced 
in book IV and can explain the role of reason as the ruling part that knows what is beneficial 
for the whole soul and each part. 
™ Note that the deviant characters in Books VII and IX who have gone probably through the first phase of 
education they can shape from time to time reasonable desires. But since they have not acquired knowledge their 
choices throughout their lives are not determined by what is really good for them. 
" Cooper 1999: 144. 
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The knowledge of the Good, does not seem to entail any improvement in the 
'character' of the appetitive part. In Book IX and after the discussion of the pleasures of the 
philosopher, the soul is presented in terms o f a man, a lion and a many-headed beast which is 
the appetitive part of the soul (588c6-10). Even in the perfectly united soul of the just person 
the reasoning part of the soul is presented as a farmer and the numerous inclinations of the 
appetitive part as the 'plants' from which the farmer 'cherishes and trains {trephon kai 
tithaseudn) the cultivated ones but checks the growth of the wild {ta de agria apokoludn 
phuesthai) having as an ally the spirited part {leontos phusin). 
'And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and 
words should tend to give the man within us complete domination over the entire man and make him in 
charge of the many headed beast like a farmer who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks 
the growth of the wild and he will make an ally of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike 
will first make them friendly to one another and to himself and so foster their growth' (589a6-b6)." 
Someone would have expected that in the real harmonious soul and in the light of Plato's claim 
that the just person experiences only the best appetites the nature of the appetitive would have 
" The way that the desires of the appetitive part are presented at this passage as the many heads of a beast or 
plants from which the fanner should let grow only a few it is very close to what I suggest in this chapter. The 
plants may represent all these bodily inclination that are allocated in the appetitive part while the cultivated ones 
are those appetites that are shaped by reason's input. 
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changed.^'' The question is whether Plato's account of the just soul and the way that the united 
soul is exemplified in the case of the philosopher, needs any kind of improvement in the 
'nature' o f the desiring part as such. I f we accept that knowledge of the Good equips reason 
with the ability to know what is beneficial about the whole soul and each part of the soul, then 
it seems that knowledge is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for the soul to be 
just. No matter what the condition of the appetitive part the person with a harmonious soul wi l l 
always desire what is good and beneficial. The role and the development of this part — that is, 
the appetites that stem from this part — in the harmonious soul depend entirely on reason's 
guidance and reason's knowledge of the Good. We have seen that in the soul of the 
philosopher the ideal harmony is achieved in so far as the philosopher in the light of the Good 
has only those bodily appetites that are beneficial for the whole soul and does not experience 
the unnecessary or the lawless desires of the tyrant. A l l his appetites are informed by reason 
and are directed towards the objects that are really good for him. The very nature, of course, of 
" This a question that Gill 1985: 22-23 raises. Gill claims that 'In fact, Plato does conclude the main part of his 
argument in the Republic by presenting a picture of the tripartite soul and its inter-relations, and one that does 
make reference to the notions of unity and harmony. But this picture makes no allusion to the second phase of 
education and its effects on the psuche Indeed what is added to the previous account of physic harmony is a 
pictorial image which emphatically suggests that the psuche is made up of elements which are divergent in 
character and difficult to combine'. In Gill 1996: 259 and n.66 he suggests a way to answer this question. He 
claims that 'the depiction of the appetitive or desiring part of the psyche as 'insatiable', capable of 'wrecking the 
lives' of the other parts, and proliferating like wild, many headed beast or plant, is a characterization not of desire 
as such, but of desire as shaped by 'unreasonable' beliefs and life-goals' 259. In n. 66 he suggests that the picture 
in 588c-592b seem to underline the unassimilably 'animal' character of desire because 'it confirms the cautionary 
picture of desire which is shaped by 'unreasonable' life choices in ^.8-9'. The claim (hat I try to advance in this 
chapter and throughout this thesis is that the 'desires' of the appetitive part of the soul are not the desires shaped 
by beliefs either 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' ones but the pure inchnations that are parts of these desires. 
Hence, I am not in line with Gill's claim that the 'animal' character of the desires depicts the picture of desire, 
which is shaped by 'unreasonable' life choices in Books VII and X. We have seen that the unjust types from time 
to time shape perfectly reasonable desires such as the necessary desires that the oligarch has or even the desire of 
the democratic man for philosophy. The problem with the deviant characters is that, unlike the philosophers, they 
do not have knowledge but mere belief As a result while their desires are always shaped by the reasoning part 
they are not always directed towards what is good. The 'plant' and 'animal' character of the appetitive part has to 
do with the irrational inclinations that belong to this part and not with the fully-fledged desires which are always 
shaped by the reasoning part of the soul. 
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this part has not changed. It is not that the appetitive part can now realize what is good for the 
soul or even what is good for itself. The part as such remains 'appetitive' in its nature with no 
concern about what is good. However, the desires that spring from this part are informed by 
reason and are directed to what is good and beneficial. In other words, while the philosopher 
can get rid of the unnecessary desires, for instance, in the sense that he, as the proper subject of 
all his desires, will never form a desire for something which is not good, he cannot get rid of 
the bodily inclinations that are transformed under reason's guidance to fully- fledged desires. 
The appetitive part cannot be educated, that is, i f understood as I propose it should be 
understood, not as the locus of the shaped desires that we normally have, but as the locus of the 
'core' impulses from where the fully-fledged desires spring. My point here reflects my earlier 
claim in the first part of this thesis (see chapter two) where I have tried to separate the simple 
inclinations that Plato allocates to the appetitive part of the soul from the fully-fledged 
appetites that belong to the whole soul. The inclination is part of what a fully- fledged desire is 
while the latter is also informed by reason no matter whether reason is in its best condition as it 
is in the soul of the philosopher or is distorted as it is in the unjust souls. In the ideal soul 
where reason has knowledge the desires develop not only with reason's input, but also with 
reason's guidance towards what is good. 
That the desiring part cannot be trained in the sense that I have proposed probably 
explains why Plato remains silent on the matter of the inter-relation between the reasoning and 
the appetitive part in the just soul. Although he implies a kind of 'agreement' at 442dl— 
something that can been seen as a strong expression of the analogy between the parts of the 
soul and the classes of the city and not as something that Plato really believes — he never 
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explains how through knowledge of the Good the appetitive part comes to follow reason. One 
suggestion could be that the appetitive part is somehow affected by the second phase of 
education that has been designed for those that will become real philosophers. It is striking 
though that this part is never mentioned during that stage of education and there is no 
implication that the appetitive part as such is 'educated' along with reason's training. More 
than that, the only thing that we are told at 571a ff. and 581bl-4 is that the nature of the 
appetitive part — that is, the bodily inclinations that are presented as 'plants' — should be 
conditioned by reason's power. It seems that in the just soul it is not that the appetitive part 
learns to shape good appetites or to follow reason and to understand reason's orders. 
Understanding of reason's orders in that case would entail that the desiring part should have 
some share in reason's knowledge, something that would lead to the incredible claim that the 
appetitive part as such can have access to the Good. My suggestion is that Plato can perfectly 
well argue about a just and harmonious soul without having to say that the nature of the 
appetitive part has changed so that the desiring part is able to follow or agree with reason. 
Plato's point concerning the just soul is that the distinct elements can perform their role and 
develop only under reason's rule and guidance and not in isolation as such. The soul in its ideal 
state still remains composite where each element plays a particular role in bringing about the 
good of the whole. The impulsive role of the desiring part is the result of the soul's 
embodiment and the bodily impulses that the soul has in this state. 
The appetitive character of the desiring part of the soul and my claim that the nature of 
this part remains the same even in the perfectly unified soul might offer a way to resolve the 
question that the 'longer road' has been supposed to answer. We have seen that at 435d3 what 
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initiates the makrotera kai pleidn odos is not the question about justice or the just soul but the 
question whether the soul has the three parts or not. I have suggested earlier on in this chapter 
that the two questions are not irrelevant to each other. Let us assume that Plato questions the 
existence of the three parts in the soul as the text itself in Book IV seems to suggest. The 
'longer road' in Book V I has not proved that the three parts cease to exist. What it has shown is 
that knowledge — that is, knowledge of the Good — can infuse real harmony in the soul. The 
just soul of the philosopher — the soul that approximates the soul in its best condition — 
which 'aims at the good and does everything for the sake of the good' at 504e, still has the 
appetitive part since, as we have seen, the philosopher has appetites albeit only good ones that 
have their source in this part of the soul. Thus, knowledge of the Good has not shown that the 
soul is not tripartite in the sense that the rational just soul has totally lost its appetitive nature. 
In his effort to identify the origins of the bodily appetites in Book IV Plato identifies a 
part from which these appetites spring in their simplest form. It is this part as such and in 
isolation as the locus of all the simple urges that is characterized by Plato as a 'many-headed' 
beast. In the just person however, who has knowledge of what is best to do, all sorts of desires, 
preferences and choices are determined by this knowledge. The appetitive desires now, 
although they remain 'appetitive' in their nature, are not any more the simple bodily urges that 
spring from the appetitive part of the soul alone, but are fully-fledged desires for what is good 
and beneficial that are formed under reason's knowledge of what is good and belong to the 
whole soul. Although the 'longer road' has not proved that the appetitive part does not exist it 
has proved that in the ideal just soul this part never manifests its 'bestial' character in the 
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actual desires that the just person hasJ^ To put it in other words, when the soul is in its ideal 
state it does not make any difference whether the soul has three parts or not since these parts 
cannot be recognized in the way that the argument in Book IV distinguishes them. The 
appetitive part can be recognized in the existence of the bodily desires that the philosopher 
shapes and satisfies; however, these desires are no longer impulses which are peculiar to the 
desiring part, but belong to the unified soul. The ideal soul can be said to be actually simple 
when each part performs its own role within human nature under the rule of reason. Remember 
that 'each part doing its own is part of the definition of the just soul in Book FV (443da). Thus, 
i f the 'longer road' has proved, according to my suggestion, that the soul is actually simple it 
has also proved that the soul is really just. 
I f we return to the outcomes of the second stage of education where the person that has 
gone through this stage has learned to have the right dispositions as the result of a kind of 
harmony between the different elements within human nature we notice that the second phase 
of education and the megiston mathema supplement the first educational programme. Although 
Plato does not mention it explicitly, we night assume that the conditioning of the appetitive 
part in the case of the philosopher is still the result of habituation. The difference, of course, 
now is that the philosopher can explain why he has the preferences and the desires that he has 
by reference to what is really good for him and the whole soul. In the first stage of education, 
where we do not get parts of the soul, I have suggested that Plato opts for a training of the 
whole person as an entity that is composed by different elements and for a specific kind of 
training that concerns the elements as such. Although the different elements of human nature in 
This claim is related to my earlier point at 571b ff. where I have suggested that the lawless desires never 
actually occur in the just soul although they might be considered a possibility since the appetitive part is still 
there. 
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Book rV are presented as 'parts' of the soul where the appetitive part corresponds to our 
impulsive and animal nature, it seems that the impact of the second phase of education on the 
ethical development of the person has to do with the soul as a whole and not with the desiring 
or the appetitive part in isolation. Ethical perfection or what Plato calls the state of the 'just 
soul' can only be achieved through the knowledge of what is really good according to the 
person's rational nature. This kind of perfection is not at danger from the existence of the 
lower parts and in particular from the existence of the appetitive part when reason is in its best 
condition and takes care of each part and the whole soul. The way that Plato describes how the 
desires of the philosopher become weakened, or his claim that the philosopher can get true 
pleasure, in so far possible, from the satisfaction of the best appetites, indicates that the mere 
existence of the appetitive cannot jeopardize the harmony in the soul; it is distorted reason, as 
the examples of the deviant characters reveal, that is responsible for the flourishing of these 
desires which are directed towards what is not good and beneficial. The appetitive part, even in 
the ideal soul of the philosopher, is not seen by Plato as a destructive element to be eliminated 
as completely as possible but as a source or energy that can be directed in the right channels. 
To conclude, it seems that in the ideal embodied soul of the philosopher which 
approximates to — i f it is not actually — the ideal soul that Plato has in mind, it is only 
knowledge that can secure the harmony among the parts and bring about the justice that Plato 
suggests in Book FV. Plato's pictorial representation at 485d of the desires that are weakened in 
the face of reason's desire for learning and the truth indicates that the role of the appetitive part 
in the unified soul depends entirely on reason exercising its proper function. The appetitive 
part, although it has some motivational strength as the locus of the bodily impulses that boot 
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the fully-fledged desires, remains motivationally inactive unless it is informed and directed by 
reason. 
PART T H R E E 
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6. Knowledge and motivation in the Protagoras. 
Those dialogues that precede the Republic, such as the Protagoras, the 
Gorgias, the Meno, the Lysis, and the Symposium are often called 'early' or 
'Socratic' dialogues. The label 'Socratic' is supposed to indicate that in these 
dialogues we get what is taken to be Socrates' own view as opposed to Plato's own 
voice in dialogues like the Republic or what are called 'middle' and 'late' dialogues. 
In particular 'middle' tends to mean mainly reference to the theory of the separated 
Forms.' Another feature that can be said to characterize the so-called 'middle' 
dialogues is the tripartite, complex soul that Plato introduces, as we have seen, in R. 
IV. This latter feature indicates probably another difference between the 'early' and 
the 'middle' dialogues — where the Republic belongs according to the standard 
division — that is a difference in the theory about human motivation and desire. The 
theory of human motivation that is recognized as distinctly 'Socratic' — but may 
not be Platonic — is labelled as 'intellectualism'.^ The core thesis of this theory is 
that agent's conception of what is good for him is sufficient to motivate action. This 
motivation involves desire for what is good as well as belief about what is good or 
beneficial for the agent. In that case desire is always focused on what is best for the 
person through the person's conception of the overall good. Given the assumption 
that that the agent always aims at her/his good via a conception of what is the 
overall good for him, any failure to achieve that aim can be explained by a cognitive 
or 'intellectual' defect. The outcome of this theory is that it conceives the soul as a 
' The traditional separation of the dialogues into 'early' or 'Socratic', 'middle' and 'late', has 
recently been supported, among others, by Fine 2003: n.l to Introduction. Fine defends the view 
developed by Vlastos in Vlastos 1991: ch. 2 and 3, and it seems that for her the introduction of the 
Forms is what divides Plato from Socrates (298). 
^ See Taylor 2000: 62-63 for a brief and clear statement of his theory. 
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unified entity and rules out the existence of any desires that are not directed towards 
what is good. 
The 'Socratic' thesis can be traced in the Gorgias where at 468c2-8 Socrates 
proposes to Polus that: 
'Then we do not wish to slaughter people or expel them form our cities or deprive them of 
their property as an act in itself, but if these things are beneficial we wish (boulometha) to 
do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish (boulometha) what is 
good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, 
do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why you do not answer? 
Also in the Meno at 77dlO-e37 Socrates claims that: 
'Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they are 
supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it 
good are really desiring the good. Is not that so?' ^ 
Apart from the two aforementioned dialogues, the same can be also found in the 
Euthydemus 278e ff. where Socrates suggests that the question whether all human 
beings wish happiness {eu prattein) or not would be a 'stupid' question since there 
is nobody that does not wish happiness (278e5-279al). In Diotima's speech in the 
Symposium — a dialogue that might be considered to belong to the 'middle' group 
The view expressed in the two passages in the Meno and the Gorgias might not be exactly the 
same; in the Meno passage Plato seems to allow that some people may desire things which are bad 
believing that they are good, while in the Gorgias passage it seems the agent desires (bouletai) only 
what is good. The difference between the two passages generates the question whether the Socratic 
good it the real good or the apparent good, that is, what the agent things to be good or beneficial for 
him at the time he takes a certain course of action. See also below in the main text and n. 25. 
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i f we accept that the distinguish mark between 'early' and 'middle' are the Forms 
— we also get the idea that humans desire ultimately what is truly 'good' and 
'beautiful'. Especially at 208d f f even the sensual desire for procreation is 
presented in terms of desire or belief about what is 'good', divine, immortal and a 
state of happiness (eudaimonia) 20866." In what follows in this chapter I shall focus 
on the Protagoras and discuss whether the thesis of Socrates in the Protagoras 
about what motivates us to take a certain course of action bears some similarities 
with the picture of human motivation in the Republic that I have proposed in the 
preceding chapters of this thesis. 
At Protagoras 35le ff. Socrates is trying to reject akrasia by refuting the thesis 
of the many that someone can be overcome by pleasure or by lupen 352d9-al or 
thumon (352b7) and erota (b8). Socrates' denial of akrasia is based on a 
controversial argument where he endorses a kind of hedonism according to which 
the pleasant is the good (353c9-254e2). The soundness of the so-called hedonistic 
argument in the Protagoras and the extent to which Plato himself is committed to 
this position in the Protagoras has received great attention by scholars.^ I think, 
however, that we should not put to much weight in the notion of hedonism and 
Socrates' initial claim at 353c9 f f that pleasure is the human good. One reason why 
Socrates has chosen hedonism is possibly because hedonism is a theory of good. 
What Socrates has in his mind is probably a kind of sophisticated hedonism about 
" See also the Lysis and Penner and Rowe 2005 for a very illuminating study on how the Socratic 
'inteilectuaiism' fits in with the main theme of the dialogue. 
^ See for a detailed analysis of the steps of the Taylor 1991. For a discussion on the question whether 
or not the hedonistic view of the Protagoras is a thesis that Plato himself holds see, among others, 
Taylor and Gosling 1982: ch. 3. 
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long-term pleasures whereby the pleasant life could be identified with the happiest 
life. Another reason that Socrates endorses a kind of hedonism for his argument in 
the last part of the Protagoras might be that pleasure, which is the chief good in this 
theory, constitutes a convenient means for Socrates to show Protagoras that the 
pathos of being overcome by pleasure or passion in general, the notion of 'being 
overcome' that most people have in mind (352d4-7), is ignorance (357cl-e2) in the 
sense that someone does not know or wrongly believes that something is pleasant 
while it is not.^ At any rate it seems to me that it is not hedonism that Socrates is 
arguing for, but a theory of human motivation that he illustrates through hedonism. 
At 357cl f f Socrates draws the conclusion of his argument against akrasia by 
saying that wrong-doing is explained by defect of knowledge while, when 
knowledge is present, nothing can overcome knowledge whether this is pleasure or 
anything else. At 358b9-c3, relying on his argument so far and his claim that being 
overcome by pleasures is anything more than ignorance or intellectual error 
Socrates makes two further claims about knowledge or belief and about human 
motivation: 
'Then if, I proceeded, the pleasant is good, no one who has knowledge or thought of other 
actions as better than those he is doing, and as possible, will do as he proposes if he is free 
to do the better ones; and to be overcome is nothing but ignorance, and to master oneself is 
nothing but wisdom...Well then by ignorance do you mean having a false opinion and 
being deceived about matters of importance?' (358b8-c8) 
* See, for instance, how Socrates is trying to explain how we might go wrong about things which are 
more or less pleasant and painful at 356c ff where he claims that the same size appears larger to our 
sight when seen form close and small when it is seen from distance (c5-9). Hence, any 
misconception is explained by intellectual error. 
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'Then surely, I went on, no one willingly (hekon) goes wrong after evil or what he thinks to 
be evil; it is not in human nature (en anthrdpou phusei), apparently, to do so - to wish 
(ethelein) to go after what one things to be evil in preference to the good; and when 
compelled to choose one of two evils, nobody will choose the greater when he may choose 
the lesser' (358 c8-d5)' 
These two passages express what is at the heart of the Socratic 'intellectualism', that 
is, no one wil l willingly choose what he knows/believes to be bad. The important 
feature of the view expressed here is that nobody will ever take a certain course of 
action without taking something to be good or bad. The question that may be raised 
however, is whether the agent will do so either believing or knowing. Does Socrates 
say that someone will always choose the right action because he believes or knows 
that this is the right action or is his claim that it is only knowledge that suffices for 
this condition. In the Greek text, throughout the whole argument where Socrates 
tries to refute the view that someone can be overcome by pleasure, in some places 
he speaks of knowledge {episteme at 357a2 and 352c4), while in other places he 
mentions belief (358c7 ignorance as false doxa, d l oietai, b9- cl oute eidds oute 
oiomenos). One suggestion could be that Socrates proposes that when belief is 
strong and the agent thinks that one action x is the best action to take the agent will 
do X . On the other hand it might be argued that it is the strength of knowledge that 
suffices Socrates' claim against akrasia. 
' The translation of the quoted texts from the Protagoras is that of Lamb 1962. 
^ For the first view see Vlastos 1969: 71-88 and Walsh 1971: 235-263 who argue that strength of 
knowledge seems to be a trivial consequence of Socrates' claim on the impossibility of belief-akrasia, 
that is, the impossibility that someone will go against what he believes to be good. On the second 
interpretation see Penner 1997:117-149. Penner suggests that the Socrates' argument against akrasia 
requires knowledge and not belief For his claim Penner thinks that Socrates does not want just to say 
that 'strength resides not simply in our automatically acting on the passion what we believe or know 
synchronically, that is, at he instant of the action', but that he claims something more than that. The 
strength, according to Penner resides 'in our acting on the basis of what we believe or know 
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In the Protagoras of course, it is not clear exactly how Socrates conceives 
knowledge or the art of measurement while the investigation of the nature of this art 
is something that Socrates himself postpones at 357b6-7 for another time.^ What I 
take Socrates to claim is that human beings always act on what they believe or value 
to be good in any situation; it is the strength of their value judgements that 
motivates them to take a certain course of action that they think is best or better than 
an alternative one. Knowledge enters the picture as a kind of regulative power 
which ensures that we always hold the true value judgements about what is good 
and bad and hence we always choose the right action.'° Let us look then, at the 
passage at 356c-357d where Socrates mentions how through the art of measurement 
we avoid having holding false judgements: 
'Does the same size appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when distant? And 
it is the same with thickness and number?... And sounds of equal strength are greater when 
near, and smaller when distant?... Now if our welfare consisted in doing and choosing 
things of large dimensions, and avoiding and not doing those of small what would be our 
salvation of life (soteria tou biou)l Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of 
diachronically, that is, throughout most of the period of coming to decide and acting.. .Strength will then 
be exhibited in our intellectual grasp in the situation-in our avoiding being seduced by differing views on 
the situation that present themselves during the temporal context of the action'. The latter notion of 
strength precludes that a certain value-judgement on which we act at one certain time, say ti, may go 
against to how we would value the same action in some other given time Xi, If for example I choose to 
take that chocolate bar on the table in front of me because I believe that it will be pleasant and beneficial 
for me having it now, it is very possible that I might regret later and say that it was wrong to had the 
chocolate bar. Although at the time I got the chocolate I acted on my judgement that it was pleasant or 
good for me to have it, retrospect I might recognize that I acted on a false belief or that I was misled by 
the way that the object appeared to me as pleasant or good. Although I agree with Penner's distinction 
(above) when he argues that akrasia in the Protagoras requires knowledge and not belief, is not 
intelligible to my mind. 
' The Republic is one place that Plato takes up the task to say what is knowledge. See the similarity 
between the passage here in the Protagoras at 356c5 ff and the passage in R.X. where Plato presents 
measurement and calculation as the mean that can help people to escape the mistakes caused by the 
way that things presented to them through the senses. See also chapter one in this thesis. 
At this point I am close to Taylor 1991: 190-192 who relies on the passage at 356c ff and suggests 
that the art of measurement, unlike the power of appearance, provides some consistency to the bulk 
of our beliefs or as I suggest makes our judgements true and somehow stable. 
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appearance? It is not the latter that leads us astray {eplana), as we saw, and many times 
makes us to view the things in different ways and to have to change our minds both in our 
conduct and in our choice of great and small? Whereas the art of measurement would have 
made this appearance ineffective (akuron epoiesen), and by showing us the truth would 
have brought peace (hesuchian) in the soul by abiding it to the truth and would have saved 
our life...it is from the defect of knowledge {epislemes endeia) that people make mistakes 
in their choices of pleasures and pains-that is, in the choice of good and bad'. 
We see that the art of measurement is presented as a kind of rational evaluation 
through which people can escape the effect of the deceptive appearances and reach 
true judgements, whether they are judgements about objects of the external world or 
value judgements about the good and the bad. Knowledge as an art of measurement 
implies that all our judgements at any given time are the result of measurement and 
calculation. I f one knows something one cannot have one belief now and another 
one later. Knowledge precludes all kinds of false appearances including false 
appearances of good and bad or - on Socrates' identification — pleasant and 
painful. In that case knowledge of what is good or bad implies that all the particular 
judgements that motivate action are the result of reflection and thorough thinking. I f 
all the particular judgements are tied down by what Socrates calls calculation and 
measurement then someone will avoid having one belief at the time that he acts and 
another belief after the action that contradicts the earlier one. While our beliefs and 
our value judgements are unstable and change according to various perspectives that 
we adopt from time to time, they become stable when they are organized and shaped 
by knowledge or the art of measurement and calculation. It is only the science of 
measurement that can secure that all our beliefs will be true ones at any given time 
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and at any situation." Thus, to say that someone has knowledge is to say that 
someone's judgemental commitments never remain unattested and unjustified so 
that the person holds now one belief and later on another one that may contradict the 
first.We may assume then that according to Socrates to have knowledge is to be 
in possession of a regulative and organizing principle that promotes a certain state 
of the soul.'^ When the person is in that state of 'knowing', that is, all his beliefs 
are justified and are tied together by reasoning then the person will always choose in 
any situation what he believes/knows to be good. On this account of knowledge and 
the way that our judgements are related to knowledge and become stable, any case 
of akrasia or any case that someone goes against his/her better judgement is a 
certain kind of ignorance, in the sense that the person acts on a false value 
judgement or appearance that he adopted uncritically and unreflectively. 
Socrates suggests in the same passage that when the soul through knowledge 
is abiding in the truth, peace of mind is achieved. But why, according to Socrates 
does knowledge promote peace of mind or what does Socrates mean by peace? We 
" In an earlier chapter of this thesis (chapter five) I have implied that the knowledge of the Good in 
the Republic can be viewed as a way through which the person can achieve some kind of order in 
his/her own life. This order is related to the aggregate of the mental and the physical events of human 
life. In the formation of the judgements the order can be achieved in so far the person can secure that 
he holds the same beliefs about certain things or state of affairs over time and he is not deceived by 
the way that things appear in any particular situation. 
This is what Plato probably means in Meno 97e2-98aI0 when he says that true beliefs {hai doxai 
ha; aletheis) are not worth so much until the are fastened and they become episteme and stable. Here 
in the Meno, as well as in the Protagoras, Plato does not necessarily draw any ontological distinction 
between knowledge and belief A true belief that is fastened becomes knowledge in the sense that a 
strong justification for the truth of the belief is provided. Although now we can call it knowledge it 
still remains a true belief with an account or logos, as it is suggested in the later Theaetetus. My 
intenrion here is not to imply an answer to the question how belief or true belief and knowledge 
differ. I just wanted to mark that when Plato is using the two terms he does not necessarily imply that 
we have to do with two cognitive states that are strictly different epistemologically and ontologically. 
It is Plato's metaphysics and especially the introduction of the Forms, in the Republic, that has 
created problem in the distincrion between the two. But even in the Republic Book V, for instance, 
where Plato attempts to define knowledge and to separate it from belief it is not clear at all what is 
the distinguish mark between them. See also the Theaetetus where in the end of the dialogue the 
question what is knowledge remains open, while at the same time it seems that true belief plus logos 
might be said to be something very close to knowledge. 
The idea of knowledge that I express here as a regulative and organizing force is close to what 
Heda Segvic suggests in Segvic 2000: 1-45. 
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could say that there is no peace in the soul in so far as the person's judgements are 
changing and sometimes contradict each other something, and this creates a kind of 
confusion within the soul. We have seen that not all people think in the same way 
and judge things in the same way. Most people are deceived by the way that things 
appear to them and end up with false beliefs or appearances. But peace of mind 
seems to imply something more. Recall the way that the many may argue for 
akrasia: 
'often, although iaiowledge is present in the human beings, whet rules is not knowledge but 
something else; sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, sometimes love 
{erotaf* or fear; they think that knowledge is dragged around by all these just like a slave' 
(352b5-cl). 
Socrates' claim in his argument against akrasia implies that when we are supposed 
to be overcome by these feelings what overcomes us is false judgement about what 
is pleasant and the feeling. Apart fi-om that and most importantly, as the passage at 
358c8-d5 suggests, what motivates us towards action is not how we feel but how we 
evaluate something or the way that something is presented to us. Sometimes 
Socrates is said to reduce desires to mere beliefs, but I do not think that this could 
be the case. Although Socrates does not say anything in the Protagoras about the 
nature of our desires and especially our bodily desires he could not have thought 
that desires like thirst or hunger are just beliefs either false or true ones. I f this was 
the way that Socrates — or Plato at the time he was writing the Protagoras — was 
thinking about our bodily desires, then he would have left out the physical event that 
''' C f Phaedrus at 238a-b where eros is used as a generic term for desires like hunger and the rest 
that are normally associated with bodily pleasures. 
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is included in any instance of a bodily desire like thirst and hunger. Socrates 
however, does not have to say that every time that we feel thirsty we experience 
nothing at all or that we are not already experiencing a kind of inclination towards 
drinking which is not a belief. Socrates could have thought of the nature of our 
bodily desires in the following way: this kind of inclination is related to bodily pains 
or pleasant sensations that we experience. When we are thirsty, for instance, we 
already feel attracted to the pleasure that comes from fulfilment. This inclination or 
physical force however, does not motivate us to act, but gives rise to a value 
judgement according to which we take something, say a glass of water in front of 
us, to be pleasant. It is the value judgement that something is pleasant that will 
motivate us to get the glass of water. The fiilly-fledged desire of thirst is neither 
simply a belief nor a pure inclination but is the way that we take something to be 
pleasant or whatever under the influence of experiencing a certain inclination. 
One objection to my interpretation of how Socrates may think about desires 
and emotions could be that this is highly speculative. However, I cannot see 
anything that would prevent us from thinking that this was what Socrates was 
thinking about bodily desires and emotion. Consider the analogy between false 
visual appearances and desires. In the passage quoted above we are told that we 
form false visual beliefs when we see things fi-om a distance and not very clearly. 
What gives rise in that case to our false belief that something is small is our sight or 
the effect of that the motion of perception has on us. This is not to say that sight for 
instance, is false but that the motion of sight may give rise to a false appearance.'^  
By the same token, the physical force that we experience when we are thirsty or 
hungry or in general the way that we 'feel' in relation to something gives rise to a 
" On the idea that perception is a kind of irrational motion of the soul actually of the lower parts of 
the soul see Tim. 43c4-7. 
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belief according to which we take something to be pleasant, for instance, though it 
might not be. Thus, our desires, even our bodily or physical desires always involve 
some kind of evaluation about the objects and it is on this evaluation or on value-
judgement that we act and not on the mere inclination or the physical force that we 
experience. Some further support that this is probably how Socrates conceives 
emotions in the Protagoras comes for the definition of fear at 358d5-7. Socrates 
defines fear as prosdokian tina kakou. I f by prosdokian Socrates means a belief 
about something then this belief seems to be the result of a finghtening experience 
that either we have now or in the fiiture and the way that we feel towards that 
experience.'^ 
Once this objection has been met and my suggestion about how Socrates 
would think about the desires and the emotions is accepted, peace of mind does not 
result only from the fact that knowledge precludes in general false and sometimes 
contradictory beliefs or appearances, but also fi-om the fact that it also precludes 
those false value-judgements that are involved in, or are part of, our desires. In that 
sense, knowledge regulates our desires through the conditioning of our value 
judgements by removing the false evaluative appearances and letting fully-fledged 
desires which are not for something good — or better in that case for something 
really good — to rise. This kind of regulafion here does not necessarily mean the 
'coercion' of our ftilly-fledged desires when they arise, but it rather means that 
under the rule of knowledge we allow those desires that involve true value 
judgements. Someone who possesses knowledge will not have desires for something 
The idea of the passion of fear as the expectation of something frightfiil that is expressed in this 
passage is very similar to how the Stoics define passions. See e.g. Stobaeus 2.881 8-90 and Galen 
PHP 4.2.1-6. The way however, that I have chosen to describe how a fully-fledged emotion or desire 
comes about is closer to Posidonius account as it presented by Galen PHP 5.5. See also chapter two 
where I claim that we might consider the appetites of the appetitive part of the soul in R. IV to be 
something very close to the 'affective motions' of Posidonius. 
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which is not good since he/will never hold false evaluative appearances and act on 
them. At the same time, my suggestion of how probably Socrates thinks about 
desires and emotions in the Protagoras reveals something about how he conceives 
the soul. Although the soul is presented as unified and without having parts in the 
way that the soul is presented in Republic IV, Socrates does not deny some kind of 
heterogeneity. This heterogeneity can be seen as heterogeneity in the ways that 
people normally take things to be or judge. Not all of them judge in the same way 
and some of them make mistakes or hold false judgements. I f we come now to those 
value-judgements that are involved in our desires and especially our physical ones 
and motivate us to act, the different ways that we value things is the result of the 
effect that a physical force has on us that is the inclinations that we experience in 
relation to pleasant sensations or bodily pains and so on.'^ Peace of mind then might 
mean that the person who possesses knowledge wil l never be motivated by a desire 
towards something in which he will regret later or will never experience fear or any 
other emotion at a great extent though he should not. 
II 
I f knowledge promotes a certain state in the soul, that is a state where all the 
practical judgements are organized and tied together in such a way that the person 
always holds the right value-judgements and consequently desires what is good or 
in that case what is really good. Thus, it seems that in the light of Socrates' claim 
that knowledge is virtue, only the virtuous who possess knowledge hold true value 
judgements and desire always the real good. I f this is what Socrates claims, then his 
" All these inclinations can be identified with a 'desiderative' aspect on us, though this 'aspect' in 
the Protagoras is not described as part of a divided soul in the way that it appears in Republic IV. 
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thesis is not that far from the Platonic thesis in the Republic that only the 
philosopher aims at what is really good. In the Republic (see also chapter five) only 
the philosopher through knowledge of the Good achieves true harmony among the 
parts of the soul and all the desires of the soul — which in that case belong to the 
soul as whole and not to each part of it — are directed towards what is really good. 
Similarly the virtuous person in the Protagoras always desires what is truly good 
when all his value-judgements are shaped by the rule of knowledge.'* The 
harmonious state of the soul in the Republic under the rule of reason could be 
identified with this state of peace and equanimity that the virtuous man achieves in 
the Protagoras. In that case, knowledge both in the Republic and in the Protagoras 
has a normative fiinction; in the Protagoras as I have suggested, the normative 
function has to do with the regulation of all the particular judgements so that these 
judgements are always true. In the Republic the knowledge has to do with the 
fulfilment of the 'needs' of its part of the soul and the soul as a whole.'' 
Knowledge in the Protagoras has all this motivating force that leads the 
person to wards what is truly good in each case. Against this view Penner^° suggests 
that for Socrates, like Hume, knowledge or reason is inert and that it does not have 
any motivating force. According to Penner it is only the desire for the good — and 
actually the desire for the real good — that motivates us. I cannot see why exactly 
Penner wishes to deny any motivating force to knowledge. One obvious reason that 
" For a similarity between the notion of the reasoning part in the Republic as the ruling part and 
knowledge as a regulative principle within the person in the Protagoras see the passage at 352c4-7 
where Socrates claims that: 'knowledge {episteme) is something noble and able to govern man 
{archein ton ant/iropou), and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be 
overcome {kratethenai) by anything to act otherwise as knowledge rules (keleuei), but knowledge is 
a sufficient aid for mankind' 
" Note that in the Republic when the reasoning part has knowledge this knowledge is not beneficial 
only for the right flourishing of the lower parts, but also for the right function of the reasoning part 
itself, in the sense that the reasoning part will never have false appearances or beliefs. This why Plato 
says that when reason has knowledge it takes care of each part of the soul including itself (442c4-7). 
See above n. 10 
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he does so is because he reserves all the motivating force for the desire. I shall 
return to this point in a moment. Another reason, according to what Penner 
maintains elsewhere,^' is that the strength of knowledge especially, in the Republic, 
is not what conditions our desires and emotions and thus, what motivates us to 
action. This is not to say, according to Penner, that the person who has knowledge 
can go wrong, but that he does not go wrong it is the result of the training of the 
emotions and the desires and the acquisition of true beliefs through the first stages 
of education and well before the philosopher acquires knowledge. In chapter five of 
this thesis I have argued that this might not be the case as the desires — or the 
appetites of the appetitive part of the soul — are not educated as such, but only 
through reason. The philosopher then will never form wrong desires as a result of 
his/her knowledge and not through the training of the appetitive part of the soul. 
Knowledge of course, as I understand it in the Republic, and also here in the 
Protagoras, is not just an epistemological cognitive state which is about something 
e.g. geometry, mathematics or the Forms. It is also a cognitive state through which 
human beings, as the passage at 356d9-e3 in the Protagoras suggests, can organize 
and shape their lives in the appropriate way. What motivates action in that case is 
not knowledge, i f this is understood as theoretical knowledge, but our pracfical 
value judgements that are shaped by knowledge. 
Let me return now to the desire for the good. In the Protagoras and the 
whole argument against akrasia Socrates does not mention desire, at least explicitly, 
and he does so only at 358 c8-d5 {ethelein d2) where his argument against akrasia is 
completed. In this passage however desire is mentioned along with belief and 
Socrates is saying that no one wants or wishes to do what thinks to be evil. It seems 
'^ See Penner 1992: 130 and n. 33. 
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to me that in the Protagoras Socrates does make — as he might be said to make — 
two claims, that is, one claim about the link between thought either knowledge or 
belief and action and another claim about desire. It seems to me that he makes one 
claim, that is, a claim about how we are motivated towards action; in this claim 
desire and thought are strongly related since desire or better fully-fledged desire 
always involves belief or value judgement. The supposition that the claims are two 
and not one might derive from the failure to understand how Socrates in the context 
of Protagoras would have thought about physical desires such as hunger and thirst. 
Let me put my point more clearly. I f Socrates makes one claim about motivation 
relating thought and action by saying that we always choose the action that we 
believe — either rightly or wrongly — to be best, then he has to claim that all the 
desires that we experience like thirst, hunger and the rest which also motivate us to 
act should be for the good. Socrates would have to do so i f he had thought of these 
desires as passions or pure inclinations. But, as I have suggested above, to have a 
fully-fledged, even a physical desire, towards something means that we already take 
something to be in certain way or we have already valued something as pleasant, 
good or bad. So Socrates does not have to say that thirst or hunger, being fully-
fledged desires, are for something good or pleasant; this is part of what he claims 
about human motivation.^^ It is in that sense that, unlike Penner, I think that all 
motivating power belongs to knowledge or to belief 
On this assumption the view that emerges from Socrates' thesis about human 
motivation is a thesis about the 'good-dependence' of all our desires even our bodily 
The view that our emotions and our fully-fledged desires are in their nature something totally 
different from the way that we think things to be or we know things to be is something that derives 
from David Hume's famous dictum 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave pf passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' {Treatise 415). But well before Hume 
the Stoics (see also note 16) and well before them Socrates — and as I have suggested Plato — had 
argued for another view. 
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ones. In saying that all our desires are good-dependent Socrates would mean that all 
our desires conform and derive fi"om our considered view of where our good lies. 
This is something that is made clear, in my view, in the Protagoras and Socrates' 
statement about human motivation. Let us take the example of someone that has a 
desire for a glass of wine. Since this a bodily desire i f we apply the mechanism of 
these desires that I have suggested above, the fully-fledged desire for the wine is a 
combination of a physical force, that is, an inclination or a feeling of excitement in 
the sight of a glass of wine and the value judgement to which the inclination gives 
rise according to which we take the wine to be something pleasant. I f we assume 
that the person is a hedonist and acts on his/her desire for the glass of wine, he has 
acted on his/her 'better judgement' of what is most pleasant or best to do. Even i f 
the agent recognizes later that to take that glass of wine was painful because of a 
discomfort that he experiences, at the time of the action he acted in accordance with 
his considered view about his overall good.^ ^ Socrates in the Protagoras, would say 
that the person did so because he did not actually know what was really pleasant. It 
is in that sense that Socrates has described any case of apparent akrasia as 
ignorance or as he says at 357e3 'the greatest ignorance' (amathia he megiste)}^ 
According to the Socratic theory of human motivation that we get in the Protagoras 
the strength of motivation resides in what the agent believes or knows. When 
Socrates claims that no one wil l ever do something that he knows or believes to be 
wrong he implies that there is nothing stronger that can motivate human beings 
" This rests on the assumption that at the time of action we always act according to a value-
judgement that is involved in the desire. Even if the value-judgement is false at the time of action it 
is for us the 'best judgement'; simply we did not know that in the end it was not. In the case of the 
virtuous however who has knowledge false value-judgements never arise and hence the virtuous 
never has desires for something which is not really good. 
See the analogy between the megiste amathia here in the Protagoras which is ignorance of what is 
really good — or really pleasant in hedonism — with the megiston mahtema in Republic at 505a2 
which the knowledge of the Good or what is really good. 
146 
other then their beliefs or their knowledge. The strength of an opposite desire is 
ruled out since on the picture of desire that Socrates probably has in mind — and I 
have described — every desire involves a value judgement or to put in another way 
to desire something means that we take something to be in a certain way, or to have 
a value judgement or appearance. Thus, it seems to me that at least in the 
Protagoras there is not a universal desire for what is good or really good that 
motivates action. What motivates us is a cognitive state either belief or knowledge. 
In that sense we might say that any instance of 'wanting' or 'desiring' is state of 
'knowing' or 'believing'. I f now the soul is in that state of knowing where all 
beliefs are shaped and are organised by the power of knowledge and become true 
beliefs or value judgements any instance of'desiring' is for the real good. 
This entails that everyone wants or desires to go after what he values or 
judges to be good. But apart from the real virtuous person who desires the real good 
the rest desire the apparent good. One word first about the distinction between the 
two. To desire the good might mean to desire either what is really good or what we 
think to be good although it is not. The latter means that when we want something 
we want it under a certain description; hence what we want is the apparent good 
what we think that is good and the real good or what we really wanted. On the other 
hand to desire the real good suggests that we always want what is really good no 
matter i f we mistakenly want something which is not the real good or what we 
really wanted.^^ Here in the Protagoras at least it does not appear that Socrates 
suggests that what all human beings want or desire is the real good. First Socrates' 
" On the apparent good see Santas 1964: 153-154. Santas draws a distinction between actual and 
intended objects of desire. According to this distinction the actual object of one's desire, that is, the 
object to which the desire is actually directed, is not the same with the intended object, that is, the 
object that the person actually wanted to acquire; the latter is identified with the real good. Penner 
and Rowe:1993:l-2 n. 2 deny this distinction and maintain that the actual object of the desire is 
always the real good. 
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claim is much more about the link between thought and action and less about 
desires. Second the important thesis against the many who might suggest that there 
is such a phenomenon as 'being overcome' by pleasure or any other passion, is that 
what overcomes us is a false belief or ignorance and not the passion itself or the 
physical force that is involved in the passion. I f we take now the claim at 358 c8-d5 
as a general claim about human nature, what we are told is that is not in human 
nature {en anthropou phusei dl-2) to wish or to desire to go after what one thinks to 
be bad or i f we reverse it that everyone desires what he things is good. On the 
assumption that not all the people have true value judgements not all of them desire 
what is really good.^^ 
I f this is what Socrates claims about human motivation in the Protagoras his 
view might not be that far form the Platonic view in the Republic. First of all in both 
dialogues, as I have already suggested, the wise person never goes wrong since he 
posses knowledge and desires only what is really good. The question is what 
happens with the rest of people that are not philosophers in the Republic or not 
virtuous in the Protagoras. According to the picture of human motivation in the 
Protagoras they desire what they think is really good at the time of action. Their 
desires then are not always for the real good but sometimes they might be for the 
On the idea that in the 'Socratic'dialogues all desires are for the real good and not only the desires 
of the virtuous see Penner 1992: 122. This is an idea that Penner suggests also in Penner 1997: 117-
149 and Penner 1971: 96-118. Rowe and Penner also hold this claim in Penner and Rowe 1993: 1-25 
and in Penner and Rowe 2005: esp. ch. 10 and 11. The view that what motivates human beings is the 
desire for what is really good in any situation might be supported by the Meno passage at 77d7-e4 
where Socrates claims that 'those who are ignorant of them (sic. bad) and think them good really 
desire good things'. However, this might not be what the passage says. Santas 1964: 152-156 
provides one interpretation according to which what is desired by the person is not what is really 
good, but what the person conceives or describes as good (see also the previous footnote). According 
to Santas the good things are the intended and the real objects of the desire. For the opposite 
interpretation according to which the good things are the real good things see Penner and Rowe 
1993: 1-25.At any rate the passage in the Meno is highly controversial and my intuition is that any 
interpretation cannot rely so much on the passage itself, but has to do with the general view that 
someone adopts about the Socratic thesis. For the sake of my argument in this thesis I follow Santas' 
view. See Penner and Rowe 2005: esp. ch. 10 and 11 who have argued recently that the idea of the 
real good can be also found in the Lysis. See also Gorgias 467c5-468e5 where, according one 
interpretation, Socrates is supposed to say that we want only things which are really good. 
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apparent good; all their desires however are good-dependent in the way that I have 
described. So even i f they go after something which is really good, they do so 
unwillingly.^^ Does Plato say something similar about the non-philosophers or the 
unjust types in the Republic? It is true that the infroduction of the parts of the soul 
in Republic book IV makes the picture of human motivation much more 
complicated than it is in the Protagoras. However, as I have tried to argue in earlier 
chapters of this thesis, we do not have to assume that Plato necessarily rejects 
Socrates' general claim abut human motivation as it is expressed in the Protagoras. 
He does not reject the view that human beings act on what they think is best to do in 
any given situation. The picture in the Republic is more complicated not so much 
because Plato divides the soul, but because in the light of the Form of the Good he 
offers a more detailed account of how someone comes to hold false beliefs or to be 
ignorant. In the Protagoras we have seen that Socrates illustrates ignorance through 
his example of the false visual judgements that people may hold in some cases, but 
he does not say why some people hold these beliefs in the first place or better why 
they cannot shape their beliefs according to the art of measurement. The unjust 
types in the Republic fail to hold true beliefs or to have knowledge because they 
lack an appropriate education of the reasoning part of the soul that wi l l ultimately 
make them to turn their thoughts towards what is really good for them.^^ Having a 
weak intellect they are unable to organize their beliefs and their desires in the light 
of what is really good for them in each case as the philosopher does. The divided 
soul in the Republic emphasizes how apparent the heterogeneity of the soul in the 
" Note that at 358c8-d3 Socrates says that 'no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks {ha 
oietai kaka) evils'. This indicates that only someone who has belief and not knowledge might go 
wrong and if so he goes wrong unwillingly .The virtuous man who possesses knowledge or has 
always true beliefs never goes wrong. 
See for instance 554b2-4 where Plato suggests that the oligarch values money and fortune because 
his thoughts have not been shaped by education. 
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Protagoras can become when the person becomes a slave of his passions and his 
desires as a result of false beliefs and lack of knowledge. 
There is of course one difference between the Protagoras and the Republic. 
Since Plato has introduced an appetitive part of the soul where all the inclinations or 
the urges are located^^ these inclinations can go against knowledge or belief as the 
case of Leontius indicates and motivate action without any consideration of what is 
good. I have argued^° however, that although this is something that results fi-om 
Plato's division of the soul the case of Leontius is an extreme compulsive case '^ and 
this is not how people normally are motivated towards action. At the same time my 
claim was that Plato would consider that such actions are done unwillingly just as 
Socrates thinks that people go wrong unwillingly. Socrates provides a general 
theory of human motivation that explains how action is motivated and emphasizes 
the role and the motivating strength that knowledge or true belief have in this 
theory. It is true however, that there might be cases that are not explicable by this 
theory, like the specific case of Leontius. But on the assumption that what we get 
in the Protagoras is a theory of motivation according to human nature the fact that 
we may find some extreme and 'unnatural' cases that are not explained by the 
Socratic theory does not mean that the theory is not valid. 
In the Protagoras Socrates, offers a picture of motivation where knowledge 
as an organizing force has the most important role. Ultimately it is knowledge that 
will motivate the virtuous towards what is really good in any particular case and at 
'^ See chapter two, where I argue that the simple desires of the appetitive part are physical forces or 
inclinations but not yet fully-fledged desires. 
See chapter three. 
•" Santas 1966: 32-33 has argued in those cases that a feeling or a desire overcome in strength 
knowledge and belief we have to do with compulsion. I have referred to Santas' suggestion and I 
have explained the case of Leontius as a case of compulsion. (See chapter three). My difference with 
Santas is that what I take to overcome belief and knowledge in strength in the case of Leontius is not 
a fully-fledged desire by what I call a physical force or a simple desire or an inclination. 
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this point there is no contradiction or inconsistency between the Protagoras and the 
Republic. At the same time Socrates claims that all desires involve value 
judgements and are good-dependent in the sense that everyone desires what is 
thought or believed to be good at the time of the action something that probably is 
also what Plato believed at the time he was writing the Republic. What is important, 
in my view, is that in the heart of the so called Socratic 'intellectualism', as it 
emerges at least in the Protagoras and as I understand it, is the power of knowledge 
or what Plato would say in the context of the Republic the power of the reasoning 
part having knowledge of the Good. Under the rule of knowledge all our mental and 
physical events are instances of knowledge and are shaped by reference to what is 
really good. It is true however, that not all people have knowledge and not all of 
them are virtuous or become philosophers. Maybe in the Protagoras Socrates — or 
Plato in his early writings — is more optimistic about human nature and its 
intellectual achievements and he may 'allow' that more i f not all people can become 
virtuous than Plato believed in the Republic. This might explain, as I have already 
suggested, why in the Republic we get the series of the unjust souls and the divided 
soul; Plato's pessimism about people's capacity to attain knowledge and their 
attachment to false beliefs and appearances is expressed through a divided soul; the 
less someone approaches knowledge and remains tied to wrong beliefs and 
appearances the more fragmented he becomes. 
However, as I have tried to suggest in the preceding chapters and of this 
thesis, Plato in the Republic could also accept that wrongdoing is unwilling. This is 
so at 412-413 in the Republic where he argues that people are deprived of their true 
beliefs and form false ones unwillingly; hence when they act on these false beliefs 
and go wrong they do so unwillingly. Even in those dramatic cases of human action 
151 
like that illustrated by the story of Leontius Plato — and presumably Socrates — 
could have said that did not actually want to do what he did. 
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